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ABSTRACT
This thesis is based on a historical study investigating and
comparing the development of industrial relations in Iraq, Egypt
and Syria. These particular countries were chosen because they
share similar historical and cultural backgrounds and because they
have undergone similar political, economic and social changes. At
the beginning of the period of this study, they were all under
foreign control, then they were governed by semi-feudal-semi-
capitalist regimes "traditional systems" and at present by nationalist
regimes.
The evidence suggests that industrial relations in the three
countries are the product of political changes and of the socio¬
economic environment in whioh they developed. The industrial
relations during the foreign administrations in the three countries
emerged and developed in accordance with the policies of the foreign
administrators. Although their economic policies were an important
factor in the emergence of the industrial labour force and subsequently
the emergence of organised labour, they paid little attention to
labour legislation or to improvements in the social conditions of
workers.
Under the traditional systems the general policy which was adopted
was biased towards employers. 'lhe monarchist regime in Iraq
discouraged labour organisations and severely restricted their
( iii)
(iv)
activities. Trade unions were encouraged under the monarchy in
Egypt, but their activities were restricted, and employers
resisted recognising them. In Syria, semi-constitutional
management labour relations were maintained in which the dominance
of employers was kept intact.
The nationalist regimes in the three countries adopted a socialist
ideology and increased their intervention in industrial relations.
They favoured labour and encouraged trade unionism, introduced
comprehensive labour legislation and played a major role in esta¬
blishing industrial relations rules. Under these regimes, the
influence of private employers in dominating industrial relations
practices has been greatly diminished while that of the management
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents an attempt to collect, evaluate and compare
information on the development of industrial relations in Iraq., Egypt
and Syria which has not previously been assembled systematically.
The main objective has been to examine the impact of changes in the
political systems and in the economic and social conditions on the
industrial relations in the three countries. The method adopted
is descriptive and emphasises the study of formal institutions of
industrial relations as this <^-emed to me a reasonable approach in
view of the little present knowledge available on the development
of industrial relations in the Middle East.
Iraq, Egypt and Syria were chosen because they share similar historical
and cultural backgrounds, and because they have undergone similar
political, economic and social changes. At the beginning of the
period of this study, they were all under foreign control, then
they were governed by semi-feudal-semi-capitalist regimes (which I
decided to call the "traditional systems"), and finally by regimes
which I decided to call the "nationalist systems", a term I used to
distinguish it from the preceding- stage. In Iraq and Egypt the
"traditional regimes" were overthrown by the army to establish
"nationalist regimes", whereas in Syria the change came about through
the country*s unification with Egypt. This similarity in background
has facilitated the investigation and has made it possible to
compare the effect of these changes on industrial relations practices
and institutions.
The three countries, for instance, have undergone almost similar-
stages of industrialisation. They are also the leading Arab
1
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countries where government intervention in economic activities (and
industrial relations) is becoming dominant. It was possible to
investigate and compare the impact of government economic policies on
state-management-labour relations, to explore the differences in the
practices and approaches and to put forward possible explanations for
the differences. Social conditions in each of the three countries
have also changed in line with the political and economic change.
This made it possible to examine and compare the inpact of social
changes on industrial relations practices in the three countries.
The basic plan for looking at the subject of the development of
industrial relations has followed the traditional approach of early
books on British industrial relations, used by the so-called insti¬
tutional or Oxford school. This approach is used by Flanders and
Clegg in the book, The System of Industrial Relations in Great
Britain. (1) which emphasised the study of the formal institutions of
industrial relations and which has sometimes been referred to as a
pioneering book. Their method "has been seen as essentially
descriptive, not following any particular discipline of the social
sciences".(2)
Only in subsequent writings on industrial relations in Britain, after
the earlier work had assembled this type of basic material, did authors
begin to turn to new and more critical evaluations of the subject
matter of industrial relations and to embark on the search for a theory
(1) See Flanders, A. and Clegg, H.A., The System of Industrial
Relations in Great Britain; its history . law and institutions,
"[siackwell, Oxford, 195U)»
(2) Goodman, J.F.B., Armstrong, E.G.A., Wagner, A., Davis, J.E., and
Wood, S.J., "Rules in Industrial Relations Theory: A Discussion",
Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.6, No.1 (Spring 1975)> P»1U»
of industrial relations. (1) In my view knowledge about industrial
relations in the Middle East has not yet reached this further stage
of development.
It would have been difficult to use the concept of Arab Socialism as
a framework for the analysis adopted in this thesis for two reasons.
Firstly, this study is concerned with the development of industrial
relations under three successive but totally different political
regimes in each of the three countries, and it was only under the
nationalist regimes that Arab Socialism emerged as the basis of their
economic policies. Secondly, not only did the nationalist regimes
in the three countries each adopt a different version of socialism, but
this was also true of the socialist groups within each country which
influenced governmental policies. The views of these groups ranged
from mild state intervention to extreme radicalism and in addition
it changed with political circumstances. Only the Ba'th Party in
Iraq (which came to power in 1968) adopted a clear socialist ideology
and pursued firm socialist policies.
These differences mean that it j not possible to use the concept
of Arab Socialism as a frame of reference for this study.
In a historical analysis, published and unpublished studies and
reports provide the main research material. However, the sources
available were very scarce. For example, only eleven relevant
studies of industrial relations as such have been undertaken by
researchers. Seven of these were concerned with specific aspects
(1) For an account of the increasing concern for the theoretical
development of industrial relations, see Ibid, particularly
pp.15-17* The paper, however, is mainly concerned with discussing
the "rules approach" initiated by J.T. Dunlop and adopted by
Flanders in Britain.
of industrial relations in individual countries(l), while the other
four studies were of a comparative nature. (2) The rest of the
research material had to he collected from government statistics and
reports,from trade unions and employer documents, and from studies
and reports whioh do not deal direotly with industrial relations.
(1) See Tellew, F.H., Labor Unions in Iraq. (M.A. Thesis,
University of Southern California, 1954)? Al-Jader, K.,
Labour Organisations in Iran. (D.Phil Thesis, University of
Sussex, 1973)? Nabulsi, H.M.S., Labor Organisation and
Development in Syria. 1946-1958. (Ph.D Thesis, Georgetown
University, 19^0;; Kassm, M.R., Nationalization of the Syrian
Textile Industry with Special Reference to Labor Behavior.
(Ph.D Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1968)5 Kamel, I.A.,
The Impact of Nasser's Regime on Labor Relations in Egypt.
(Ph.D Thesis, University of Michigan, 1970); Mansour, M.B.,
*Hie Development of the Industrial Relations System in Egypt.
(Ph.D Thesis, New York University, 1972)? and Elsayed, M.S.E.,
Worker Participation in Management in the Experience of the
Arab Republic of Egypt. (D.B.A. Thesis. George Washington-"
University, 1972).
(2) See Salim, S.A.K., Political Significance of Labor
Conditions in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Labanon.
(Ph.D Thesis, University of Southern California, 1958)?
Al-Habib, M.M., A Study of the Social. Political. Economic
and Cultural Institutions and the Labor Movement in the
Middle East. (Ph.D Thesis. University of Wisconsin. 1964);
Legget, C.J., Role of Government in Labour Relations in the
Arab Countries"of the Middle East. (M.So Thesis. Bradford
University, 1971)? and Haseeb, K.A., Musahaaat Al-ummal
Fi Al-idara* Pi * I-watan Al-'Arabi; Dirasa' Muqarana',
(Worker Participation in Management in Arab Countries:
A Comparative Study), (Dar Al-Talia', Beirut, 1971)•
(in Arabic).
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Because most of this material was so difficult to obtain, I paid a
visit to the International Labour Office (lLO) in Geneva to consult
evidence which the Office had collected and allowed me to use and to
consult ILO experts. I also corresponded with, and sought advice
from, scholars and experts with experience in the field of
industrial relations in the Middle East. Additional data had to be
obtained orally. For this purpose I visited Iraq, Egypt and Syria
and conducted open-ended interviews and discussions with a number of
trade union officials, members of the boards of employers' associations
and officials of the ministries of labour.
Although some of the literature is written in English and some in
French, most of the published and unpublished material is written in
Arabic and had to be translated by me. The Arabic version of the
titles in a romanised form as well as their English translation are
included in the bibliography.
To avoid confusion and to use a systematic procedure, I have made a
distinction in the bibliography between books, articles and periodicals,
and governmental and official documents. I have also distinguished
between published and unpublished material, all of which are
classified in accordance with the author.
Chapter 1 of the thesis deals with the political, economic and
social development in Iraq, Egypt and Syria, as a historical
background to the study of the development of industrial relations
in these countries.
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Chapter 2 describes the development of trade unionism in each of the
three countries.
Chapter 3 examines trade union membership and formal structure
under the present nationalist systems in the three countries.
Chapter U describes the development of the role of employers and
of employers* associations in each country.
Chapter 5 deals with the development of the role of the state in
industrial relations in each of the three countries.
Chapter 6 deals with collective bargaining and industrial disputes
in each country.
Chapter ^ describes the development of worker participation schemes
and examines the present schemes of worker participation in the
three countries.
Comparison and evaluation are presented as a summary and conclusion
section at the end of each of chapters 1 to 7 and in a brief summary
found on the last page of each of these chapters.
Chapter 8 summarises final conclusions
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO TUB DEVELOPMENT OF
IIIDTISTRIAL RELATIONS IN IRAQ. EGYPT AMD SYRIA
i
The main purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyse the
political, economic and social developments in Iraq, Egypt and
Syria since these countries have become separate political
entities under the foreign administrations. This information is
a necessary historical background to the analysis of the




Iraq is situated in the eastern part of Arabia, and covers a
total area of 438,446 square kilometers. In 1974 the
estimated population of the country was just under 11 million.
The majority of the population are Arab Moslems. In addition
there exist various other ethnic and religious minorities. (1)
(a) Political Development (1920-1976)
Upfor thq British Mpndat? (lgffH?32). Within a week of the
declaration of the First World War, the British invaded Iraq.
(1) Minorities include Kurds (Moslems by religion) who constitute
about 1j$ of the population, Turcomans, Persians, Sabaeans,
Assyrians, Armenians, Yazidis and Jews. Christians (mostly Arabs)
make about 5$ of the population.
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Direct British control was maintained, in Iraq from 1917 to 1920,
and in April 1920, Iraq was declared a British Mandatory .rea.(l)
In August 1921, the country was reconstituted as a constitutional
parliamentary monarchy guided by Britain under the Mandate.
Faisal, son of Husein of the Hejaz, recently expelled by the
French from Syria, was proclaimed King of Iraq as a result of
British pressure.(2) In practice, the country was governed by
a group of aristocratic ministers and the ruling Monarch under the
influence of the British High Commissioner and British advisers.
Nationalist pressures in Iraq convinced Britain that she could
better maintain her interests in Iraq through a treaty which
provided for the termination of the Mandate. The Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty of 1930 provided for this termination upon Iraq's admission
to the League of Nations. Important strategic, economic and
diplomatic privileges were reserved for Britain securing her
interests in Iraq. Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations
and thus became independent on October 3rd, 1932.(3)
Under the Monarchy (1932-1958). During the period of the Monarchy,
the oligarchy of traditional politicians and the King, developed
under the British Mandate, was maintained.
(1) See Plarris, G-.L. , Iraq; its people, its society, its culture.
(HRAF Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1958)» P.24.
(2) See Longrigg, S.H., Iraq. 1900 to 1950? A Political. Social
and Economic History. (Oxford University Press, London, 1953),
pp.130-133.
(3) See Khaddouri, M., Independent Iraq. 1932-1958? A Study in
Iraqi Politics. (2nd Ed.), (Oxford University Press, London, 1960),
pp.1,6. This volume is henceforth cited as Independent Iraq.
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The death of King Faisal in September 1933 brought his young son
and heir King Ghazi to the throne. The new King showed signs of
independence and relative discontent with the aristocratic
politicians. The new development encouraged the emerging young
intellectuals to form the "Ahali" (Nationalists) group, adopting
a wider programme of reform with socialist inclinations. This
situation alerted the traditional politicians who encouraged
tribal sheikhs to stage a series of uprisings against the central
government; as a result, the tribal sheikhs began to assume far
greater political importance.
King Ghazi's death in April 1939»(0 and the succession of his
infant son, Faisal II, under the regency of his pro-British uncle
'Abd-ul-Hah, did not change the situation. On the contrary,
it escalated a conflict between the nationalist elements supported
by army officers, and the pro-British elements represented by the
Regent and the Prime Minister, Nuri Sa'id.
In the Spring of 1941 the conflict came to a head when the
nationalist army officers assumed power and formed a "National
Defence" Government. The Regent and Nuri Sa'id escaped to
Transjordan but soon after were returned to power by British
(1) King Ghazi was killed in a car accident on April 4, 1939#
Because of his anti-British sympathies, his death led to anger
with and suspicion of the British in Iraq. See Khaddouri, M.,
Independent Iraq, pp.140-142; and Suwaidi, T., Muthakarati:
Nisf purn Min Ta'rikh Al-'Iraq Wal-qadhia* Al-'Arabia.
(My Memories: Fifty Years of Iraq's History and the Arab Cause),
(Dar Al-katib Al-'Arabi, Beirut, 1969). (in Arabic).
troops which occupied Baghdad by the end of May 1941.(1)
9
The return of the Regent led to the establishment of a ruling
oligarchy formed by the Regent, the traditional aristocratic
politicians led by Nuri Sa'id and the tribal landlords, British
influence dominating both foreign and economic policies.
The post-War period was characterised by times of political
liberalism alternating with strict police rule; comparative
quietness alternating with growing violent opposition. In
September 1954, Nuri Sa'id was recalled to head the Government
(after a short departure). His return was characterised by an
iron police state which disregarded many constitutional practices.
Externally Nuri Sa'id maintained dose collaboration with the West,
particularly with Britain.
These developments increased opposition to the regime and further
alienated the regime from the people. In February 1958 the
anti-nationalistic policies culminated in the formation of the
"Arab Union" between Iraq and Jordan as a counter-move to the
establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between Egypt
and Syria. Five months later, on July 14, 1958, the monarchist
regime collapsed when the revolution led by the army broke out.
Under the Nationalist System (1958-1976). The revolution brought
(1) For further details on these events, see Longrigg, S.H.,
op. cit.. pp.282-287; Khaddouri, M., Independent Iraq,
pp.20^-209 and Suwaidi, T., op. cit.. pp.343-359*
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a complete change in the structure of the political system and of
the ruling elite, and in the basis of the political ideology.
A new Provisional Constitution was promulgated under which Iraq
became a Republic. The Presidency was entrusted to a "Sovereignty
Council" while the legislative and executive functions were retained
by the Cabinet.
The ruling oligarchy of the old regime was replaced by a United
National Front, (l) The Free Officers who came from the army and
led the revolution(2) came from middle and even lower-class origins.
Brigadier Abdul-Karim Qassem who planned the revolution assumed the
post of Prime Minister. His collaborator and aide, Colonel
Abdul-Salam Aref became Deputy Prime Minister.
Soon a power struggle developed between Qassem and Aref of which the
outcome was that Aref was temporarily jailed. (3) This affected the
United National Front, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (ABSP)
backing Aref and advocating Arab unity and nationalism, while the
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) supported Qassem's opposition of
Pan-Arabism. Qassem's domestic policy was based on dividing
(1) The United National Front comprised the Ba'th Arab Socialist
Party (ABSP), the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the National
Democratic Party and the Independence Party. The ICP was not
represented in the first revolutionary government.
(2) For further details an the organisation of the Free Officers,
see Khaddouri, M., Republican 'Iraq; a study in 'Iraqi politics
since the revolution of 1958 (Oxford University Press. London, 19&9)»
pp.21-23. This volume is henceforth cited as Republican Iraq.
(3) For details of the events which led to Aref's arrest see Ibid.«
pp.92-98 and Dan, U., Iraq Under Oassem: A Political History.
1958-1963. (Praeger, New York, 1969), pp.81-89.
political groups and using them against each other to secure his
absolute rule# Although he managed to outmanoeuvre the ICP,
an atmosphere of intrigue and violence speedily spread, ending in
the downfall of Qassem's regime and his death at the hands of the
ABSP in February 1963#
The ABSP rule lasted from February 1963 to the coup in November 1963.
Colonel Aref was made president and a new cabinet was formed under
Brigadier Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, a free officer and a veteran
Ba'thist. Based on its Pan-Arabism ideology, the Party made
enthusiastic moves toward Arab unity which resulted in the
conclusion of the April 17th 1963 Tripartite Unity Agreement with
Egypt and Syria.(l) In November 1963, Aref launched a coup in
collaboration with the Nasserlst aimiy officers and assumed almost
absolute power. Under his rule, there were three Prime Ministers
and there was chronic instability within each cabinet. This
situation resulted in confusion and dissension within the government.
Aref's rule came to an end in April 1966 when he was killed in a
helicopter crash.
Under the influence of the Nasserists in the Iraqi government, an
Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was formed on the Egyptian model and
this was to be the only legal political organisation in the country,
but Aref was soon able to manipulate the Nasserists and bring the
ASU under his influence.
(1) In July 1963, Egypt withdrew from the April 1963 Tripartite
Unity Agreement when relations between the ABSP's governments in
Iraq and Syria and Egypt deteriorated as a result of uncovering a
Nasserist plot to take over power in Syria.
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The death of Aref brought his brother, General Abdul-Rahman Aref,
to the Presidency. The new President was rather weak, and this
led to confused domestic policies. This state of affairs.,
together with Iraq's uncommitted position during the June 1967
War, were important factors leading to the fall of the regime.
On July 17, 1968, the ABSP(1) was able to take over power
peacefully, and General .Ahmed Hasan Al-Bakr, the Regional
Secretary-General of the Party became President of the Republic.
The new regime pursued firm socialist policies, part of which was
the nationalisation of foreign oil companies. The regime managed
to put an end to the hostile attitudes among the various political
groups through the formation of the "National and Progressive Front".
The ABSP regime also managed to settle the Kurdish War which had
started under Qassem's rule.
(1) The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party has played a significant role
in the life and politics of the Arab 'World. It was officially
founded in Syria on April 7» 1947* Its founding roots, however,
could be traced back to the early 1930'8 in the writings of the
Party founder and leader Michael Aflaq. The Party's ideology,
which has undergone continuous development, is based on the Unity
of the Arab Nation, the Freedom of People and Socialism. The Party
is based on a Pan-Arabism organisation, with a national leadership
and regional leaderships in various Arab countries. Its early
formation was in Syria then it spread to various Arab countries.
In Iraq it was founded in the early 1950*s and gained power in
1963 and 1968. For a detailed account of the Party's history,
see Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (National Leadership),
Lamahat Min Ni'dhal Al-Ba'th (Glimpses from the Ba'th Struggle),
(ABSP, Baghdad, 1975)* (In Arabio); and Abu Jaber, S.,
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. History, Ideology and Organisation.
(Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 1 96(>)'.
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(b) Economic Development (1920-1976),
Under the British Mandate (1920-1952). During the First World War,
Iraq's economy was in a very poor state. Apart from a small
agricultural sector and local trading and handicraft industries
there were few other economic activities.(1)
During the British Mandate, measures were introduced to improve
agriculture, education, health and transportation. Emphasis was
given to agricultural development and little attention was paid to
the other sectors of the economy. This policy was motivated to a
large extent by the need to secure the loyalty of the tribal
sheikhs through land endowment and improvements in the methods of
cultivation.
Oil concessions were awarded in 1925,(2) and the government received
its first oil royalties in 1927f these were allocated to capital
investment.(3)
Under the Monarchy (1932-1958). In the years preceding the Second
World War, political instability was a major obstacle to economic
(1) See Qubain, F.I., The Reconstruction of Iraq. 1950-1957.
(Atlantic Books, London, 1958), p.18.
(2) Various Western manoeuvers and changes accompanied the process
of awarding the Concessions. They finally settled as follows:
Equal shares of 23»75f° to the Near Eastern Development Corporation
(.American), Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British), Hoyal Dutch Shell
Group (British-Dutch) and the Cie Franoa3.se Petroles (French), and
5/i for the Estate of C.S. Gulbenkain.
(3) See Jalal, F., The Role of Government in the Industrialisation
of Iraq. 1950-1965. (Cass. London. 1972). PP.5-A.
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development. Surpluses from oil revenues (which had steadily
increased since commercial production began in 1934) were used
for investment in social overhead projects. The emphasis
continued to be placed on agriculture. Tribal sheikhs,
through rebellion and political influence, were able to concentrate
the land in their hands thus forming a semi-feudal system.
In the period which followed the Second World War, a considerable
increase in oil production and in oil revenues took place and this
made oil the major base of the economy. Oil production, for
example, increased from 3 million tons, providing a revenue of
I.D. 2.0 millions in 1948, to 33 million tons, providing a revenue
of I.D. 84.4 millions in 1955*0) Ibis increase in oil revenues
led to a change in the government's economic policy affecting
development planning. The government began to utilise oil
revenues in public investment projects, and in 1950, the
Development Board was established to direct and control this new
policy. At the beginning, the Development Board made no
substantial change from the polioy of using oil revenues for
investment in social overhead projects. In 1952, however, as a
result of recommendations made by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBID),(2) 20/o of the investment
(1) See alnasrawi, A., Financing Economic Development in Iraq;
the role of oil in a Kiddle Eastern Economy. (Praeger. New York.
1%7), p.23.
(2) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
The Economic Development of Iraq (Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, 1952). This volumeis henceforth cited as IBRD Report
on Iraq.
fund was allocated to industry and mining. This percentage
was further increased in 1955.0)
The shortage of consumer goods during the Second World War led
to an expansion in private investment in manufacturing industry.
A new industrial elite emerged which was able to expand the old
small-sized industries such as textiles, cigarettes, soap and
shoe manufacture; it also established new industries, such as
cement, vegetable oil, beer and clothing.
Under the Nationalist System (1958-1976). The revolution brought
a complete change in economic policies, both in the emphasis and
in the nature of economic development. The role of the state in
the economy increased rapidly and the general trend towards the
establishment of a socialist economy was a policy pursued by
successive revolutionary regimes.
In 1959, this involvement led to the abolition of the Development
Board and its replacement by the Economic Planning Board. A five
year economic development plan for 1961-1 966 allocated expenditure
(l) In 1955, the government sought separately, the advice of the
British economist, Lord Salter, and the American consultants,
Arthur D. Little, Inc., to study the prospects of the
industrialisation of Iraq. Both recommended that in a country
like Iraq, which has a predominantly agricultural economy, it
would be advantageous for industrialisation to go stage by stage.
The monarchist government was largely influenced by these two
reports in determining the programmes of the Development Board.
For further details, see Salter, Lord, The Development of Iraq;
A Plan for Action. (The Development Board, Baghdad, 1955);
and Langley, K.M., The Industrialisation of Iraq, (harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 19^1)» pp.216-218.
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of I.D. 566,3 million almost entirely to industrial development,(1)
The finance was provided from oil revenues, Soviet loans, and
profits from government agencies. The next five year plan fear
1965-1969 allocated an expenditure of I.D, 820 million to economic
development; the government contributed I.D, 640 million to this
sum, and the private sector I.D. 180 million. Emphasis in the
second five year plan was put on agriculture, industry and power
generation. The third five year plan (1970-1974) allocated
I.D. 894.9 million to industrialisation, agricultural development
and housing, and financed this mainly from oil revenues. (2)
Oil remains the most important source of revenue - a source on
which the Iraqi economy depends. The contribution of oil to
the national income amounted to about 37% in 1974 and oil
resources contributed 87% of the total finance for the national
development plan of 1970-1974.(5) The oil policy in operation
since 1958 could be termed a qualified success. In 1973» for
instance, production increased steadily to 98 million tons and
revenues increased to I.D. 460 millions.(4)
(1) See Jalal, F., op. cit.. p.39.
(2) See Qaddori, F., Spotlight on Iraq's Investment Programme for
April-December 1975. (The Iraqi Cultural Centre, London, 1975). P.7.
(3) See Republic of Iraq (Ministry of Planning, Central >
Statistical Organisation), Annual Abstract of statistics. 1974.
(Central Statistical Organisation Press, Baghdad, 1975)# P. 192.
This volume is henceforth cited as Iraq's Annual Abstract of Statistics.
1974. " ""
(4) Republic of Iraq (Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical
Organisation), Annual Abstract of Statistics. 1973# (Central
Statistical Organisation Press, Baghdad, 1974)# p.302. This volume is
henceforth cited as Iraq's Annual Abstract of Statistics. 1973.
Disputes between the government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (3PC)(l)
over the revision of the oil agreements continued through the 1960's
and early 1970*8. It ended in the nationalisation of the Company
in June 1972, followed by the nationalisation of its subsidiaries
in 1973 and 1975»(2) so that all the oil exploitation functions are
now nationally controlled.
Early revolutionary governments recognised the importance of the
private sector for the economy. In September 1958, the government
passed an Agrarian Reform Act; the aim of this was to limit land
ownership and to end the influence of tribal sheikhs but not to
increase government involvement in agricultural production.
The drive for socialism became more dominant in the mid 1960*s.
The first step in this direction was taken in July 1964 when all
banks (foreign and local), all insurance companies, and seven
large trading and thirty-four large industrial firms were
nationalised. Later the government increased its share in
mixed companies (i.e. those jointly owned by the government and
the private sector). After this, several more businesses were
nationalised, mostly pharmaceutical concerns.(3)
(1) The holders of the 1925 concessions (see footnote of page 13
of this Chapter) formed the IPC and its two subsidiaries Mosul, and
Basra Petroleum Cos. in Iraq. IPC was nationalised on June 1, 1972,
but not the two subsidiaries. An agreement was reached on March 1,
1973, according to which Mosul Petroleum Co. became totally owned
by Iraq. Then in 1973 and 1975 the nationalisation of Basra
Petroleum was followed.
(2) Republic of Iraq (Ministry of Information), Iraq Today
(Weekly Magazine), Vol. 1, No. 6 (December 1975), p.3.
(3) See Khaddouri, M., Republican Iraq, p.236.
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In the 19701s the trend towards the expansion of the public sector
and towards establishing a socialist economy continued. By 1974,
the public sector controlled almost all mineral production, 73/ of
industrial production, 82/ of foreign trade and the land owned by
the state (state farms, state agricultural projects, together
with collective farms) amounted to 63/ of the total land under
cultivation.(1) Economic planning and emphasis on industrialisation
led to & oonsiderable increase in employment. Total employment
increased from about 2,403,000 in 1969 to about 2,859,000 in 1974.
Employment in industry and oil increased from about 187,000 in 1969
to about 270,000 in 1974« 37a of the industrial firms were located
in the three major cities, Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, and accounted
for 62/ of the employment in industry. (2)
Gross Domestic Product was valued at I.D. 1565 »0 million and the
Net National Product (at factor cost) I.D. I33I4..8 million by 1974
prices (see Table 1.1). The average annual economic growth was
estimated at 7»8/ between 1967-1970 and at 8.3$ between 1971-1974*(3)
Per capita income was estimated as I.D. 47 C/140) in 1 959»
1) Calculated from figures in Arab Ba'th Socialist Party
Regional Leadership, Iraq), Revolutionary Irac. 1968-1973:
The Political Report Adopted by the Eighth Regional Congress
of the Arab Ba'th Sooialist Party - Iran. (ABSP. Baghdad., 1974),
pp.141-147# This volume is henceforth cited as ABSP Report;
and Iraq's Annual Abstract of Statistics. 1974. p.138.
(2) Republic of Iraq (Ministry of Planning), Al-ihtiyajat Min
Al-qiwa1 Al-'amila Wa Athar Attaghurat Al-haikalia 'Ala
addakhil ffa Al-aioor Lil Fatra 1975/1980 (Manpower Needs and
the Effect of their Structural Changes on Incomes, Productivity
and Wages for the Period 1975/1980). (Unpublished Report),
(Baghdad, 1975), P«58. (in Arabic).
(3) Ibid., p.12.
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I.D. 70 (^210) in 1968, and I.D. 124 (£1+13) in 1974 (see Table 1.1),
which puts Iraq in the same category as Iran and Tunisia.
(°) Social Development (1920-1976).
Under the British Mandate (1920-1952). In 1920, Iraq's population
was predominantly rural and tribally structured (including nomads).(l)
Urban communities constituted only about 20^5 of the total population
and were mainly concentrated in the three major cities of Baghdad,
Mosul and Basra. These cities were under the influence of a small
mercantile aristocracy and of bureaucratic civil servants. The
majority of city dwellers were small traders, artisans and
labourers.
Meanwhile, social conditions were very backward, with almost total
illiteracy and a complete absence of health facilities.
Under the Monarchy (1932-1958). Social development during the
Monarchy was relatively slow. Efforts were made to settle nomadic
tribes in agriculture and to incorporate them with the rest of the
rural communities. This resulted in a gradual fall in the nomad
population to about 5% of the total population in the early 1950's.(2)
The slow progress in agriculture and the endowment of large estates
to the tribal sheikhs led to increased unemployment in agriculture
(1) See Wardi, A., pirasa Fi Tabi'at Al-Mu.itama' A1-'Iraqi (A Study in
the Societv of Iraq), (Al-'Ani Press, Baghdad, 1965)» p.119»
(in Arabic).
(2) IBRD Report on Iraq, p.126.
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and to continuous migration into the urban centres, and the
development of large towns. .'toiong these migrants rural
traditions continued to play a very important role.
The growth of urban centres was associated with improvement in
health and education and with industrial growth. This led,
in turn, to a gradual growth of the middle class from among the
old artisans and small traders, and of a working class largely
made up by rural migrants. The middle class became the
intellectual elite which constituted the main political
opposition during the monarchy while the working class
developed as a force of political and economic protest.
Under the Nationalist System (19*58-1976). Drastic changes in
social conditions and structure were brought about as a result
of the 1958 revolution. In the field of social welfare,
impressive intensive efforts were made to fight illiteracy and to
raise the level of education (for instance, primary education became
compulsory in 1976), to expand health facilities, and to raise
living standards.
The urban communities continued to grow rapidly and constituted
Gyfo of the total population in 1974.0) In addition to migration
from rural areas, this growth was caused by the industrialisation
programme and the improvements in the standard of living. The
(1) Calculated from figures in Iraq's Annual Abstract of Statistics.
1974. p.46.
emphasis placed on education and industrialisation resulted in
a slow hut noticeable decline of tribal influences among the
urban population. The middle and working classes have become
the most important sectors of the urban society.
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SffiTP*
Egypt is located at the north-eastern corner of Africa, with a
total area of just over one million square kilometers. The
inhabited area covers only some 22^ thousand square kilometers
(approximately 4/e of the total area). In 1 974 Egypt's
estimated population was about 352 million. The majority of
the population are Arab moslems.(l)
(a) Political Development (1882-1976).
Under the British 'dministration (1882-1922). Egypt became the
focus of the European powers as an important centre for
international transportation through the construction of the
Suez Canal in 1869. This was the major factor which subsequently
led to the British occupation in 1882. The British soon established
control over the affairs of the country and appointed Sir Evelyn
Baring (later Lord Cromer) to the post of Council-General (from 1883
to 1907). Baring's approval became necessary for the appointment
and dismissal of ministers by the Khedive, the dynastic ruler of
Egypt.(2) Sir Evelyn Baring became practically the absolute
ruler of Egypt until 1907.(3)
(1) Nan-Arab minority groups in Egypt include Italians, Greeks and Jews.
(2) For details on the Cromer policy, see al-Sayyid, A.L., Egypt and
Cromer; A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Kelations. (Murray, London, 1968),
PP.55-86, 98-136.
(3) See Ibid.. pp.74-82.
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She departure of Lord Cromer in 1907 brought about changes in
British policy and administration# A co-operative policy
between the Khedive and the Administration was established and
some financial and administrative reforms were introduced. (1)
These did not change the political system significantly and
seme of them were never implemented. The changes which did
take place, and Cromer's departure, were eonneoted with the rise
of the Egyptian nationalist movement which was directed against
British influence in Egypt.
13ie outbreak of the First World War led to the establishment
of the British Protectorate over Egypt and the introduction of
martial law. The 1919 revolution was oaused by Britain's
refusal to give up the Protectorate and to leave the country
and led to the unilateral Declaration of Egypt's Independence
by Britain in 1922.(2)
Monarchy (1922-1?^). After the Declaration of
Independence, a Constitution was drafted which came into force
in 1923 and which laid down that Egypt was to be sovereign and
independent. The King(3) was to be head of the executive branch;
(1) For a summary of the new polioy and reforms, see Mansfield, P..
The British in Egypt. (Holt, Reinhart and Winiston, New York, 1971),
pp.179-188.
(2) For further details of the events of the 1919 revolution,
see Berque, J., Egypt. Imperialism and Revolution. (Trans. Stewart, J.)
(Faber and Faber, London, 1972), pp.3Qk-324.
(3) The title of Khedive was changed to "Sultan" during the First World
War and this was changed to "King" upon Egypt's independence in 1922.
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he was to exercise his powers through the Cabinet of Ministers
which was to be responsible to Parliament,
From the start, the King paid little attention to the powers
given to Parliament and to the Constitution and, in 1930, he
brought in a new Constitution which gave him more powers.(l)
Throughout the period of 1922-1930, there was conflict between
the King and the Wafd (Delegation) Party which held the
Parliamentary majority. The King, in order to enhance his
position against the Wafd, co-operated with the British.
The Wafd emerged from this struggle as the most powerful political
party in Egypt because of its nationalist programme and its
efficient method of organisation.
After the accession of King Farouq in 1936, the alignment of the
parties changed. Mustafa Nahas, the leader of the Wafd Party,
concluded a Treaty of Alliance with Britain which provided for
British troops to be stationed in the Suez Canal zone.(2)
A conflict developed between Farouq on one side and the British
Ambassador in Cairo, Lampson and the Wafd on the other side.
This conflict came to a climax in February 1%2 when Lampson,
together with the Commander of the British troops in Cairo,
compelled Farouq to appoint a Wafdist Cabinet headed by Nahas.




one side and the British and Wafd on the other, continued until
1952.
The Wafd government resigned in 1944- and the political situation
began to deteriorate, and new political forces began to emerge
in the country. For instance, the Moslem Brotherhood (the largest
non-parliamentary political party which was based on religious
ideology) gained considerable strength and stepped up its attack
against the Wafd. The Xree Officers Movement was developing
secretly, and the activities of the Communist Party (founded in
the early 1920's) spread particularly among workers and students.
In 194S the Palestine War broke out and the Free Officers
movement came out into the open. Violence erupted soon after
the Palestine War, leading to the burning of Cairo in January
1952,(1) and the takeover by the army on July 23, 1952.(2)
Under the Nationalist System (19*52-1976). One of the first steps
taken by the Free Officers after assuming power was to depose
King Farouq. The Monarchy itself was abolished on June 18, 1953
when a republic was established. The Revolutionary Council (RC),
(1) The extensive burning of Cairo (when a large number of shops,
cinemas, art galleries, government buildings and buildings of
foreign institutions were destroyed) was caused by the violent
demonstration which broke out on January 26, 1952, in protest of
the massacre of Ismalia in the Canal zone where British troops
killed about 100 of the auxiliary police on January 25, 1952.
For further details on the events of the burning of Cairo,
see Laoouture, J. and S., Egypt in Transition. (Trans. Scarfe, F.),
(Hethuen, London, 1958)» pp.105-122.
(2) For the events which led to the revolution, see Naguib, M.,
Egypt's Destiny. (Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1955)> a*id
El-Sadat, A., Revolt on the Nile, (day, New York, 1957)•
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composed of twelve free officers, was set up as the supreme
authority. These officers came mostly from the lower
middle class.(l)
The revolutionary government embarked on a series of reforms
which influenced most aspects of society as well as Egypt's
international relations. One of the first measures was the
Agrarian Reform Law which limited landownership to 200 acres per
person. The significance of this law was that it reduced the
power of the old type landowners who had largely controlled the
political and economic life of Egypt.
As regards political reforms, the abolition of the Monarchy was
followed by measures restricting the powers of the old political
parties, which were accused of having corrupted political life.
In their place, a united front was created which became known as
the Liberation Rally and which was renamed the National Union in
1956. The purpose of forming a united front was to enable people
to participate in new national political parties which the leaders
of the regime hoped to oreate,(2) but the establishment of such new
parties never took place.
In 1953-1954 the revolutionary regime encountered a crisis of a
different sort. This resulted from a conflict that developed
(1) See Vatikiotis, P.J., The Egyptian Army in Politics; Pattern for
New Nations?. (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1961), p.46.
(2) See Naguib, M., op. cit.. p.161.
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during 1953 between General Naguib the President of the
Revolutionary Council (RC) and of the Republic and other members
of the RC. Naguib's insistence tiiat he ought to be able to
exercise more power led to his being ousted in October 1 954, and
to Carnal Abdel-Hasser, the leader of the Free Officers Organisation,
becoming President of both the RC and the Republic.(1)
A new political drive, based on nationalism, constituted the
essence of the new internal and external policies of Nasser.
Because the West refused to supply arms, Nasser concluded an
arms deal with Czechoslovakia in 1955, and because the United States
refused to finance the High Dam Project he nationalised the Suez
Canal in 1956. This action led to the Suez War, which established
Nasser as the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism. His
pan-Arabism policy led to the unity agreement between Egypt and
Syria which established the United Arab Republic (UAR) in
February 1958.(2) Thi3 union was dissolved by Syria's separatist
coup d'etat in September 1961.
The period 1961 to 1970 was characterised by the establishment of
a socialist economy and the stabilisation of the political system.
In July 1961, all banks and insurance companies in both regions
of the UAR were nationalised and so were a large number of
(1) For a detailed account of the conflict between Naguib and the RC,
see Ibid.. pp.189-21Oj and Stephens. R., Nasser: A Political
Biography. (-Mien Lane, London, 1971;, pp.122-128.
(2) For further details on these events, see Stephens, R.,
op. cit., pp.198-302.
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industrial firms. In Egypt this process was completed by-
further nationalisation measures in 19&3. These measures
increased the alienation of the upper class from the system
and put an end to the remaining features of feudalism in Egypt.
Nasser's popularity also increased and he won the support of
political elements hitherto reluctant to accept his regime
such as the various underground marxist and communist groups.
fter Syria's withdrawal from the UAR, to ensure a stable
political system, Nasser started to make changes in the political
organisation. The National Union was replaced by the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU) to make it into a "revolutionary instrument
for national measures".(1) Membership of the ASU was to include
workers, peasants, intellectuals, professionals, soldiers and
national capitalists. Nomination to the National Assembly and
various elected organisations was to be an ASU prerogative only.
A National Charter was presented by Nasser to became the basis ctf
the economic and social policies for the coming period of his
regime. The Charter confirmed the socialist nature of the
regime and the continuation of its pan-Arab policy.(2)
The sudden death of President Nasser on September 28, 1970
brought his Vice President, Anwar El-Sadat to the Presidency.
Nasser's policy was maintained during the early period of Sadat's
(1) United Arab Republic (Ministry of Information), The National
Charter, (information Agency, Cairo, May 1962), p.64.
(2) Ibid., pp.117-130, 131-138.
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rule but thereafter a gradual change began to take place.
While maintaining state control, a liberal economic policy
began to be encouraged.
-Although the -ASU is being maintained as the sole political
organisation, a policy of liberalism within the framework of
the ASU is being adopted. Three organisations within the ASU
have been officially formed: (1) the Arab Socialist Organisation
of Egypt representing the Centre; the Organisation of Liberal
Socialists representing the right; and the National Progressive
Organisation representing the left. The policy of establishing
a socialist economy has been maintained but liberal trends have
been increasingly encouraged, (2)
(b) Economic Development (1882-1976)
Under the British Administration (1882-1922), British economic
policy, particularly under Lord Cromer, was based on the belief that
Egypt was basically an agricultural country and should continue to
(1) For further details on these organisations, see Ibid,, p,1,
also see Arab Socialist Union, Al-Itiiahat Al-Iqtisadia Li
Sivasat Al-Hanabir Pi Misr (The economic Trends of the
Inner-Organisations in Egjrpt), (Unpublished report, Cairo,
May 1976). (In Arabic)/
(2) For details of this economic policy, see Al-Ahram (Daily
Newspaper of Cairo), Vol. 102, No. 32652, (May 4» 1976), p.3.
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be so.(1) The development of agriculture and agricultural roads
was encouraged, as was the construction of railways to connect
fertile land with the centres of export. Some export processing
industries based on agricultural products were also established by
foreign investors. Crcsaer adopted a policy which prevented the
development of local industry, and he declined to give any direct
assistance to industrial development.(2)
the Mpflctrchy (lg2?-19g8). The monarchist government, since
it was under British influence, maintained the previous economic
policy which focussed mainly on agriculture; but pressure from the
emerging industrial elite forced the government to pay some attention
to other sectors of the economy. This led to the building of a
number of factories, and to the imposition of almost prohibitive
tariffs on imported manufactured goods in the late 1920's and
early 1930*s. This policy fostered increased industrial production,
but agricultural production declined because of the oontinued use of
old methods of cultivation and insufficient irrigation. The increase
in industrial production was not sufficient to offset the decline in
agriculture and the real national income of the 1930's was therefore
below that of the previous decade.(3) This factor, combined with
the rise in population, led to a distinct decline in the standard of
living,
(1) See Owen, S.R.J., "The Attitude of British Officials to the
Development of the Egyptian Economy 1882-1922", in Cook, H.A. (Ed.),
Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East. (Oxofrd University
Press, London 1970), pp.489-491» ~
(2) Ibid., p.492.
(3) Issawi, C.P., Egypt in Revolution; an economic analysis.
(Oxford University Press, London 1963)# p.34*
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In the early post-War years, the transport system (which was
relatively adequate) was improved by the building of new roads
and airports and the modernisation of the railways. Specialised
government-sponsored banks were created to fill gaps in the credit
system, and the introduction of income tax and other direct taxes
removed some of the defects of the fiscal system. More importantly,
the poat-War period witnessed an expansion in manufacturing industry
and in technicians and skilled workers.
Under the Nationalist System (1952-1976). The revolutionary regime
attempted from the start to promote economic development, to raise
• <»<
the standard of living, and to industrialise the country. From
1952 to 1956# the government encouraged both foreign and domestio
capital investment in industry. After the nationalisation of the
Sues Canal in 1956, government economic policy began to change.
From 1958 to 1961 the government increased its intervention in
economic affairs and, in retrospect, it can be seen that during
this period sooialist planning was gradually developed. (1) Broad
scale planning had begun in 1957 when two plans were adopted, one
for industry and one for agriculture. But it was not until 1958-1959
that a first Five-Year Plan covering the whole economy was put forward
but this was not implemented until 1960. (2) The decisive shift to
a socialist economy in Egypt was made in mid-1961 when a series cf
nationalisation measures were inaugurated. During the post 1961
period the socialist economy was further consolidated.
(1) See Kerr, H., "The Emergence of a Sooialist Ideology in Egypt",
She Middle East Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1962), pp.127-144-
(2) See Hansen, B. and Marzouk, A., Development ana Economic Policy
in UAR (Egypt). (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1965)» p.278.
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She long term objective of the first Five-Year Plan was to double
the national income in ten years, the more immediate aim being to
raise the level of national income by 40$ during the first five
years* It also called for the provision of additional employment
for one million employees during the first five years; half of
these jobs were to be provided by agriculture*(1) More than 80$
of the net investment during the first two years was to be
undertaken by the public sector* This plan was then followed by
a series of short term plans, all placing heavy emphasis on
industrialisation and the modernisation of agriculture*
The growth of the public sector increased rapidly after the
completion of the second nationalisation measure in 1963* By 1 964,
the government was in control of about 76$ of manufacturing
production, 95$ of the wholesale trade and 68$ of the retail trade.
The proportion of the value of manufacturing production owned by
the public sector increased from 76$ in 1964 to 81$ in 1971 • (2)
This demonstrates that the public seotar controls the bulk of
economic activities* Despite recent trends towards encouraging
private investment there is no evidence to suggest that a substantial
change has as yet taken place*
Employment has increased continuously since 1960* Total employment
was about million in 1960, about 8 million in 1968, about
(1) Ibid*.* p*295«
(2) Calculated from Arab Republic of Egypt (Central Agency for Public
Mobilisation and Statistics), A.R.B* Economic Indicators* 1961-1975.
(Cairo, 1974), p.10.
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10 million in 197k and. about 11 million in 1975*0) (See Table 1.2
for the distribution of employment by economic sectors in 1971+)*
The increase in employment is attributable to economic planning as
well as to the government's policy of deliberate overmanning in
service industries and in the public sector so as to reduce
unemployment.
In 197U, Egypt's domestic product was estimated to be about
£E3212 million (#8993*6 million) and the net National Product
(at factor cost) about CE28814. million (#8075*2 million) (bee Table
1.1). Per capita income was estimated as £E70 (#196) in 1968 and
£E81 (#227) in 197i+,(2) which puts Egypt in a lower category than
Iraq and Syria.
(c) Social Development (1882-1976)
Under the British Administration (1882-1922). Since before the
British occupation, the majority of Egypt's population settled in
the cultivated rural land of the Nile Valley while the smaller
(but growing) urban communities lived in the industrial and
(1) For 1960 see Arab Republic of Egypt (Central Agency for Public
Mobilisation and Statistics), Statistical Indicators of the A.R.E.,
1952-1972. (bar Al-Ma'arif Press, Cairo, 1975), P*112.
For 1971+ and 1975 figures, see Arab Republic of Egypt (Central Agency
for Public Mobilisation and Statistics), Estimates of the labour Force
in the A.R.E.. (The Central Agency Press, Cairo, 1975)» P*53* This
volume henceforth will be cited as A.R.E.'s Estimates of the Labour Force.
(2) Arab Republic of Egypt (Ministry of Information), Progress in
All Aspects, (State Information Servioe, Cairo, 1971+)> P*2»
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commercial cities of the Upper Delta and the Suae Canal. The
economic polio;' adopted by the British administration did not
aim to expand the urban population; nor did the education
policy which was based on the assumption that there was no
direct relationship between education and development.(1)
The concentration cf land among a small number of powerful
aristocratic owners was encouraged by the British administration.
In 'i G90, the "guild system" (wiJ.ch restricted skill development
and prevented progress among labourer^2) and "the corvee"
(forced labour) which had been developed during the Ottoman rule
were abolished. The abolition of those two systems removed
major obstacles to the growth of a working-class in Egypt.
Under the Monarchy (1922-1952). After independence, the emergence
of national and foreign industries enabled the growth of a middle-
class as well as the working-class. The middle-class was composed
of the intellectual elite and the revolutionary Froe Officers who,
together with the working-class, mounted opposition to the regime
and represented a serious threat to the ruling aristocracy.
Political and economic pressures led to a considerable increase
in the level of education. This, together with economic progress
and an improvement in health and welfare services in the urban centres,
(1) See owen, E.R.J., op. pit., p.492.
(2) For further details on the guild system and its abolition,
sea Baer, G,, Studies In the Social History of Modern Egypt.
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969)# pp.149-160.
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helped to Increase the urban population and encouraged rural
migration to towns. This migration was also due to population
pressure in the rural areas which created a "push" effect.(l)
Under the nationalist System (19*52-1976^. One of the primary aims
of the 1952 revolution was to change Egyptian society. Post-
revolution social reforms covered almost all aspects of welfare
and the improvement of social conditions, particularly in the
fields of health and education.
Family and kinship relations tend to be very influential among
rural communities and among poor classes of urban communities.(2)
This suggests that, despite efforts to modernise, changes in the
traditional values occur very slowly and are largely connected
with the social position of the group concerned. The middle-class
by contrast has grown rapidly and become important in the system,
as is shown by the regime's increasing dependence on this class as
administrators in government departments.
While the Agrarian Reform Act has led to an improvement in the
position of peasants, the logical consequence of industrialisation
has been the growth of urban population in general (to constitute
of total population in 1974) and of the urban labour force
(1) See Issawi, C.P., op. oit.. pp.83-85.
(2) Wilber, D.N., United Arab Republic. Egypt. (HRAF Press,
New Haven, Connecticut, 1969), p.82.
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in particular. Workers and peasants were given special
attention by the revolution which considered them as the basis
of its popularity.(1) In practice, however, the dominance of
the middle-class has never been matched.
(l) Arab Socialist Union, at-»«««! v7a*l-thawra Fi 'Idaho -Al-hadi
Wa'l-'Iahrijtt (Workers and the Revolution in its Twenty-First
Anniversary), (ASU, Cairo, 1973)# P.32. (in Arabic).
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Syria
Syria is located at the nort it-west of Arabia v/ith a total area
of 115*903 square kilometers. In 1974» Syria's estimated
population was about seven million. The majority of the
population are Arab Moslems; in addition, there exist various
other ethnic and ethno-religious minority groups.(1)
(Q) Poetical Dgyplopmeflt (192O-1976)
Under the French Mandate (1920-19h£). Present-day Sjpria became
an entity in 1920 when it was occupied by French troops. This
put an end to a short-lived Arab Kingdom of Faisal of Hijaz which
had been established after the collapse of the Ottoman rule in
1918.(2)
The French authority improved public services and administration
but the people of Syria rejected it as foreign. Syrian nationalist
opposition erupted into violence several times during the 1920*s.
In 1925 an uprising started in Jabal Dr-use and spread to all areas
of Syria to become a national uprising which was finally quelled in
July 1927.
(1) The minorities include Moslem Kurds (7% of the population),
Christians (mostly Arabs and constituting 13/^ of the population),
Druse, Yazidis, Jews and Turks.
(2) For details of these events, see Ziadeh, A., Syria and Lebanon.
(Bonn, London 1957), pp.49-50.
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In response to this revolt, the French government agreed to grant
nominal independence to Syria based on a treaty which would ensure
special privileges for the Mandatory Power.(1) However, the
Syrian national movement which was becoming increasingly influential
and which united in the "National Bloc" was not prepared to accept
anything less than full independence.
The "Popular Front" government in France was prepared to grant
Syria's national demandsj and, in September 1936, a Franco-Syrian
Treaty was signed, which envisaged that Syria would become
independent after a three-year interim period. The French, however,
began gradually to retreat from the Treaty, its ratification was
delayed, and finally in 1939, the French Parliament refused to
ratify it. The Syrians reacted to this decision violently and
soon street demonstrations became a daily phenomenon.
During the Second World War, the fall of France and conflicts
between Allied interests proved decisive in Syria's move to
independence. In 194-3# under British pressure, the Free French
held general elections which resulted in an overwhelming majority
for the National Bloc, and on April 17, 1946, Syria was declared
an Independent Republic.(2)
(1) See Petran, T., Syria. (Benn, London 1972), pp.61-62.
(2) For a detailed aooount of the events that led to Syria's
Independence, see Longrigg, S.Ii., Syria and Lebanon Under French
Mandate. (Oxford University Press, London, 1953), pp.334^368
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Under the Traditional System (1 946-1958). The newly independent
state faced problems of leadership and internal political conflict.
The National Bloc, the major political force in the fight for
independence, disintegrated soon after independence had been
realised. New political forces which had emerged during the War
challenged the National Bloc and took the lead in popular support;
the new forces were - the ABSP, the Syrian Communist Party (SCP)
and Akrara Hourani* s Arab Socialist Party. The latter merged with
the ABSP in 1954. 0 )
Lack of political stability, coupled with lack of reforms and the
defeat in the Palestine War in 1 948 led to a serious crisis and to
a series of coup d'etats during the period 1949-1951 • These were
followed by the dictatorial rule of Colonel Adib Shishakli from
1951 to 1954.(2) Shishalcli's regime was overthrown in February 1954
and a Parliament was reinstated. The ABSP and other leftist elements
became influential in the government, and due to the ABSP's campaign,
unity between Syria and Egypt was achieved in February 1958.
Under il25§slSZ&I» Since the unity with
Egypt, Syria has undergone numerous political changes; in spite of
(1) Akram Hourani, a lawyer, was an aotive nationalist during the
French Mandate. In 1943 he was elected for Parliament. Afterwards
he started a campaign to organise peasants and improve rural conditions.
In 1950 he founded the Arab Socialist Party, which then In 1954 was
merged with the ABSP. After the establishment of the UAE, he became
Nasser's Vice President (from 1958 to 1960). For further details on
Hourani's role in Syrian Polities, see Abu Jaber, K., op. oit..
PP.31-35» 57, and 63-65.
(2) See Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (National Leadership), op. oit..
p.26; and Abu Jabber, K., op, cit.. p.30.
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this, this period has shown similarities in policies and methods
of action with Egypt#
In a plebiscite which was held on February 21, 1958, the union
and Nasser's candidature for the presidency were approved. All
political parties in Syria were dissolved and a National Union on
the Egyptian style was formed.
The union with Egypt soon became unpopular in Syria, as Egypt -
the bigger, more modern and developed country - increasingly took
over control of the government. The ABSP, the major force that
had brought about the union, was disappointed at "some trends of
regional dominance and internal isolationtt.(l) Although the
nationalisation and reform measures gained the full support of the
ABSP and other leftist elements, they came relatively too late to
lead to reconciliation, and they antagonised the economically
influential upper classes. These factors helped a group of army
officers to carry out a successful coup d'etat on September 28, 1961,
announcing Syria's secession from the UAE.(2)
The new regime turned to the right and abolished many of the reforms
of the UAR government, notable among their actions being the
denationalisation of industry and financial institutions. This
policy roused opposition against the regime which was finally
overthrown by the ABSP on March 8, 1963.
(1) Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (National Leadership), op. oit.. p.65.
(2) For a detailed account of the period of Syria's unity with Egypt,
see Petran, T., op. cit.« pp.128-146.
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One of the early steps of the ABSP government was the restoration
and expansion of nationalisation, distribution cf land to peasants,
and the development of further socialist measures. These measures
resulted in merchants' and landowners' riots and protest
demonstrations during February-April 1964 but these were quickly
suppressed.
Conflict within the ABSP now emerged. The veteran Party leadership
remained loyal to the ideal of Arab unity, hoping to reach an
alignment with Egypt, while a newly dominant "regionalist" group
(anti-unity) led by General Salah Jadid and largely based on
sectarianism which had source of power in the army, was against the
union. This latter group launched a coup d'etat on February 23,
1966 and so took over power and deposed the ABSP National
leadership.(1)
The new ruling group soon split into two factions centred primarily
on the personalities of Jadid and the Minister of Defence, General
Hafith Asad. 3h November 1970, the Asad group gained the upper
hand, arrested Jadid end dismissed his followers. In March 1971,
Asad was endorsed in a plebiscite as President of the Republic.(2)
(1) For further details of these events, see Seymour, M.,
"The Dynamics of Power in Syria since the break with Egypt",
Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1970), pp.35-47.
(2) See Petran, T., op. oit.. p.250.
Cb) Economic Development (192Q-1976)
Under the French Mandate (1920-1956). The First World War had
brought disruption and famine and complete collapse of the Syrian
economy. Early Frenoh policies further aggravated the eoonomie
crisis by putting up tariff barriers which cost Syria's
traditional industry the greater part of her market (i.e. Arab
consumers), (1) " In addition, the mandate-inspired "open door"
enforced non-reciprocity in economic matters between Syria and
the members of the League of Nations and deprived Syria of
protection against dumping and other competitive practices by
League of Nations members. This situation led to further decline
in the demand for home products and rapid increase of urban
unemployment. ( 2)
By the late 1930's the French began to make some ohanges in their
economic policy. Roads were built, communications improved, power
stations and other construction projects were sponsored by the
Administration, the adoption cf modern industrial plants was
encouraged, and most importantly, tribesmen were settled on
agricultural lands. However, much of the land was allocated to
the tribal Sheiks who supported the Administration.(3) A shortage
of imports brought about by the outbreak of the Second World War,




(3) Longrigg, S.H., Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate, pp.2?9-282.
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Under the Traditional System (1S&.6-195B). Political independence
led the way to economic independence when, in 1950, Syria severed
the customs union with Lebanon which had been imposed under the
French and was thus able to pursue an economic policy which was
appropriate for its industrialisation and economic development
strategies* The wartime period had created unprecedented demands
on the local and international markets for agricultural crops and
this helped Syria to increase her agricultural production* The
problem of uneven land distribution and the dominance of big
landowners, however, resulted in peasant migration to urban
centres*(1)
The industrial sector underwent rapid expansion during this period*
It was stimulated by the new profits from agriculture and trade and
by the accumulation of wartime savings* The private seotor
provided most of the industrial investment as it largely dominated
the Syrian economy.
Under the Nationalist Regimes (1958-1976). Since the establishment
of the UAR (except for the Separatist Regime of 1961-1963) socialist
ideology has replaced that of private enterprise in Syria, government
intervention in economic activities has become dominant*
An Agrarian Reform Act, based cax the Egyptian law, was introduced in
(1) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
The Economic Development of Syria. (John Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, 1955/, pp.67-68. This volume is henceforth cited as
IBRD Report on Syria.
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September, 1 958. (1) The Act restricted landownership to a
maximum of 200 acres of artificially irrigated land, and
750 acres of land irrigated by rainfalls. This maximum limit
was further reduced by the ABSP government in 1964, and the
sequestrated landholdings were sold to peasants in small plots.(2)
Similar to the Egyptian Plan, a comprehensive First Five-Year Plan
was introduced during the unity period to cover the five years from
the end of 1 $60 to the beginning of 1 $65 and to make possible the
transformation of the Syrian economy to a socialist economy. The
plan aimed to achieve an annual growth rate of 0$ in the level of
the national income. The plan also aimed to redistribute income
in order to achieve more social justice; this was to be achieved
by increasing output per head (per capita) by 24.5$ over the five
years which represents an average annual increase in output per head
of 4.9$. (3)
At the end of the five-year plan, the public sector had only reached
56$ of its investment targets, while the private sector had beaten
its targets by increasing its share by 161$, a performance which it
did not repeat in the Second Plan (1966-1970) when it reached only
88$ of its planned investment. The overall performance of both
(1) Government of Syria (Directorate General of Information),
Al-Jarida Al-Baaaniva (Official Gazette), No. 54 (September 1958).
(2) Zaid Keilany, "Socialism and Economic Change in Syria",
Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 9, No. 1, (January 1973), P.63.
(3) See Syrian Arab Republic (Ministry of National Planning),
The Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. 196o/61-
1964^65. (Government Printing Office. Damascus. 1962). p«7.
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sectors reached 86% in the First Plan and 68% in the Second Plan.
One of the basio reasons for the poor performance in the public
sector was that planners overestimated the government's capacity
to undertake such a programmej an overestimate which was repeated
in the Second Plan. The planners believe that the investment
targets of the 1971-1975 plan have been more realistic.(1)
The shortfalls in economic performance during the Second and Third
Plans has led to fluctuations in employment. Although total
employment increased from about 1>196,000 in 1962 to about
1,774,000 in 1968, it declined to about 1,631,000 in 1974. The
decline was particularly sharp in agriculture (from 1,139,000 in
1968 to 864,000 in 1974) due to a decline in agricultural production.
In industry and oil, however, employment increased from about 176,000
in 1968 to about 205,000 in 1974.(2) (See Table 1.2 for employment
figures by economic sectors in 1974.)
The series of nationalisation decrees issued in July 1961 by President
Nasser were applied to Syria as well as to Egypt. The deorees
included outright nationalisation of all banks, insurance oompanies and
financial institutions as well as of fifteen large manufacturing
companies.
(1) Syrian Arab Republic (State Organisation of Planning), The Five-Year
Plan for Economic and Social Development. 1971*1975# (Government
Printing Office, Damascus, 1972), p.3.
(2) Calculated from Syrian Arab Republic (Office of the Prime Minister,
Central Bureau of Statistics, Statiatioal Abstract. 1969/1970.
(C.B.S. Printing Office, Damascus, 1970), pp.414-415» Thi3 volume is
henceforth cited as Syria's Statistical Abstraot. 1969/1970; and
Syrian Arab Republic (Office of the Prime Minister, Central Bureau of
Statistics), Statistical Abstraot. 1975. (C.B.S. Printing Press,
Damascus, 1975)# PP»158-159* This volume is henceforth cited as
Syria's Statistical Abstract. 1975.
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After the break-up of the UAR, the new government abrogated the
nationalisation laws to appease the Syrian Nasserists and to
retain, at the same time, elements of free enterprise in the
country. However, this trend did not last long. After
seising power in 1963, the ABSP government introduced by far
the most severe measures of economic control, '.ftiese measures
included complete nationalisation of all banks in Syria, all
petroleum firms and an additional 61 companies, A further step
of nationalisation in 1965 covered private electricity firms and
about 70?o of the export and import trade,(l) Since then, the
process cf state intervention in economic activities has been
steadily increased. By 1572, the state owned 56% of the value
of industrial production, and 5f$ of the value of wholesale and
retail trade,(2)
Gross Domestic Product was valued at £S7162. i+ million ($2363.6 million)
and the Net National Product (at factor cost) £S6797.l± million C$--2ii3,l)
(see Sable 1,1), Per capita income was £S680 ($224) in 1968 and
£S. 955 ($31^) in 1974#(3) putting Syria in a higfrer category than
Egypt but lower than Iraq,
(1) Petran, ?,, op, oit,. p,179«
(2) Calculated from Syrian Arab Republic (Office of the Prime Minister,
Central Bureau of Statistics), Statistical Abstract, 1974, (C.B.S,
Printing Press, Damascus, 1 974), pp.301, 588, This volume is
henceforth cited as Syria's Statistical Abstract, 1974,
(3) Syria's Statistical Abstract, 1975. p.881.
(c) Social Development (1 920-1976)
Under the French Mandate (j 920-1 %■£>)« Upon becoming a new entity
in 1920, Syria's population was predominantly rural and illiteracy
exceeded 9Q& Social conditions were very backward, and health
and general services were almost non-exi3tent,
She urban population which represented less than 20$ of the total
population formed an active community of professionals, intellectuals,
merchants and artisans. This elite, though it seemed socially
divided, was united politically and supplied the early nationalist
movement leadership. Modernisation under the French, though
limited, benefited the urban well-to-do and stimulated the growth
of a small middle class but it made very little impact on most of
Syrian society.
Under the Traditional System (1 %.6-1958). The post-War economic
development, in addition to developing a capitalist-class of wealthy
notables, furthered the growth of the middle class. Small merchants
and shopkeepers, artisans and small manufacturers carried on the
bulk of commercial and industrial activities while the educated urban
middle and lower middle-class grew rapidly. At the same time
industrialisation increased the growth of the working-class in spite
of low standards of living and poor working conditions. Although
there was industrial growth, rural immigration gave rise to
unemployment.
Post independence Syrian governments were conscious of the need for
social reform, and expansion took place in education, health and
welfare services.(1) This led, among other things, to further
urbanisation, modernisation and, abcve all, a strenghtening of
the position of the middle-class which together with the growing
worldng-clas3 represented the active political elements outside
the traditional ruling class.
Under the nationalist Regimes (1956-1970). The period since the
establishment of the UAR in 1958 has witnessed a noticeable social
change. There has been a strong emphasis on education and health
services. Steady economic growth and increased industrialisation
has, to some extent, absorbed urban unemployment but has led to
further rural-urban migration. By 1974, the urban population
represented 43% of the total population as compared with about
34% in 1956.(2)
Increasing government control of economic activities has resulted
in a decline of the traditional upper class, both in influence and
activity. It has also led to further growth of the middle class
which is increasingly involved in the running of the country's affairs.
The working-class has also acquired an influential position since the
adoption of socialism, for the state now views workers as an
important group in building socialism.(3) Workers themselves,
(1) For details on these reforms, see Ziadeh, N., on. cit.. pp.248-249.
(2) Syria's Statistical Abstract. 1975. p.109#
(3) See Syrian Arab Republic (state Organisation of Planning),
op. cit.. p.102.
however, are divided into two sub*oultural groups} those who were
born and brought up in the urban community have much in common
with the middln-class; but those who immigrated from rural
areas are still influenced by rural traditions based on ties

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparison of the Historical Background to the Development of Industrial
Relations in the Three Countries
At the beginning of the period of this study, Iraq, Egypt and Syria were
ruled by foreign administrations* Iraq was occupied by Britain in 1917
and became a British mandate with a constitutional monarchy in 1920.
In 1932 Iraq became an independent kingdom but Britain maintained import¬
ant strategic and economic priviledges.
Egypt was occupied by Britain in 1882 and was declared a British protec¬
torate during the First World War. The growing Egyptian national move¬
ment rejected the protectorate and attempted a revolution in 1919* Egypt
gained independence in 1922.
Syria was occupied by French troops in 1920 and continued as a French
mandate until 19^6. The Syrians rejected the French administration as
foreign and frequently rebelled against it. Although the French quelled
these rebellions, they finally granted Syria independence in 19^6.
In each of the three countries semi-feudal semi-capitalist regimes were
established after independence which I have called "traditional systems"
(monarchies in Iraq and Egypt and a republic in Syria). In both Iraq
(1932-1958) and Egypt (1922-1952) the monarchist regimes were ruled by an
oligarchy comprising the Royal Palaces, the aristocratic politicians (and
businessmen in Egypt) and landowners. Both regimes maintained close
collaboration with the West, particularly Britain, until they were over¬
thrown by the armies which established nationalist republican regimes.
In Syria, the traditional system (19lt6—1958) was a parliamentary republic
in which the aristocracy gained the upper hand but did not manage to
maintain political stability. Gradually, the nationalist elements
became very influential and they succeeded in bringing the regime to an
end when Syria was united with Egypt in 1958.
5fa
The nationalist systems in the three countries adopted political ideologies
which were interested in keeping republican regimes in power and in
introducing socialism.
In Iraq (1958-1976). until 1968, there were frequent changes within the
nationalist government. In 1968, the A3SP came to power and was able to
maintain political stability and to pursue socialist policies.
In Egypt, in 1952-1976, stability was maintained and socialism was pursued
Tinder the rule of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Although his political ideology
has in essence been maintained under Sadat since 1970, there has been a
cautious move towards political and economic liberalism.
In Syria, in 1958-1976, frequent political changes were witnessed. The
union with Egypt was dissolved in 1961 and a separatist regime was
established which in turn was overthrown by the ABSP in 1963* Then
followed a series of political changes which ended in General Hafith Asad
taking over power and becoming President in 1971*
Economic Development
Under the foreign administrations the economies of the three countries
were based mainly on agriculture. A few export processing industries
were established mainly to help the home countries of the occupying
powers; these were usually owned by foreign companies. The Second World
War forced the French to encourage the setting up of some consumer goods
industries in Syria.
Under the traditional systems, the monarchist regime in Iraq relied on
the support of the landowners and maintained agriculture as the basis
of the economy. Political opposition and the new wealth from oil
(discovered in the late 1920*s) led to the adoption of economic planning
in the 1950*s and to industrial investment.
51*
In Egypt, businessmen were influential among the ruling elite and put
pressure on the government to expand industrial investment. In spite
of this, agriculture remained the major economic sector.
In Syria, there was some expansion among small and medium-sized firms but
agriculture remained the major sector. In the three countries private
enterprise predominated.
Under the nationalist systems in the three countries economic policies
began to be based on socialist principles. State intervention became
dominant and the state pursued industrialisation programmes mainly in
the consumer goods industries. In Iraq oil contributed significantly to
the development programmes which tried to create a balance between
agriculture and industry. In Egypt, there has recently been a cautious
shift towards economic liberalism. In Syria, economic planning has
become dominant.
Social Development
Under the foreign administrations, social conditions in the three countries
were very backward and almost 90% of the population were illiterate.
Under the traditional systems some efforts were made to improve educa¬
tional and health facilities, particularly in Egypt and Syria. Although
economic development was slow it led to the growth of the middle and
working classes who worked together in opposing the ruling elites.
The nationalist systems in the three countries believed in the welfare
of the masses. Their economic policies resulted in a further growth of
the working class which also gained political strength. The middle class
has become the main support of the regimes and the source of their
political recruitment while the influence of the upper classes has
gradually declined. The expansion in health and education has been
51#
very impressive, particularly in Iraq., and this together with economic
development has resulted in the growth of urbanisation.
The main features of the historical background to the development of
industrial relations in the three countries are summarised on the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONISM
This Chapter is concerned with the investigation of the development
of trade unionism in Iraq, Egypt and Syria. It also examines the
effeots of changes in the political systems and social and eoonomio
conditions on the development of trade unions.
In dealing with trade unions, I shall restrict my investigation to
"workers and employees unions" whioh are covered by the provisions of
various labour laws in the three countries. These unions are usually
affiliated (in acoordanoe with the law) to the general federations of
trade unions in their respective countries. They also, to a large
extent, fall in the category of "trade union" as defined by the Webbs;
that is "a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of
maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives".(1)
Occupational associations of which membership is compulsory, for groups
such as the engineers, teachers and doctors, are excluded from this
investigation. Firstly, they are not trade unions proper in terms of
pursuing activities of trade unions, since they are primarily concerned
with academic, professional and welfare activities. Secondly, member¬
ship is regulated by statute on the basis of professional qualification
and thus there is no distinction between both employers and employees.
Iraq
A primitive industrial relations system existed in Iraq before it
became an entity in 1920. A more differentiated system emerged with
(1) Webb, S. and B., The History of Trade Unionism.
(Longmans, London, 1920 Edition), p.1.
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the development of the labour force and of the trade union movement.
In analysing the development of trade unions, the period from 1920
onwards will be divided into three stages which are related to: the
British Mandate, the monarchist regime, and the nationalist system.
(a) Trade Unions Under the British Mandate (1920-1932)
Before the First World War when handicraft industries were dominant
in Iraq, the relations between artisans and labourers were governed
by family, kinship and craft rules. Under the British occupation, the
Port of Basra was expanded and modernised and the construction of rail¬
ways was completed. The first recognisable stable industrial labour
force began to emerge in these two large organisations though most of
the skilled workers were foreigners. In 1919» a group of workers at
the Port of Basra staged a short strike protesting against low wages,
but it was easily suppressed owing to lack of organisation and
coherence.(1)
The first attempt to organise workers in trade unions was made in
1921)., when a group of skilled railway workers, headed by Mohammed
Salih Al-Qazzaz, a mechanic, (3) decided to establish an organisation
(1) See 'Abd Al-Jabba? T..Hub 'Qurn Min Ta'rikh Al-haraka
Al-naqabiva Ai'l-Iraq (Twenty Five Years of Trade Union
History in Iraq). (Eabita Press, Baghdad i960), p.12..
(in Arabic).
(2) Al-Qazzaz was born in 1901; in Baghdad. After his graduation
from primary school he entered the Trade School and became a
mechanic. He worked in almost all the fa/stories and major
industries which then existed. During his work in these
factories he developed great skill and ability as a leader.
He won workers* respect and confidence for his firm stand in
defending their rights and voicing their complaints. Owing to
government oppression, he retired from the trade union movement
in 193l+» but remained in constant contact with the trade unionists.
In the mid 19^0's he was given the title of the "First Iraqi
Unionist" and was asked to arbitrate in a number of industrial dis¬
putes. Letter sent to K.I. Al-Kassab from Mr M.S. Al-Qazzaz,
Leader of the Iraqi Trade Union Movement from 1927 to 193Uj
(dated 28 November 1971+)• See also Tellew, op. cit., pp.211+-2l6.
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to safeguard their interests and improve their working conditions.
They applied for permission to form a social club for workers, similar
to the clubs already formed by other groups such as doctors, teachers
and lawyers. According to the "Association Law of 1922" these
groups were given the right to establish associations to protect their
interests and improve conditions. Until 1936, there was no law which
permitted workers to organise, so workers referred to the Association
Law of 1922 for this recognition. However, the government rejected
their demand on the ground that they were not professionals.(1)
But workers everywhere continued to demonstrate their will and desire
to form labour organisations. Illegal "workers* associations" were
established and, through meetings and publications, exerted pressures
on the government in order to get legal recognition. In 1927 >
Al-Qazzaz and his colleagues staged a successful strike at the Railway
work shop of "Shalijia". The main demands of the strikers were:
wage increases, improvement of working conditions, and to be given
the right to form an organisation. The strike ended with management
giving in to most of the workers* demands. Finally, the government
acceded to workers* pressures and reluctantly granted permission to
Al-Qazzaz and his colleagues to establish the first trade union in
Iraq. The -union was named "The Association of Iraqi Artisans" (All)
and Al-Qazzaz was elected as its chaiiman. (2) The membership of the
(1) The Ministry of the Interior interpreted the word "professionals"
to cover exclusively those who were qualified through academic
attainments such as lawyers and doctors.
(2) For detailed accounts on the formation of the AIA, see
•Abd Al-Jabbar, T., op. cit., pp.18-22; and Muhsin, H.A,,
Tatwur Al-haraka Al-naqabiya Fi*l-'Iraq (The Development of the
Trade Union Movement in Iraq), (Al-Sha'ab Press, Baghdad,1967),
Vol. I, pp.20-26.
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AIA was opened to all I aqi workers. However, only the railway
workers joined the AIA, but at the same time, the AIA participated
actively in the establishment of other workers* associations in the
country. Thus, during the period 1929-1930> barbers, tailors, retail
grocers, mechanics and printing workers established their associa¬
tions in Baghdad. In Mosul, other workers* organisations were estab¬
lished such as the Carpenters and the Grocery Associations.(1)
The AIA soon became very active in organising railway workers and
formulating continuous demands to the authorities. In late 1930,
Colonel Tinge, the Director General of the Iraqi Railways, in order to
deal with a budgetary deficit, ordered a reduction in the wages and
an increase in working hours. In response, the AIA on December 12,
1930, called a strike demanding that both wages and working hours must
return to their previous level. They also asked for paid holidays
and an end to certain discriminatory practices which favoured foreign
workers over Iraqis in regard to wages and other benefits. (2) The
strike was called off next day when Colonel Tinge promised to grant
some of the workers* demands and review others.
However, after waiting for a period of more than two months without
(1) For list of these associations and their activities, see
Khabbaz, S.K., ffisf Qurn Min Tarikh Al-haraka Al-naqabiya
Fi'l-'Iraq (Fifty Years of Trade Union History in Iraq),
(Ummal Press, Baghdad 1971), pp.31-32; and Jai'd, H.,
Al-haraka Al-naqabiya Pi * I- * Iraq (The Trade Union Movement in
Iraq), (Dar-assalm Press Baghdad 197U)» PP*1U-1$ (both sources
in Arabic).
(2) Government of Iraq (Ministry of the Interior), Directory of the
Kingdom of Iraq. ^Government Press, Baghdad,1936), p.301.
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any serious action being taken to implement the workers* demands, the
ATA on February 26, 1931, staged another strike. After a week, the
government intervened as mediator, and negotiations were held to
settle the dispute. The central issue was the "budgetary deficit",
and Colonel Tinge held that there was no solution other than the
reduction of wages and increase of working hours. But Al-Qazzaz
opposed such a solution, because it only affected Iraqi workers, while
foreign workers and the clerks remained unaffected. Al-Qazzaz
proposed a solution to deal with the deficit involving laying off
non-technical foreign workers and redistributing the cuts in wages
among all categories of employees. He also demanded the introduction
of injury compensation regulations and improvement of working condi¬
tions. His demands were accepted and a promise was made to deal with
them within one month. Accordingly the strike was called off, but
the Railways Authority did not keep its promise.(1)
After the strike, the AIA requested the government to pass a labour
code to protect workers. Some members of Parliament supported this
move, and the government promised to pass a law. The government
asked Al-Qazzaz to submit his suggestions, which he did on March 21,
1931 > but the issue was not pursued further.
According to the Direotoiy of Iraq, the government was careless and
indifferent to workers* complaints and needs.(2) When, in 1931» the
government passed the "Law of Municipal Taxes" aimed at levying a new
tax on workers, the self-employed and small employers, the AIA on
(1) For further details of this strike, see Tellew, F.H., op. cit.,
pp. 219-221, and *Abd Al-Jabbar, T., op. oit., pp.26-28.
(2) Government of Iraq (Ministry of the Interior), op. cit., p.802.
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June 6, 1931? yet again called a strike. This time the strike
involved all workers* associations, the self-employed, and small
employers who were directly affected by the Law. The strike lasted
for fourteen days and was called off when the government agreed
immediately to some of the demands and promised to satisfy others
within a short period.
However, the government did not fulfil its promise, and, by late 193*1»
closed the AIA and other workers* associations and arrested Al-Qazzaz.(1)
This action was taken because the government was unable to cope with
the continuous pressure imposed upon it by various worker organisations.
The government instead adopted the tactic of encouraging the formation
of trade unions under its control. Accordingly, it permitted the
formation of the "Iraqi Workers Association" headed by Abdul-Razzaq
Al-Summarie, a government supporter and opponent of Al-Qazzaz. But
members of this new union soon resented their pro-government leadership
and held a convention in December 193*1 > at which they dismissed
Al-Sammarie, elected a new leadership, and condemned government action
in arresting Al-Qazzaz.
In confronting this situation, the government could take no action
against the legally elected leadership. Thus, it tried to form
another rival union called the "Association of the Mechanical Workers".
But at the convention of this union on April 26, 1932, Al-Q,azzaz, who
by now had been released from prison, won the election against the pro-
government candidate. Thus, government efforts to control the trade
union movement had failed again.
(b) Trade Unions Under the Monarchy (1932-1958)
After independence in 1932, the Association of Mechanical Workers
continued its stand against the government, as there was no particular
change in the latter's labour policy. In January 1933, the Associa¬
tion held its second convention and changed its name to "The Union of
Workers Federation" (UWF), so that workers of all categories could join.
Al-Qazzaz was re-elected as chairman of the new union. In his
opening speech at the convention, Al-Qazzar, pointed out that the aims
of this association were to protect the rights of Iraqi workers, to
educate them, to represent their interests and to campaign for the
enactment of a labour code. He also condemned the government's
suppression of the trade union movement and its indifference to the
improvement of working conditions.(1) In this respect, the UWF
requested the intervention of the International Labour Office (lLO)
to investigate working conditions and the status of labour in Iraq.(2)
This request marked the beginning of ILO pressure on the Iraqi
government to enact adequate labour legislation.
In December 1933» "the UWF called for a boycott of the Electric Supply
Company of Baghdad, to force the Company to reduce the price charged
for electricity.(3) Approving this defence of the consumer, both
(1) An Arabic text of Al-Qazzaz's speech is published in Muhsin,
op. cit.. Vol.1., pp. 1+9-52.
(2) Government of Iraq (Ministry of the Interior), op. cit., p.807.
(3) The Company which was British, practiced price discrimination.
Prices in Baghdad were 28 Iraqi fils per unit, while in the
Hinadi, Shaljia and Railways areas, where the British had their
houses, factories and military establishments, prices per unit
were 12+, 18 and 8 Iraqi fils respectively.
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the public and. political opposition enthusiastically supported this
action.(1) The boycott was so successful that the authorities had
to intervene, they accused the UWF of unlawful representation of
Iraqi workers,(2) arrested the members of its executive committee and
deported them to Sulaimania in northern Iraq. The government also
closed down the union's headquarters.(3)
The government's policy of curbing the labour movement extended
through 1932-33. This policy, without doubt, served the interests
of the employers. Salim stated that they (employers) chose to stay
out in the background and direct the political organ to do the fighting
for them.(k)
However, the big setback to trade unionism at that time was the
decision of Al-Qazzaz to retire. He had never had faith in what he
called the government's lip-service to labour. Later he became a
shop-owner and retired from the trade union movement scene.
Meanwhile, some external and internal pressures forced the government
to pay serious attention to the conditions of labour in the country.
The ILO made several requests to the government concerning labour
problems. These requests, together with pressure from political
groups in Iraq and the too categorical demands of the Iraqi workers,
(1) For example, the Al-Ahali group demanded the nationalisation
of the Electricity Company.
(2) On December 11, 1933» the Mayor of Baghdad wrote to Al-Qazzaz
warning him that the government had neither recognised the UWF
nor his Chairmanship and threatening to take legal action if proof
of the legal standing of the union was not presented.
(3) See Salim, S.A.K., op. cit.. pp.172-17U»
(1+) Ibid., p. 173.
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wore the obligations which the enactment of the Labour Law No. 72 of
1936 was designed to fulfil. Longrigg puts it thus:
"The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected
pressure on government to insist, at least ostensibly, on
something of modem standards in the treatment of
industrial workers."(1)
The Labour Law granted workers the right to organise, but it also
gave the government the authority to cancel the licence of any union.
The Law restricted unions membership to "workers" employed in
"industrial undertakings" which meant exclusion from the right to
organise of administrative staff, government employees and agricul¬
tural workers.(2)
Despite the passing of the Labour Law, the government refused to allow
workers to organise. Except for the Drivers Union, which was
licensed in 1937»(3) no legal union existed in Iraq until
The authorities were apprehensive of the possibility that organised
labour "might be used as an instrument of protest and source of power
for other political opponents".(U) As a result of this policy of
harassment underground trade unionism began to spread and were
organised by the ICP (Iraqi Communist Party) and to a lesser extent,
by national elements. This situation continued to exist until the
licensing of trade unions in 1914;*
(1) Longrigg, S.H., Iraq. 1900-1950. p. 21+6.
(2) The Law is to be further discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
(3) See Al-Habib, M.M., "The Labor Movement in Iraq", Middle Eastern
Affairs. Vol. 7, No. h (April 1956), p.138.
(1+) Harris, C.L., , p. 176.
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These underground organisations chose to pursue peaceful tactics in
exerting pressures on government and employers. Their efforts
resulted, in 191+2, in the amendment of the 1936 Labour Law. The
amendment included provisions for fixing wages,' for the settlement of
disputes and for industrial safety.(1) There were some strikes,
notable among the incidents was the strike by the workers of the Abboud
Tobacco factory in 1938 and the sit-in of workers of three cigarette
plants in 191+2* The first strike took place in protest against the
government's refusal to license a union for the tobacco workers,
while the sit-in was motivated by demands for wage increases in one of
the factories followed by sympathy action in the other two plants. (2)
The amendment of the Labour Law and the formation of a less conservative
government in 191+1+,(3) encouraged the underground unionists to apply
for licences. Although several were rejected, between 191+1+ and 191+6,
sixteen trade unions were licensed. The majority of these unions were
organised on an industrial basis. A few of them were craft unions,
but these were open to all categories of workers engaged in their
specific occupations as their main concern was to expand their membership.
According to data supplied by the Iraqi Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs, the membership of these unions seems to have grown fairly
rapidly, particularly if one takes into account the high proportion of
(1) See International Labour Review. Vol. 1+8, No. 1+, (October 191+2),
pp. 1+93-1+91+*
(2) See Ibrahim, R., "Al-haraka Al-naqabiya Al-ummalia Fi' 1 -1 Iraq"
(The Trade Union Movement in Iraq), Afaa Arabia (Arabic Horizons),
Vol. 2, No. 9,(May 1976) p.23, (in Arabic).
(3) This was the government of Hamdi Al-Pachachi, a moderate
politician, who was known to oppose Nuri Sa'id's policies, but
who was acceptable to the Royal Palace as a "compromise" man
in critical situations.
illiterate workers who were usually expected to be indifferent or
unenthusiastic towards trade union organisation. This suggests that
underground unionisation, which was largely politically activated, had
been successful enough to attract a considerable number of workers
who joined the legal unions once these were licensed. The majority
of the unions were formed in Baghdad, and a few in the other two
large cities, Mosul and Basra. This was to be expected, as Baghdad,
was the industrial centre as well as the focus of political activities,
and Mosul and Basra were the only other major urban centres. Only
one union was formed outside the three major cities and that was the
Mechanics Union of Qmara.
Once the trade union movement became publicly active, the government
began to worry and accordingly took some restrictive measures.
Firstly, the government refused to license a federation of unions.
In July 1951, when trade unions tried to form a permanent co¬
ordinating bureau, the government quickly closed it in December of
that year on the grounds that the bureau was not legally licensed. (1)
Secondly, the government closed many of the unions, on the grounds
that they were involved in political activities dangerous to public
security. By 1952, only a few remained licensed and these were
confined to educational and welfare activities.(2)
(1) See Ibrahim, R., op. cit., pp.1*0-1*1.
(2) See Al-Habib, M.M., "The Labor Movement in Iraq", p. 11*0.
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In spite of this, the period was dominated by violent worker protests
against the government and foreign employers. As opposed to this,
only a few strikes took place in industries owned by Iraqi industrial¬
ists, and a majority of these were settled quickly. The friendly
attitude of workers towards national employers wan explained by
•Abd Al-Jabbar, a prominent trade unionist, on the grounds that*
MThe national bourgeoisie have an essential part in the
evolution of the national economy they, at that stage,
realised the importance of co-operation between workers and
their employers, and in that respect they were our periodical
allies in the struggle against the ruling oligarchy."(l)
As conditions worsened, the oil workers in Kirkuk, who were not
allowed to form a "union, went on strike on July 3> 191+6. The dispute
was basically centred around the shortage of housing, the right to
organise unions, and higher wages to match the mounting costs of
living. The strike continued for two weeks and generated a chain
reaction of labour discontent and unrest all over the country. The
discontent was exploited by the political opposition including the
ICP and soon became severe. The climax came on July 1i|., when the IPC
(Iraq Petroleum Company) asked for the governments assistance to
break up the strike. Policemen fired at a meeting of about l+OO
workers killing five to eight persons.(2)
This brutality created a storm of public protest and criticism in the
press against the government and foreign interests in Iraq, particu¬
larly Western. The ultrar-nationalist - right and left - directed
(1) *Abd Al-Jabbar, T., op. cit.. p.86.
(2) Known as the "Kawer Baghi Massacre" after the name of the
gardens in which the meeting was held.
severe criticism against the IPC.(1)
This strike was followed by a series of strikes in the oil industry
which continued throughout the 1950's.(2) Outside the oil industry,
too, the 1950®0 were characterised by continuous labour protests.
Workers, as Tellew asserted, "showed no reluctance to accept the idea
of a strike because conditions were so poor that the strike
loomed up as the only way out of the situation".(3) The importance
of these strikes was not in securing' demands - they failed on that
score - but in dramatising the labour movement in Iraq..
The period from 1954 to 1958, during which Nuri Sa'id was in power,
witnessed the return to underground organisations by trade unionists,
who totally became part of the political opposition. In 1954> all
political parties and the majority of professional organisations were
dissolved, and a police state was imposed. Most of the trade union
leaders were arrested on the grounds of being involved in communist
or leftist political activities. The membership of the remaining
legal unions dx-opped considerably during this period. In 1945,
membership was 13»170, by 1953 it had dropped to about 1,000 members;
iu 1957. to 321 registered members, and in 1958 it was estimated only
(1) For further details of this strike, see Khaddouri, M.,
Independent Iraq, pp.256-257*
(2) For an account of these strikes, see Lenczowski, G., Oil and
State in the Middle East, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
New York, i960) p.2675 also see Ibrahim, R., "Ma*a Al-tabaqa
Al-*amila'Fi'1-•Iraq, 1952-1968" (With the Working Class in
Iraq, 1952-1968), Afaq 'Arabia (Arab Horizons), Vol. 1, No. 3>
(November 1975) p.91 (in Arabic).
(3) Tellew, F.H., op. cit.. p.245*
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at 450 members.(1)
To compensate for this policy, the government, under pressure from
the ILO, passed two important acts during this period; the Social
Security Act Bo. 27 of 1956 and Labour Law No. 1 of 1958 (replacing
the 1936 Law). However, the actual implementation of these two
laws had to wait until after the revolution.
(o) Trade Unions Under the Nationalist System (1958-1976)
The revolution brought a complete change regarding government labour
polioy. Subsequent post-revolution governments maintained a belief
in a leading role for the Iraqi working-class in the process of
economic development. Accordingly, trade unionism was encouraged
and various measures were taken to ensure social justice and welfare
of the workers. However, the position of the trade union movement
has fluctuated in accordance with changes in the political regime.
Soon after the revolution, trade unions emerged as an "avalanche'* in
Iraq. (2) Underground organisations established during the previous
(1) The figures of 1946 are supplied by the Iraqi Ministry of Labour;
for the 1953 figure, see Hallsworth, J.A., "Freedom of Association
and Industrial Eolations in the Countries of the Near and Middle
East", International Labour Review. Vol. 70, Nos. 5-6,
(November-December 1954) p.3665 for the 1957 figure, see
Beling, W.A., Pan-Arabism and Labor. (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960), p.37; and for the 1958 figure,
see United States Department of Labor, Labor Law and Practice in
Iraq. (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1962), p. 16.
(2) See Halpern, M., The Politics of Social Change in the Middle
East and North Afrioa. (Princeton University Press. Princeton ,
New Jersey, 1963)» p.334*
regime were transformed into public "preparatory committees of trade
unions". The majority of these committees were controlled by the ICP
which emerged as the most powerful and best organised political group
in the country. The nationalists led by the ABSP (Arab Ba'th
Socialist Party), however, managed to control some of these committees.
Meanwhile, the newly enacted Labour Law was amended to enable the
formation of trade unions. The Agrarian Reform Act, in turn, made
it possible for agricultural workers to join trade unions, a ri^at
which was denied them under the previous regime. Accordingly, the
preparatory committees applied for legal recognition of trade unions,
but the government was reluctant to grant permission, due probably to
fear of ICP influence on these committees. Early in September 19!?8>
a preparatory committee for the General Federation of Trade Unions,
Iraq. (GFTUI) was formed,(1) to which unions* preparatory committees
affiliated. Both were not yet legalised but relying on their politi¬
cal strength functioned publicly. Tacticly, the GFTUI's union
committees sought to put pressure on government through industrial
unrest. This and the pressure put by the ICP resulted in the licensing
of fifty-two trade unions early in February 1959*
The year 1959> was of special significance in the history of trade
unionism in Iraq. For the first time since the 1920*s, the right
to organise was granted by the government without restriction on a
(1) Until 1969, the GFTUI was known as the General Federation of
Iraqi Trade Unions (GFITU). In 1969, the second congress
decided to change it to GFTUI. I have decided to use the
present name in order to avoid any confusion.
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national basis. Another feature of the new state's labour policy-
was government pressure on the oil companies to allow union
organisation. The companies' resistance lost the backing of the
regime and the trade union movement, at last, established itself in
the oil industry.
Trade unions took full advantage of the situation and launched the
biggest campaign ever to organise workers. The fifty-two licensed
unions soon established branches in various districts, some 170
branches in a few months. The Law permitted organisation either on
an industry or a craft basis and as a result thirhptwo of the licensed
unions were industrial while the rest were craft unions. Official
figures indioated that by the end of 1959 union membership amounted
to 139,853 members,(1) though some other sources had estimated much
higher figures,namely 250,000 to 275»000 members.(2)
The GFTUI held its founding congress between July 9 to July 11, 1959*
On its agenda, in addition to electing an executive and establishing
its internal constitution, were the following topicsi the preservation
of the democratic republican regime; campaigning for, and partici¬
pating in, the growth of the national industry and in economic
development; improving working conditions and the living standards of
the Iraqi working-clans; and establishing a new basis for relations
with Iraqi employers.
(1) Quoted by Al-Habib, M.M., A Study of the Social. Political,
Economic and Cultural Institutions and the labor Movement in
the Middle East, p. 150.
(2) See Halpern, M., op. cit.. p. 33U; and Dann, TJ., op. pit., p.218.
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Prime Minister Qassem himself opened the Congress. In his speech,
he implied that the workers of Iraq should devote their efforts
towards the creation of a "better future through the toil of their
hands, leaving politics to those best suited to deal with them.
Falahi, the President of the Preparatory Executive of the GFTU1, took
up the challenge. In his address to the Congress he stressed at
length the political character of trade unions, which he defined as
the originised expression of the Iraqi workers* will to fight. That
his mood was no more conciliatory than Qassem's was shown by minor,
but intensely disagreeable .sallies against government departments.
These, he alleged, had of late "unexpectedly" demonstrated hostility
to "union workers" and their "measures must be checked immediately* (1)
The Congress elected Falahi as President of GFTTJI; Shuker, the
Chairman of the Railway Union was elected Vice President; and *Abd
Al-Jabbar, General Secretary. Both the President and the General
Secretary were ICP members and had considerable trade union experience,
both public and underground.
Qassem*s treatment of the GFTUI revealed an uncharacteristic measure
of spite. His clash with Falahi had angered him and he would have
nothing to do with the movement as long as Falahi was at its head.
But Qassem did not merely discriminate against personalities. In
July 1959 > the GFTUI's headquarters were closed in the name of "the
public interest" and its licence wan cancelled because "the application
(1) Dann, U., op. cit., p.21J4.
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was not made in conformity with the law".(l) The GFTUI was put in
abeyance for three months; legally not existing until November 1j?,
1959, when the Minister of Social Affairs gave his approval to its
constitution. In response, the GFTUI issued a statement asserting
that it had no political aims - the very issue over which Falahi had
foundered in early summer. New elections were held on November 20,
1959, and Vice President Shuker emerged as President; Akhajadoor, the
Chairman of the Oil Workers Union was elected Vice President, Ayyash,
the Chairman of the Post Office Union was elected General Secretary.
Falahi was sacrificed and not elected to the Executive, while
•Abd Al-Jabbar, was elected to the lesser, but very influential post
of Secretary of the Industrial delations Committee. Both the
President and the General Secretary were not official members but
sympathisers of the ICP, and they had a notable record as trade
unionists during the monarchy. The outcome indicated a compromise
offer by the ICP to avoid further government hostility. However,
during February 9-11, 19&0, the GFTUI held the First General Congress
(as the July 1959 Congress was considered a general meeting), in which
Shuker and Akhajadoor were confirmed in their positions. fAbd
Al-Jabbar was reinstated as General Secretary, and Falahi was given
the post of Secretary of the Organisational Committee.
The control of ICP affiliates over the trade union movement was met
(1) The GFTUI was licensed without delay on June 12, 1959* on the
basis of an application signed by the members of the Preparatory
Executive, most of whom were also chairmen of individual unions.
In accordance with Ordiance No. 39 of 1958 which established the
procedure for licensing unions, the formation of a federation
required the signature of seven chairmen of unions. On
July 29, 1959* the licence was cancelled on the grounds that the
signatories applied not in their capacities as chairmen of unions
but as representatives of an illegal executive.
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by a furious reaction from the ABSP and other nationalist groups.
Underground union committees were immediately formed, and these, and
not the official leadership of the trade union movement, were received
by the nationalistically inspired International Confederation of
Arab Trade Unions (iCATU). The activities of these committees,
together with the change in the political scene resulted, by early
1960, in a drastic decline in the ICP's control over the trade union
movement. In the elections of individual unions held in June 19^0,
the ABSP and its nationalist allies gained control of the majority of
shop steward committees, as well as union branches. As a result,
the GFTTJI became isolated from the rest of the movement and clashed
with them. It even denounced many of the official strikes led by
unions on the grounds that they aimed at sabotaging the national
economy.(1) In February 19^1, when the term of office of the GFTUI's
Executive came to an end, elections were postponed on the grounds
that the accounts and auditing had not been completed. The real
reason, however, was that the executive wanted to prolong its days
in office, as it was obvious they would not win the elections.
Alerted by these developments, Qassem, who by no means wanted to see
the nationalist bloc revived and in control of the trade union
movement, prepared the ground for bringing the total movement under
government control. Accordingly, a pro-government "independent
(1) See Akhajadoor, A., Pirasat ffi '1 -haraka Al-naqabiva
(Studies in the Trade Union Movement), (Rabita Press,
Baghdad, i960) pp.1*0-1*2 (in Arabic).
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listM(l) emerged, and when finally, on May the second Congress
was held, the government intervened by presenting some opposition
members from attending in order to ensure that its candidates would
win the elections. Haj Ibrahim Jawad, who had been previously
elected as Chairmancf the Oil Workers Union, emerged as President of
the now government-controlled GFTUI. nevertheless, many of the
union branches and shop stewards committees remained under the control
of the nationalist bloc headed by the ABSP.
When the ABSP took over power in 1963, the pro-Qassam GFTTJI's
Executive was dissolved and a new Temporary Executive was set up in
March 1963.(2) The task of this Executive was to administer the
routine affairs of the GPPUI, reorganise the existing unions and
prepare for elections.(3) Accordingly, unions in similar industries
or crafts were amalgamated reducing their number to only twenty-three
central unions, while the number of branches in the districts was
(1) After the revolution, when professional and trade union
organisations were legalised, various political groups adopted
"lists" in order to be identified with them in standing for
elections. This procedure is still preserved.
(2) Mohammed Zaki Yunis, a veteran Ba'athist and a well known
underground unionist during both the monarchy and the Qassem
regime, emerged as President of the Temporary Executive.
•Isa Khether, a trade unionist active in the textile industry
became Vice President, and Sami Hamid from the Iraqi Railways,
was made General Secretary.
(3) International Labour Office (Regular Programme of Technical




The new Executive, had successfully campaigned for the formation of a
union-government joint dismissal committee. The dismissal committee
which was formed in May 19&3» was responsible for reinstating the
majority of workers who were dismissed by the previous regime because
of their alleged political activities. The Executive was also
successful in obtaining, in September 19^3» an amendment to the Labour
Law 1958* The dismissal committee thus became the permanent
"Termination of Service Committee". The tasks of the new committee
were to monitor the dismissal of all workers and employees in government
establishments, and to enquire into cases of unfair dismissal in other
establishments. Another major achievement by the Executive was to
obtain a Ministerial Decree which stated that members of the GFTUI and
union executives were to become "full-time officers". They were to
perform their union duties exclusively and their original employers
were obliged to pay them the full wages and other allowances they
would have received when fully employed. Once their term of office
expired, they were to be automatically reinstated in their previous
jobs. Prior to the decree, union office holders either performed
their duties in the evenings and weekends, or in some cases, reached
special but voluntary agreements with their employers to be released
on full pay.
The new federation was soon received by the ICATU as a formal member.
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Al-taqrlr Al-muqadam
Lil Mu'tamar Al-thalith Lil Itihad Al-'am Li Naqabat Al-ummal-
Al-qitr Al-1Iraq CReport Presented to the Third Congress of the
General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq) (Unpublished),
(Baghdad, January 1971)? p.26, (in Arabic).
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Individual member unions joined the Arab Confederation under the
previous regime in their capacity as representatives of the nationalists*
trade union movement.
Che issue of union elections began to grow more pressing a task for the
Temporary Executive. Another change of government in November 1963 >
delayed elections for the time being. The new government, hostile to
the ABSP affiliated Temporary Executive, dissolved the latter and the
unions* executives on March 12+, 19&U, and formed a ministerial
committee to reorganise unions and hold elections. The new committee
reduced the existing unions to nineteen and their branches to 117-(1)
Meanwhile, as a result of their dominance in government, the Nasserists
emerged as the strongest group. Their list was sponsored by the ASU,
the only official political organisation in the country. Another
dissident group known as the "Labour and Workers Group", also stood
for the elections but managed to gain control of only one union, the
Construction Workers Union. The outgoing ABSP *s Temporary Executive
boycotted the elections on the grounds that "government intervention
in favour of the AUS*s list made it impossible to carry out free
election".(2)
The GFTUI held its third Congress in October Ibe main topics
on the agenda were: the means of socialist transformation after the
nationalisation of industry, methods of implementing and protecting
the workers* participation laws which were recently passed, and the
achievement of Arab workers* solidarity. Hashim Ali Muhsin, a
(1) International Labour Office, op. cit., p.5.
(2) General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, op. cit.. p.28.
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prominent Nasserist and a member of the Executive Committee of the
ABU was elected President of the GFTUI;(1) Omar *Isa Bajari as Tice
President, and Nuri Najim as General Secretary. The new Executive
remained in offioe throughout the whole period of Aref*s regime. Ho
elections were held until 1969. However, with the decline of the
Hasserists* influence in the late 1960*3, the relationship between the
trade union movement and the government began to suffer. The latter
expressed less enthusiasm towards the formal leadership of the move¬
ment and encouraged the dissident "Labour and Workers Group". This
group wliich had controlled only the Construction Union, was led by
Immad Al-Aziz, a trade unionist formerly of the Mechanioai Union who
since the Qassem days had attached himself to the ICATU.(2) His
group opposed Muhsin*s leadership and the ASU on the grounds that they
were leftists and marxist elements. The period until July 1968 wit¬
nessed continuous conflict between the two groups which reflected on
the performance of the trade union movement. Although memberahip had
increased annually it suffered a relative decline during this period.
Per example, the increase in 1965 compared to 1961* was 6%; in 1966
compared to 1965 was 36^65 and in 1967 compared to 1966 was 1996. (3)
(1) Later, in 1966, Muhsin was elected as President of the ICATU in
addition to his post as President of the GFTUI.
(2) Immad Al-Aziz tried to enlist the ICATU support on his behalf,
but the Arab Confederation declined on the grounds that the
issue was an internal one.
(3) See Table 3«1 of Chapter 3 in "this thesis.
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In addition, the government represented by its main agency, the
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,(1) adopted a hostile attitude
towards the GFTUI, and a series of discriminatory actions were taken
against some individual members or unions.
The question of the legality of the GFTUI Executive after more than
one year in office was a major challenge against the formal leadership.
Despite subsequent threats, no legal action was taken to dissolve the
Executive or hold elections.
The return of the ABSP to power in July raised the question of
elections and the legality of existing union executives. A new
election procedure was set up by the Ministry of Labour, according to
which the GFTUI and constituent union executives were all suspended.
In order to arrange for eleotions a provisional committee wan set up,
chaired by Mohammed Ayesh, the Chairman of the Post Office Union and
Secretary of National Affairs in the 19&3 Executive. (2) The
committee had suggested further amalgamations between unions to
reduce the number to sixteen central unions.(3) Union elections were
(1) The Ministry of Social Affairs was established in 19^1 and was
entrusted with responsibility for Labour affairs amongst other
social and welfare functions. In 1963, it was reorganised and
renamed as the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs with a
separate under secretariate for Labour. Henceforth will be
referred to as Ministry of Labour.
(2) Mohammed Ayesh, a prominent Ba'thist and a veteran trade unionist
during both the monarchy and the post-revolution periods. In
1963, he became the Secretary of National Affairs in the GFTUI,s
Temporary Executive, but then was arrested for a while during the
Aref regime. Since 1966 he led the Socialist Progressive List
which campaigned for unions elections.
(3) General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Report Presented to the
Third Congress of the General Federation of Trade Unions, Iran,
op. cit., p.35*
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held in December 1968, and the GFTUI Congress was held in January 19^9*
The participants in the Congress declared it to be the Second GFTUI
Congress, recognising only the first Congress of 1960* The 19^1 and
I96I4. congresses were disregarded on the grounds that in both cases the
government had intervened over the composition of the congresses1
membership and the results of the elections.(1)
In the union elections and the Congress, two main lists emerged, the
Socialist Progressive List representing a coalition led by the AD3P
and including the Democratic Kurds and independent leftists, and
the United List representing the ICP and its sympathisers. In
addition a few individuals stood independently for election. The
result was an overwhelming victory for the Socialist Progressive List.
Ayesh, was elected President of the GFTUI; Uraibi, an active unionist
in the Agricultural Workers Union was elected Vice President; and
Fathil, a leading trade unionist in the Tobacco Union became General
Secretary.(2)
Among the major issues discussed by the Congress was the proposal to
change the existing labour legislation. As a result of its recommen¬
dation, two government sponsored committees were formed in which both
GFTUI and IFI were represented. These committees were to propose
new labour and social security laws which eventually resulted in
Labour Law No. 151 of 1970 and the Social Security and Workers Pension
(1) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Dirasat Ummalia
Naaablah (Studies in Labour and Trade Unionism), (GFTUI, Baghdad
1973)t P*3* (in Arabic).
(2) Wai* Al-Ummal (Labour Review) (Organ of GFTUI), Vol. 1, No. 18
(April 16, 1969)> P*8, (in Arabic).
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Law No. 39 of 1971. The two laws, compared with previous legislation,
advanced workers' rights and position, and the status of the trade
union movement.(l)
The 1969 Congress lengthened the period between elections to every
two years. It was then extended to three years during the Third
Congress held in January 1971• In this and the subsequent Fourth
Congress held in June 197U? no other major change took place in the
composition of the GFTUI, except for the post of Vice President which
went to Majid Jabbari, while Uraibi was given another responsibility
within the Executive. (2) In both Congresses, the GFTTJI expressed its
unquestioned support of the government's national, as well as labour
policies. It also pledged itself to protect the revolution, offered
its support to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) as the
international trade union movement and to the ICATU as the basis of
a united Arab trade union movement. In addition, it proposed further
changes in labour legislation aiming at active worker participation
in various aspects of the management of enterprises. (3)
gryp*
As in Iraq, the emergence of an industrial relations system in Egypt
was attributable to the development of the labour force and the trade
union movement during the British occupation. The development of
(1) These two laws are to be discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
(2) Wai' Al-Umraul (Labour Review) (Organ of GiJ'i'Ui), (February 1, 1971)
p.6. (In Arabic).
(3) Mu'ala, A.A., "Taqrir 'An Al-Mu.' tumar Al-thalith Liummal
Al-'Iraq" (Report on the Third Congress of the Iraqi Workers),
Dirasat Arabia (Arabic Studies), Vol. 7, No. 6 (April 1971)?
pp. 132-13i+. (In Arabic).
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trade unions in Egypt follows a similar historical process to that of
Iraq..
(a) Trade Unions Under the British Administration (1882-1922)
Until the end of the nineteenth century, there was only primitive
industrial relations in Egypt. The abolition of the Corvee (forced
labour) and the guild system in 1890 greatly influenced the development
of the industrial labour force, and subsequently the emergence of the
trade union movement. A year earlier, in 1889, foreign workers
started to organise strikes. The first of these was organised by
Italian workers engaged in the construction of the Aswan Dam in March
1889. The second was organised by workers in one of the cigarette
factories in Cairo, in December of the same year. The latter strike
lasted for about two months and was of a non-violent nature. The two
strikes were followed by a series of strikes during the period to 1903»
also organised by foreign workers who were employed mainly by the
cigarette industry and the transportation companies. The chief
demands of the workers were for wage increases and for short hours of
work.
The strikes were organised by strike committees, most of which dis¬
appeared soon after the strike ended. However, some of these strike
committees were transformed into "Workers1 Committees", pursuing
economic demands. Between 1899 and 1903> ei^at Workers* Committees
were established, but the first successful attempt to organise trade
unions was in 1908, when the Cigarette Workers Union and the Cairo
Tram Workers Union were founded. These two unions were organised by
both foreign and Egyptian workers.(1)
(1) See Amin, M.F. Ta'rikh Al-haraka Al-naqabiyahWa^.Tashri' at Al-'amal
Fi*l-iglim Al-misri (The History of the Trade Union Movement and
Labour Legislation in Egypt), ('Alam Al-kutub, Cairo, 19^1),
pp.13-1l+. (in Arabic).
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With the increasing strength of the nationalist movement, labour
organisations and activities increased. The period between 1906 and
1911 witnessed a series of long and violent strikes. Although the
strikes which took place during this period were aimed mainly at
achieving economic ends, they were also, to some extent, politically
motivated. They were led by Egyptian workers against both foreign
firms and government-owned establishments, such as the Railway
Administration and the Port of Alexandria, which were both controlled
by British officials.(1)
The Rationalist Party played an important role in the development of
the trade union movement. The Party adopted a policy of educating
workers and encouraging the formation of trade unions. By the end
of 1908, a number of night schools had been established in Cairo and
other major cities. With the assistance of the Nationalist Party, the
Handicraft TJhion was established. ThiB included all workers who were
enrolled in the night schools which were established by the party.
By 1909, membership in this union which consisted only of Egyptian
workers, reached 800. The original purpose of the union was not the
protection of the workers, but rather the provision of educational and
social services to its members, and it was successful in establishing
production and consumer co-operatives.(2)
(1) For further details on these strikes see *Izz al-Din, A.,
Tar'ikh Al-tabaoa Al-'amila Al-misriya Montho Nasha'teha Hatta
Thawrat 1919 (The History of Labour and Labouring Classes in Egypt
from their I&aergence Until the 1919 Revolution) (Bar Al-Kitab
Al-*arabi, Cairo, 19&7)* PP*76-117? and Nekheili, S.M., Al-haraka
Al-ummalia Fi Misr Wa Mawkif Al-Sahafa Wal-sultat Al~talsriya Ifenha
(The Labour Movement in Egypt and the Stand of the Press and the
Egyptian Authorities Towards It) (EFL, Cairo, 19^7)> PP«17-72
(both sources in Arabic).
(2) See Nekhieli, S.M., on. cit.. p. 75»*
The relationship between the nationalist movement and the Labour
movement wan strengthened after the establishment of the handicraft
Workers* Union. The nationalist Party continued to encourage the
establishment of trade unions and provided substantial support to
them. In I9H9 the number of unions increased to 11, with a total
membership of about 6,000. Bib Party attempted to establish a close
relationship between the intellectuals and workers by spreading
socialist ideas.(1)
However, the British administration*s policy aimed at suppressing
the nationalist movement during the pre-war period successfully
weakened trade unions. With the outbreak of the Pirst World Wax,
martial law was introduced and other speoific measures were enacted
undermining further the trade unions. Some union leaders and nationa¬
list leaders who were connected with trade unions were imprisoned.(2)
Meanwhile, the huge increase in the cost of living during the War
resulted in wider spread unemployment, forcing many workers to abandon
their union activities. As a result, many trade unions disappeared.
In 1918j the revival of both industry and the nationalist movement
resulted in the revival of the labour movement. Workers at first
started to reorganise themselves in trade unions, the constant rise
in the cost of living- was an important factor in unifying the workers
around the theme of exploitation by foreign oap..tal. The 1919
(1) See Al-Ghazali, A.A., Tar*ikh Al-haraka Al-ftakabiya AI-misriyah,
1899-1952. (The History of the Egyptian Trade Union Movement,
1899-1952), (Bar Al-thaqafa Al-jadida, Cairo, 1968), pp.33-393»
(in Arabic).
(2) See *Izz al-Din, A., op. cit.. p.136.
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revolution provided an outlet for the articulation of labour demands.
This was an important turning point in the development of the trade
union movement in Egypt.
Workers relied on two strategies: strikes(l) and organisation of trade
unions. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the 19*19 revolution
was the establishment of a large number of trade unions. The number
of trade unions increased from 11 in 1918 to 1+3 ia 1919; 19 Cairo,
18 in Alexandria and 6 in other towns in the delta region.(2)
Another important outcome of the revolution was the emergence of the
concept of "general union" which included other groups in addition to
workers. Two general unions were established in Cairo and Alexandria
by the Handicraft Workers Union. The main purpose of these unions
was to mobilise various groups for advocating nationalist aims.(3)
Soon after the 1919 revolution, adherents of socialist ideas started
to infiltrate trade unions. In 1920, the Socialist Party was
established, advocating a programme of political and labour reforms.
The Party's programme of reform was received with enthusiasm by the
trade unions. The Party also advocated the establishment of trade
unionism as a mass movement, and was successful in establishing a
(1) The pattern of these strikes is to be discussed in Chapter 6
of this thesis.
(2) For details on the establishment of these unions see
'Izz al-Din, A., Ta'rikh Al-tabaqa Al-'amila Al-misriya.
1919-1929 (The History of Labour and Labouring Classes in
Egypt, 1919-1929). (Lar Al-Sh »b, Cairo,1970), pp.9*1-103
(in Arabic).
(3) Ibid., p.101.
short-lived Egyptian Federation of Labour which included 38 trade
unions. (1)
(b) Trade Unions Under the Monarchy (1922-1952)
In 1922 some people left the Socialist Party and established the
Communist Party of Egypt, and these elements started to infiltrate
trade unions. However, the Party was weakened by the enactment of
a law in 1922, which prohibited communist activities. In the same
year, a law was passed which prohibited strikes on projects which
served the public interest. The Egyptian Federation of Labour
established by the Socialist Party disappeared after tne government
broke up a violent strike in 192U> and imprisoned communist leaders.
In 192U, the Wafd Party attempted to control trade unions through the
establishment of a federation under the chairmanship of Abdulrahman
Fahmi, a prominent Vafdist.(2) This new federation likewise,
disappeared the same year, following the imprisonment of its president.
V
Trade unions tried to bring pressure on the government for the enact¬
ment of a labour code, but to no avail.
During the period from 1922 to 1930, Labour activities were limited to
attempts to persuade the government to enact a labour code and the
establishment of trade unions.
Political parties continued their attempts to control trade unions.
(1) See Amin., M.F., op. cit.. p.20.
(2) See *Izz al-Din, A., The History of Labour and Labouring Glass
in Egypt, 1919-1929, p.170.
In 1930, a new trade union federation was formed by the Prince Abbas
HaLim, with the encouragement of the Wafd, but in 1935> when a
conflict developed between the Prince and the Wafd, a split occurred
among trade unions. The Wafd succeeded in controlling some of the
trade unions. The Royal Palace and some other political parties also
attempted to win the support of trade unions. In 1935» Ismail Sidqi,
the leader of the People's Party, who had been a Prime Minister and a
prominent businessman, attempted to bid for the support of trade unions
by promising labour reforms. The Royal Palace also announced the
establishment of a trade union federation unders its sponsorship. (1)
The promulgation of the 1930 Constitution prevented the articulation
of demands by many groups including workers.(2) Employers succeeded
in preventing the enactment of significant legislation which might
have strengthened the position of workers in general, and of trade
unions in particular. 'They also succeeded in securing the co¬
operation of the police in breaking up strikes. 'This led workers,
on some occasions, to resort to hunger strikes and even suicide.(3)
The spread of unemployment, the rise of the cost of living, the
worsening of working conditions, and the dissemination of nationalist
ideas through the press, all led to the resumption of strike activity.
A series of strikes, some of which were extremely violent, took place
between 1932 and 193^.
(1) See Amin, M.F., op. cit.. pp.22-23.
(2) See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
(3) See Nekheili, S.M., op. oit.. pp.169-170.
84
The period from 1938 to 19UU di<3- »ot witness strikes. In 19U0,
following the outbreak of the Second World Wax, a law was enacted
prohibiting strikes and strict control was established over trade
union activities.
When the Wafd was brought to power with the help of the British in
19U2, it passed a number of laws. Of particular importance was
the Trade Union Act 191+2, which gave legal recognition to trade
unions.(1) But even though the law legally recognised trade
unions, it established strict government control over them.
Furthermore, agricultural workers and government employees were
specifically forbidden from organising trade unions. The
exclusion of agricultural workers was aimed at preventing peasants
from gaining political strength, which might have constituted a
challenge to the authority of landowners. Government employees
were allowed to form only associations, whose activities were
limited to providing services to their members.
The Act restricted union membership to persons actually working
in industry and commerce. This was aimed at preventing intellectuals
and political groups from infilitrating trade unions. The Act
restricted the establishment of unions to those having fifty and
more members. Some other restrictions were introduced which were
generally aimed at limiting trade union activities.(2)
(1) A summary of the main provisions of the Act appeared in
International Labour Review, Vol.i+8, No.2 (August 191+2), pp.216-217.
(2) The Trade Union Act 19^+2 is to be discussed in detail in Chapter 5
of this thesis.
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In spite of the limitations of the Act, the number of trade unions,
as shown in Table 2.1, increased to 1+89? with a total membership of
about 11+0,000 in 191+5. The number of unions and union membership,
however, dropped to about 92,000 by 1947. The reason for this decline
was that many unions were found to have less than the minimum of fifty
members required by the law, and accordingly their licences were
cancelled. The licences of other unions were cancelled for their






















(1) Handley, W.J., "The Labour Movement in Egypt", The Middle East
Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 1949)? P»279«
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Sources Derived from El-Giritly, A.A., "The Structure of Modern
Industry in Egypt', L'Egypte Contemporaries, Nos. 21+1-214.2
(Novembers-December 19l+7)> P«550; Handley,W.J., "The
Labour Movement in Egypt", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 3,
No. 3 (Summer 191+9), p.279; Audsley, M.T., "Labour and
Social Affairs in Egypt", St. Antony's Papers, No. 1+ -
Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 1, (Chatto and Windus, London,
1958)» P»96; and Amin, M.F., op. cit.. p. 1+9.
The trade unions which existed during the period from 191+2 to 1952
were rather weak: and the majority were small but a few were large.
For example, in the textile industry, the unions at two leading
textile companies in El-Mehalla El-Kubra and Alexandria, consisted
of about 30,000 workers. The small size of unions was due to the
fact that many company unions were established in the same industry.
In 19l+7> there were eighty-two separate unions in the transport
industry, with a total membership of 16,61+0 workers.(1)
The Trade Union Act 191+2, prohibited the establishment of trade
union federations, nevertheless, a short-lived trade union congress
was founded in 191+6. It was known as the Committee of National
Liberation and was founded by a group of leftist unionists. The
Committee changed its name to the Workers* Congress attracting
more conservative elements as it became involved in nationalist
activities. It was one of the main forces behind a series of
(1) See Handley, W.J. op. clt.. p.281
violent political demonstrations and workers1 strikes which took
place during 19U6. It disappeared, however, at the end of 19M>»
when the government severely suppressed some of the strikes,
dissolved the major unions involved and imprisoned their leaders.(1)
A few surviving members of the defunct Congress started to reorganise
themselves. They participated in the activities of various
nationalist groups, among which was the leftist organisation known as
the Democratic Movement of National Liberation. This workers*
group was responsible for organising the major strikes which took
place at El-Mehalla El-Kubra in 19U7» The stern counter measures
taken by the government resulted in the disappearance of this group.
The recognition of trade unions clearly did not result in industrial
peace. Factors which led to these strikes were related to the huge
increase in the cost of living, the low level of wages, unsatisfactory
working conditions, lack of housing and social services, the extreme
repressive measures taken by the government against workers, and the
workers* involvement in the growing nationalist movement. Many of
the workers lived below subsistence level during this period.(2)
(1) See Audsley, M.T,, "Labour and Social Affairs in Egypt",
in St. Antony's Papers. No. - Middle Eastern Affairs No. 1,
(Chatto & Windus, London, 1958)> pp.96-97.
(2) See El-Giritly, A.A., op, oit.. p.531.
(c) Trade Unions Under she Nationalist "yatem (1952-1976,
The revolutionary regime that came to power in mgypt in 1952 aimed
from the start to establish social justice for all and mobilisation
of the masses for political action participation. In order to achieve
these goals various measures were taken to improve the welfare of the
people. The two main groups representing the majority of the popula¬
tion were the peasants and the workers. Agrarian reform was
introduced to improve the welfare of peasantry. To improve the
welfare of workers, the revolutionary regime enacted a series of
labour laws which aimed at regulating almost all aspects of management-
labour relations. It also established machinery for more rigorous
enforcement of existing labour laws. The regime's efforts to
strengthen the labour movement were not limited to the development of
trade unions, but also included measures for the education and training
of workers.(1)
Soon after the new regime assumed power in 1952, a new Trade Union
Act was promulgated (Trade Union Act Ho. 319 of 1952).(2) The law
gave agricultural workers the right to form trade unions, permitted
the establishment of a nationwide federation, the right of the trade
union to represent all workers on the shop-floor if three-fifth of
them were union members, the formation of shop stewards' committees
(1 • The government's labour policy arid measures are to be discussed
in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
(2) A summary of the main provisions of this Act appeared in
Harbison, ?.H. and Ibrahim, I.A., Human Resources for Egyptian
Enterprise,(McGraw-Hill. Hook Co., Inc., New York, 1958),
pp.130-182.
and check-off agreements. These provisions contributed greatly to
unionisation and to the financial independence and security of trade
unions.
Under the new Aot, unions continued to be prohibited from engaging in
political and religious activities. Strikes also continued to be
forbidden. Furthermore, all trade union officials were required to
be full-time workers. This specific provision prevented the
development of a full-time professional union leadership.
Although strikes were forbidden by law, the early years of the
revolutionary regime witnessed frequent instances of labour unrest.
These were to be expected. After all the workers had suffered from
oppression and exploitation in the past and were encouraged by the
declaration of the government that their rights and their entitlement
to a higher standard of living and working conditions would be
supported by legislation and other provisions.(1)
The formation of a nationwide general federation was delayed until
1957 when the government had practically removed all opposition
grorjps from among the trade union movement and brought the latter
under its total control. The formation, in 1957> of the Egyptian
Federation of Labour (EFL) marked the beginning of a nationwide
(1) Some of these strikes were of a serious nature and included sit-
ins and wrecking of factories. The government dealt sternly
with the strikers. For further details on the events which
accompanied these strikes, see Hussein, M., Class Conflict
in Egypt; 1945-1970. (Trans. Chirman, M., Chirman, S.,
Ehnenfeld, A., and Brown, K.), (Monthly Review Press, Hew York,
1973) pp. 121+-125.
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unified trade union movement politically integrated with the ruling
Party and sole political organisation, the National Union (and
thereafter the ASU).
Tn 1959, a comprehensive labour code was promulgated (Labour Code
No. 91 of 19^9). (1) This law, along with various later ministerial
decrees, constitutes the basis of labour policy in Egypt during the
period from 1959 onwards. Part of the law was aimed at strengthening
trade unions. A trade union wan to include persons engaged in a given
occupation, trade, or craft. Trade unions were permitted to set up
branches in each district, and to form shop stewards committees in
each plant having fifty workers and more. This was a confirmation of
the same provision of the 1952 Aot aimed at unifing trade union leader¬
ship. The new Code also permitted government employees to join trade
unions. Unions, reorganised in fifty-three central unions with 288
branches, witnessed a considerable increase in membership. In 1963
total union membership reached 1+08,566 workers.(2)
Despite the general support and satisfaction of the labour movement
for the 1959 Labour Code, practical problems soon emerged when the Code
was applied. Restricting shop stewards1 committees to establishments
with fifty or more workers resulted in a severe communications problem
between union branches and their members in small firms who had no
(1) United Arab Republic (Central Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labour), Presidential Decision Promulgating Labour Law No. 91
of 1959. (Labour Code) (Unpublished), (Cairo, 1959).
(2) Ibrahim, I.A., "Socio-Kconomic Changes in Egypt} 1952-1961+",
in Ross, A.M., (Ed.), Industrial Relations and Economic Development.
(Maomillan, London, 1966), p.132.
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official union representation. The centralisation of authority in
the hands of the central unions with headquarters usually located in
Cairo and Alexandria, resulted in weakening union branches.
To eliminate the above weaknesses in the Labour Code the Presidential
Decree No. 62 was issued in 1961*.(1) The Decree did not change the
structural organisation, on the contrary, it further affirmed the
central authority of the central 'unions and the EPL. It did, however,
give greater autonomy to union branches and shop stewards' committees.
The new decree also provided for the appointment of full-time officers.
After completing their term, these officers were to return to their
former employment. The provision was intended to develop professional
trade union leaders drawn from union membership. The legislation wan
also intended to establish government authority over the trade union
movement. In this respect, the government alone was authorised to
specify the number of unions and classify similar trades in which one
union was to be established. Accordingly, Ministerial Decree No. 30
of 1961* specified the -twenty-seven trade unions that were permitted. (2)
The changes in labour legislation and full government support for
trade unionism resulted in uniting various political factions within
the trade union movement, and in expanding trade union activities.
(1) See United Arab Republic (Ministry of Labour), The New Organisation
of Trade Unions(Government Press, Cairo, 1961*).
(2) For a list of these unions see Ibid.. pp.1*2-1*3; and Khalid, M.,
Al-haraka Al-naqabiya Baina Al-madhi Wal-hathir (The Trade Union
Movement Between the Past and the Present), (Mu'ssat Dar At-ta'wey,
Cairo, 1975), P*58, (in Arabic).
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Various marxist groups now content to be incorporated within the
formal trade union leadership, offered their support to the regime
and started to play a positive role in trade union activities,
The National Charter presented in 1962 by President Nasser, stipulated
that trade unions were to contribute to industrial development, to
protect their members* r ghts and interests, and work for the improve¬
ment of their members* material, educational and social well-being.(1)
Thus, trade unions were viewed as agencies for promoting co-operation
for the purpose in achieving industrial development. The new role
assigned to trade unions differed sharply from their previous role.
Hitherto, trade union activities, apart from some collective bargaining
which was limited in scope and in subject matter, were confined to
the provision of welfare services and workers' education programmes.
The changes introduced profit-sharing, workers-directors and other
forms of participation at local, as well as national levels.(2) This
wave of activities opened up a new horizon for the trade union movement
and led to further refinement of its ideology towards workers control.
Thus, at the Fifth Congress held in May 196£> the EFL issued a "list
of recommendations" to the "national government" to "strengthen the
position of the Egyptian working-class so that it is able to contribute
effectively to the economic development and the creation of the
country*s renaissance" (3) The list included demands for expanding
(1) United Arab Republic (information Agency), The National Charter,
pp.99-100.
(2) Worker participation in management is to be discussed in
Chapter 9 of this thesis.
(3) Al-'Amal (Labour) (Organ of EFL), Vol. 3> No. 26 (June 19&5)? p.12.
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workers* participation in all aspects of industry and economic
sectors, notably in planning, legislation and manpower forecasting.(1)
Despite the cool reaction of the Ministry of Labour, subsequent steps
were taken by President Nasser himself (through Presidential decrees)
to expand the trade unions* role in national planning and to consult
them about labour and industrial legislation.(2) These changes
suggest a shift in the process of rule-making at national level.
In the past, nationwide rules had usually been established by the
government with occasional consultation of employers and the management
of the public enterprises. The new changes in the role of trade
unions eventually led to their inclusion in this process, though the
state continued to maintain the leading role.
Political changes brought about after Nasser*s death have not much
affected the position of trade unions. Despite the policy of "economic
liberalisation", the Sadat*s government has maintained socialism as
the essence of the Egyption economy making no drastic changes in
labour policy.
At the EPL*s Ninth Congress, held in July 1973» Salah Gharib, the
then Minister of Labour, was elected President of the Pederation
replacing Bulita who became President of the ICATU.(3) This move
helped to maintain the traditional co-operation between the government
(1) Por a list of these demands, see Ibid., pp.12-13.
(2) Arab Socialist Unions, Workers and the Revolution in its Twenty-
Pirst Anniversary, pp.198-199.
(3) Bulita, at present is the Minister of Manpower Planning in
addition to his post as President of the ICATU.
and the trade union movement at the centre. However, within the
rank and file in branches and union committees where Nasserist and
marxist elements were strong, there has been some opposition to the
formal leadership. This opposition still operates within the legal
framework of the ASU and the regime.
Union elections which were due to be held in July 1975 were postponed
on the grounds that new labour and trade union laws were about to be
passed. This action wan criticised by a representative of the
leftist elements, Miss Amina Shafiq. In an article published in the
Al-Ahram, (the semi-official Cairo daily newspaper), Miss Shafiq
argued that there was no justification for postponing union elections,
except for fear of the possibility that some radical elements might
reach top positions.(1) Although given the present system by which
the ASU nominates candidates for union offices, it seems difficult to
believe Miss Shafiq's argument, it is still obvious that no union
elections have been held up to the present time. The promised labour
and trade union laws were enacted but have not yet been put into
effect due to opposition from trade unions. The Trade Union Act in
particular was criticised by EFL (though the Federation was consulted
when the Bill was drawn up) on the grounds that it did not contain
their recommendations and further increased government control over
the trade union structure.(2)
Meanwhile, the leftist elements have been putting increasing pressure
on the EFL to take an independent economic and political stand.
(1) Al-Ahram (Daily Newspaper of Cairo), Vol. 102, No. 3253b
(January7, 1976), p.11. (in Arabic).
(2) Al-'Amal (Labour) (Organ of EFL), Vol. 1i{., No. 156 (May 1976), p. 16
(in Arabic).
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Although they failed in persuading unions to join the National
Progressive Organisation, the Leftist Front within the ASU, they
successfully prevented the EFL from standing with the Centre Front.(1)
Under pressure, the Federation was forced to call for free choice by
its members to join any of the three fronts.(2)
In conclusion, it seems that the present trend of inter-union
ideological conflict is going to continue for the near future. If
so, this will undoubtedly effect the trade union movement and its
relationship with the government.
Syria
In Syria, similar to Iraq, and Egypt, a primitive industrial relations
system existed prior to the emergence of the industrial labour force
and trade unionism under the French Mandate. Therefore, in
analysing the development of trade unions I shall follow a similar
historical process to that followed in the cases of the other two
countries.
(a) Trade Unions Under the French Mandate (1920-19U6)
Prior to the French Mandate, when handicraft industries were prosperous,
management-labour relations were governed by a guild system. Both
(1) In May 1976, President Sadat announced the reorganisation of
the ASU so as to allow for the existence of three formal
political fronts operating within the ASU. One represents the
political right, the other represents the left and the third
represents the centre (the government*s front). For further details
see Chapter 1 of this thesis.
(2) See Al-Ahram (daily Newspaper of Cairo), Vol. 102, No. 32665
(May 17, 1976), p.1. (in Arabie).
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employers and employees were organised in one crai"t association, in
which the power of employers based on paternalism was dominant.(l)
However, the emergence of the factory system under the French admini¬
stration, accompanied with a relative decline in the handicraft
industries, made possible the emergence of modern trade unionism.
Nevertheless, the guild system did not disappear until it wan
officially abolished in 1935.
The first trade union to be organised independently from the guild
system was the "National Union of Workers of the Textile and Knitting-
Industries" which wan formed in Damascus in 1925* Subhi Khatib, the
pioneer of Syrian trade unionism was elected Chairman of this Union. (2)
In 1928, the "Printing Workers1 Union" was also founded in Damascus.
In the absence of any law regarding the formation of trade unions,
the French authority ratified the two unions1 internal rules in
accordance with the Ottoman Code of the Guilds.(3) Employers,
confident of their power and aware of the ineffectiveness of such
organisations, did not object. (1+)
(1) Allouni, A., "The Labor Movement in Syria", The Middle East
Journal. Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1959)» P»65»
(2) Subhi Khatib, a foreman, originally campaigned for a formation
of a workers* union in 1922, but did not succeed until 1925.
He later became the President of the GFTUS and a founding member
of the ICATU.
(3) Government of Syria (Directorate General of Information), Syria,
Vol. Ill, p.155.
(1+) Shahoud, M., "Al-haraka Al-ummalia Fi-Suria" ('The Labour Movement
in Syria), Ma.ialat Al-'amal (The Labour Journal), Vol. 1, No. 1,
(April 1958)» P»69, (In Arabic).
97
In the ensuing years other permits were granted and several unions
were formed in Damascus and Alleppo. Their establishment set the
pattern for workers in the newly-developed industries.
Workers' attempts to organise on a modern basis were not easy. There
were many setbacks, for example, the strong roots of paternalism, the
powerful position of the employers, the absence of a protective
labour code, and the lack of qualified and experienced labour leaders.
The few unions which were established were ineffective because they
lacked the legal structure according to which they could justify their
activities. The Ottoman Code of the Guilds entitled them to act as
organisations arranging the rules of their crafts and pursuing some
other welfare activities within the limits of social norms and customs.
It was apparent to the French authority that new labour legislation
was needed, since the idea of trade unionism was increasing in
popularity among workers and any legislation would have to reckon with
their sentiments. Thus, in September 1935* a legislative decree was
passed (Legislative Decree No. 152 of 1935) which abolished the
Ottoman Code of the Guilds, and was also designed to restrict trade
union activities and to control and suppress them.(1)
Although the abolition of the Ottoman Code did not provide trade
unions with the needed labour code, it made it possible for them to
convene and act as workers' organisations. Meanwhile, the change in
French policy under the National Front government encouraged the Syrian
trade unionists to act freely. Accordingly, in late 193&, the
(1) Allouni, A., op. oit.. pp.65-66,
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delegates of the leading trade unions of Damascus convened a conference
to study the problems of trade unionism and workers. Its outcome
was a list of problems which the conference expected the government
to dead with, among them: maximum hours, a labour code, a committee
to resolve industrial disputes, and the problem of low wages. The
list of demands also asked for compensation for workers who had been
discharged owing to the severe economic conditions, the banning of
child labour, and prohibition of the employment of foreign workers.
The government's reaction was negative and contributed to industrial
unrest and the outbreak of a series of strikes. Another conference
was convened in March 1938 and was attended by representatives of all
workers in Syria. The conference led to the establishment of a
federation of all trade unions to give labour a powerful united front.
The Federation, which elected Subhi Khatib as President, submitted to
the authorities a new list of demands, notable among them was the
right to organise all categories of workers, including those still
engaged in handicraft industries. This demand was conceded and in
January 1939» the govenaaent issued a directive specifying the
occupations and professions that could form trade unions. This list
of occupations and trades was shortly expanded to include almost all
categories.
The outbreak of the Second World War brought a temporary setback to
the development of trade unions. To prevent interruption of wartime
production, the state prohibited trade union conferences and meetings.
The Federation of Trade Unions thereupon authorised its President,
Khatib, to follow up the efforts of the unified demands of workers.
Meanwhile, the need to seek workers' co-operation to meet the wartime
production requirements resulted in a gradual easing of the restric¬
tions on trade unions' activities. Khatib's efforts succeeded in
bringing about the enactment of better and more protective labour
legislation, and in creating an atmosphere of freedom to organise.
'Trade union activities were not limited to economic goals but
extended, as was the case in Iraq and Egypt, to identification with
political parties and upheaval in the country. Political parties
competed to infiltrate the trade union movement and gain trade union
support. Both the ABSP and the SCP (Syrian Communist Party) were
very active in this field and more successful than the traditional
parties, such as the National Bloc. The political orientation of
trade unions was reflected during the elections of the unions'
executives. Syria's nationwide war efforts made the workers realise
their obligations to the country and their importance as a pressure
group.(1)
The War era also brought formal changes in government policy
beneficial to the cause of trade unionism, namely, industrial peace.
Government intentions were to support the war effort by avoiding
strikes. The way to achieve that aim was by easing out the
restrictions imposed on trade unions by legislation. Hanna points
out that numerous decrees were passed to help solve some of the
problems, such as Decree No. 125/N1 of December 191+1, providing
(1) For a detailed account of the political orientation of trade
unions in Syria during this period, see Hanna, A., Al-haraka
Al-ummalia Fi Suria Va Libanan, 1900-19li5 (The Labour Movement
in Syria and Lebanon, 1900-191+5), (Dar Dimashq, Damascus, 1973)»
pp.362-381, (in Arabic).
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living allowances and. the decrees of August 191+2 and May 19l+5>
providing wage adjustments to meet increasing cost of living. (1)
This encouragement stimulated further organised efforts, and "by 191+6
there were some 18,000 to 19,000 members in Syria1s trade unions.(2)
(b) Trade Unions Under the Traditional System (191+6-1958)
Among the earliest actions cf the newly independent government was the
enactment of the Labour Code Ho. 279 of 191+6.(3) The government
needed the support of various groups, including trade unions, and
had no choice but to submit to the letter's demand for a Labour Code.
The Code brought, in addition to legal recognition, very advanced
provisions regarding trade union activities. However, as was the
case in Iraq and Egypt, it excluded agricultural workers and
government employees from the right to organise.
After the enactment of the Labour Code, trade unionism began to
spread rapidly in Syria, though not as impressively as in Egypt.
By the early 1950's there were 182 registered trade unions with
nearly 28,000 members, of whom about 15^ were in industry.(ij.)
By comparison, Egypt at that time had 1+88 unions with about 150,000
members, and Iraq had only 12 unions with some 7>000 members.
(1) Ibid., pp. 1+79-1+83.
(2) See Nabulsi, op. cit.. p.235.
(3) The Code is to be discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
(1+) See Saiygh, Y.A., "Management-Labour Relations in Selected Arab
Countries", International Labour Review. Vol. 77, No. 6
(June 1958), p.530.
Table 2.2 shows that the total membership of Syrian trade unions was
very small and increased very little between 1951 and 1957 although


















Source: Devised from Nabulsi, H.M.S., op. cit., pp. 233 and 236;
and Deling, W.A., op. cit.. p. 1^0.
This was mainly due to the ineffectiveness of many registered unions,
whose establishment was motivated by political rivalry rather than
actual expansion of employment in their respective trades.
Since the figures of Table 2.2 represent the aggregate of industrial,
transport, construction and services employment, it is fair to say
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that the Syrian trade union movement was weak during this period,
though compared to Iraq, it was in a healthier position. Among the
factors which hindered its expansion, in addition to the ineffectiveness
of many registered unions, were the exclusion of the agricultural
workers and government employees and the high percentage of illiterate
workers who were indifferent towards organised activities.
However, except for the Shishakli's rule (1951-195U), the Syrian trade
union movement, during this period, enjoyed a considerable degree of
freedom to function. In 19l+9» the General Federation of Trade Unions,
Syria (GFTUS) was established to replace that of the 1938.(1) A few
other general federations were thereafter also established but the
GFTUS wan the most powerful among them. By 1958 there were some 135
unions affiliated to it in various parts of Syria. (2) The Federation
played a significant role in the country's domestic policies. Prior
to 1957* the GETUS was controlled by a coalition of various leftist
and moderate political groups among trade unionists. Its first
President was Subhi Khatib, the pioneer trade unionist who presided
over the 1938 federation. In the 1957 elections, the ABSP, now very
powerful in Syria, was able to capture the leadership of the Federation,
and Tala'at Taghlubi, the Chairman of the Railway Union and a prominent
Ba'athist was elected to the Presidency. The ABSP's control of the
Syrian trade unions continued until 19^0, when the Nasserists took
over the leadership of the GFTUS.
As a result of the ABSP's influence, the GFTUS became very active in
the political field, advocated socialism and Arab unity. The
(1) Later in 1959 > the GFTUS became by law the only recognised
trade union federation in Syria.
(2) Lenczowski, G., op. cit., p.279.
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federation, guided by the spirit of Pan-Arabism, was one of the founders
of the ICATU in 1956.
However, owing to ideological differences, some other, but far less
influential, general federations were also established throughout the
19£0's. In 1953» in addition to the GFTUS, there were two other
national and six regional general federations.(1) Many other federa¬
tions were formed thereafter; in early 1958> they totalled eighteen
national and regional general federations. (2) Like their affiliated
unions, the majority of these federations were small, ineffective,
and merely a reflection of political rivalry.
Industrial unrest was a familiar phenomenon during the period, parti¬
cularly between 19U6-1+9 and 195U-58. The post-war wave of strikes
may be traced to inflation, the adverse effects on the young Syrian
industry of the resumption of imports, and governmental instability.
During the period 19l+9-5i+» the number of strikes declined, as the military
regimes attempted to improve working conditions and suppress strikes
and it was not until the deposition of Shishakli that another series
of strikes erupted.(3)
(c) Trade Unions Under the Nationalist Regimes (1958-1976)
The new UAR regime aimed at integrating the Syrian Trade Union movement
into the National Union, and thus, like the Egyptian trade union move¬
ment, it was to come under government oontrol. (ij.) Early attempts to
(1) Hallsworth, J.A., op. cit.. p.379*
(2) Belling, V.A., op. oit.. p.^O.
(3) Baer, G., "Labor in the Arab East", Middle Eastern Affairs.
Vol. 11, Nos. 6-', (June-July i960), p.186. ————
(i|) The National Union was Egypt*s only political party prior to
the ASU. During the union with Syria, a National Union was
also established in that country. See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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persuade various federations, including the 3a*ath-dominated GFTUS
to join the National union failed. This wan mainly because the
Syrian trade union movement had experienced freedom of association
and would not sacrifice this freedom even for national integration.
However, the government, in order to enforce its policy, pursued new
tacticss it influenced workers to join the National union on an indi¬
vidual baais, it sponsored Nasserist unionists, and in the meantime,
gave concessions to the labour movement in order to ensure its loyalty
and prepare it to accept political integration with the National Union, (1)
The ABSP, which controlled the Ministry of Labour, could not officially
oppose these tactics. However, in order to maintain its control
over the trade union movement, the ABSP instructed its unionist members
to join the National Union individually. Meanwhile, a campaign to
organise uncommitted workers was waged, and both the ABSP and the
Nasserists competed with each other in this respect. The ABSP was
very experienced and had a popular base among workers compared to the
Nasserists who were inexperienced and relatively new to this field of
activity. Thus, despite direct intervention by the Ministry of the
Interior on behalf of the Nasserists, the ABSP list won the union
elections which was held in September 19£8» though by a margin of
only twenty-feffr votes.(2)
The Labour Code No. 91 of 195>9» which enacted in April of that year
applied to both Egypt and Syria. (3) Although the Code drew upon the
most advanced Egyptian labour legislation, to Syria it was in
(1) Al-Habib, M.M., A Study of the Social, Political, Economic and
Cultural Institutions and the Labor Movement in the Middle East,p.U50.
(2) See Khareet, M., and Jamal, R., Al-haraka Al-ummalia Pi Surla (The
Labour Movement in Syria), (Unpublished paper presented to the Third
Educational Session of the International Confederation of Arab Trade
Unions, Cairo, December 12-2U, 1970), p.6, (in Arabic)
(3) The main provisions of the Code were discussed earlier in this
Chapter. The Code is also to be discussed in detail in Chapter
5 of this thesis.
certain important aspects, a step "backward. The Code established
very close government control over both unions and workers, which the
Syrians had never experienced before. It prohibited strikes, a
right which Syrian workers had enjoyed since the Ottoman days. It also
applied the Egyptian form of disciplinary procedures. These procedures
gave employers greater authority regarding discipline, including the
right of summary dismissal in certain cases (a right hitherto unknown
in Syria).
More significantly, the government, in January 1960, enacted a new
law (Law No. 8 of i960) which made it compulsory for trade unionists
who stand for union office, to join the National Union. Article (6)
of the Law explicitly states:
MA trade unionist may not stand for trade union elections at any
level within the trade union organisation structure, unless he
(or she) becomes a member of The National Union."(1)=
The Labour Code was accepted enthusiastically by the Egyptian trade
unionists (to whom it represented a very great advance), but the
Code was met with severe opposition by the Syrian trade union move¬
ment. The GFTUS and other Syrian federations became virtually
illegal \inder the provisions of the Code. The GFTUS strongly
criticised the Code on the grounds that it subjected the trade union
movement to government control, prohibited unions to engage in
political activities, and prohibited the right of strike. The GFTUS
also claimed that the Code, contrary to international agreements,
abused the freedom of association by giving the authorities the right
to dissolve unions on trivial grounds.(2) The GFTUS reacted strongly
(1) Quoted by Khareet, M., and Jamal, R., op. cit.. p.7.
(2) General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria, Al-haraka Ai-ummalia
Fi'l-qitr Al-'Arabia Al-suri (The Labour Movement in Syria) ™"
(GFTUS, Damascus, 1975)» pp.l|-3-l+i+> (in Arabic).
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against Law No. 8 and considered it to be "an Act aimed at paralysing
the labour movement in Syria" and "there is no resemblance to this
Law even in the more reactionary regimes and those countries who
are well known to oppose freedom of association".(1)
The opposition to integration led to abandoning the idea and amending
Article (183) of the Labour Code which stipulated that "it is for¬
bidden to constitute more than one general federation of trade unions
in the United Arab Republic". The new amendment stipulated that the
"term one generail federation of trade unions applies separately
and independently to each region of the United Arab Republic". This
meant that there would be two separate trade union movements, one in
Egypt and the other in Syria, with two general federations and
affiliated unions in each region.
All trade union federations and their affiliated unions in Syria
became illegal in accordance with Labour Code 19591 and new applica¬
tions for union licensing had to be made. Applications for licenses
for forty-one central unions were granted (compared to about 300
unions which existed in various districts prior to the enactment of
the Gbde). This was a result of the Code's provision that only one
union may be formed in one industry or craft.
The licensed unions soon opened branches in the districts and prepared
for the elections which were held on July 5, 1959* Despite
government intervention, the ABSP (which had now come into open
(1) Ibid., p.1+1+
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conflict with the government) was again able to control most of the
trade unions. Its candidates also held the majority of the seats
in the GFTUS' Executive, including the presidency which went to
Khalid Hakim, the Chairman of the Automobile Drivers Union who was
a prominent B&'athist and an active founder of the ICATU«(1)
The enactment of Law No. 8 of 1960, required that all office holders
had to join the National Union. This provoked great protest and
resentment among the Syrian trade union movement. Refusing to join
the National Union, representatives of more than 300 -union branches
and 36 out of the 1+1 general unions held a conference in Damascus on
January 31, i960. The conference petitioned President Nasser to
restore trade union rights. The delegates demanded the right to
strike, an end to summary dismissal, an amendment of the Labour Code,
an end to the National Union's control, and a 10% increase in minimum
wages (because wages had declined at least that much in 1959)* Many
of the union leaders, as a result, were arrested and in protest the
Executive of the GFTUS resigned.(2)
The government then installed a new leadership loyal to it from among
the National Union members. Executives of general unions were
suspended and union branches were dissolved and replaced by appointed
loyal personnel. This action was deplored by various trade union
(1) Safawi, H., Adhwa* 'Ala Al-haraka Al-ummalia Al-dawlia'l'a
A1-'Arabia (Spotlight on the International and Arab Trade Union
Movement),(Shopkeepers Union of Beirut, Beirut, 1967)? pp.62-63,
(in Arabic).
(2) See Ibid., p.63; and GFTUS, op. cit., p.1+5*
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factions sis anti-democratic and illegal, because in accordance with
the Labour Code, all union posts must be filled by elected
personnel.(1)
The new trade union leaders occupied themselves mainly with National
Union activities, and Arab and international affairs; they paid
little attention to the mounting problems of unemployment and rising
prices. Consequently, workers lost confidence in their new leader¬
ship and tried, on several occasions, to enforce their demands by
resorting to short daily stoppages.(2) However, the nationalisa¬
tion measures introduced in 1961 were generally welcomed by many
deposed trade unionists, despite the conflict between these unionists
and the government. But these measures came too late in the life
of the regime to provide a serious solution.
The Syrian trade union movement further suffered under the separatist
rule (1961-63). The new regime which denationalised industry was
determined to revive the pre-unity position of the private sector and
strengthen it. Open conflict ensued between employers backed by the
government and trade unions. The Nasserist unionists, who conti¬
nued to lead the trade union movement officially, were paralysed
after losing government support after the separation. The
Ba'athists and communists though holding no official trade union
posts, became the most active groups leading almost daily strikes in
protest against the new regime's anti-labour policies.
(1) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria, op. oit., p.l;5.
(2) See Khareet, M., and Jamal, R., op. cit., p.10.
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Another blow to the trade union movement came with the enactment of
the Legislative Decree No. 50 of 1962. The new Decree, amending
the Labour Code of 1959 > restructured trade union organisations. It
returned unions to the pre-1959 status of district-based trade unions.
The Decree, contrary to the pre-1959 situation, did not allow the
formation of shop stewardscommittees on the shop floor, though
workers could still join their respective district trade unions.(1)
This move helped employers to act freely on the shop floor in the
absence of legal union representation. The Decree, however,
repealed Law No. 8 of 19^0, though this Law became ineffective once
recession from the UAR had taken place.
In accordance with the provisions of the Decree No. 50, the government
dissolved the existing union executives and appointed temporary union
officials until elections were held. The new appointees were chosen
from among the supporters of the pre-unity traditional parties, the
People's Party and the National Block (both represented in the
government).
The Decree was met by strong opposition from workers and consequently
the outbreak of strikes increased further and was accompanied by
demonstrations, hunger strikes and sit-ins.(2) These actions forced
the government to freeze the Decree in November 19&2, and then repeal
it in February 1963.
(1) Quoted by Khareet M., and Jamal, R., on. oit., p.12.
(2) GFTUS, Al-taarir Al-muqadam Lil Mu'tamar Al-hadi 'Ashr, 1963
(Report presented to the Eleventh Congress, 1963) (Unpublished),
(GFTUS, Damascus, 19^3)> p.12, (in Arabic).
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The repeal of the Legislative Decree No. $0 required the reapplies-
tion of the Labour Code No. 91 of 19£>9, regarding trade "union
organisations. Accordingly, the existing district unions were
restructured into nationwide general unions, and fifty-nine new
general unions were formed between April and May 1963* The ABSP, which
took over power on March 8, 19&3, seized this opportunity to appoint
unionists loyal to it to the temporary executives until elections
could be held.
In July 1963, the GFTTJS held its Eleventh Congress. Pour different
groups competed for the elections, the Ba'athists, the Nasserists,
the Communists and the Houranists (followers of Akram Al-Hourani, "who
by now had been dismissed from the ABSP because of his anti-unity
stand and support for the Separatist regime).
The Nasserists were in a weak political position and gained little
support during the elections. The Communists who revived their
activities during the Separatist period and became active in leading
worker protests, by now suffered from a political division. This, in
turn, affected their performance in the elections so that they only
won a few seats at shop stewards level. The Houranists, on the
other hand, still had some popular support and were able to capture a
few major seats. The majority of the seats, however, were won by the
ABSP candidates who emerged as the most experienced group in
campaigning for the elections.
The Congress, which reinstated Khalid Hakim as President of the
GFTUS, resolved that the Labour Code of 1959 must be amended and
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trade unions must be consulted regarding the enactment not only of
a trade union law but of other labour legislation. As a result of
this resolution and due to GFTUS* pressure, a new trade union law
was passed in 196k (Law No. 31 of 1961+)• The new Law reorganised
trade unions into a hierarchical structure. The major change in
this regard wan that union branches were federated into local
district federations in addition to affiliation to nationwide general
unions. This was intended to combine the advantages of both central
and local organisations, but this led to a conflict of authority
between local federations and general unions. The new law did,
however, repeal most of the provisinns of the Code which had been
the subject of trade union criticism.
The 1961+ Act was then repealed by the Law No. 8J+ of 19^8, which
completely restructured trade union organisation and government. (1)
Meanwhile, the internal political conflict in Syria began to affect
the trade union movement. The elected leadership of the trade union
movement was replaced in 1966 by an appointed personnel loyal to the
regime. Then the government launched a purge of the movement to
remove its opponents and to bring it firmly under control.
The period from 1966 onwards witnessed a drastic change in trade
union ideology. Apart from increasing demands for workers* control,
a new order of union-government co-operation was promoted. The
Eighteenth Congress of GFTUS held in September 197U> advocated the
priority of increasing production over indulging in "economic demands".
(1) This Law is to be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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It was later explained that this did not necessarily mean abandoning
the economic and social demands of workers, "but the priority of
objectives. Because the public sector is dominant in most
industries, it is deemed that the main objective of the working-
class was to increase production, reduce waste and cost, and protect
the public sector.(1) In pursuance of this objective, the GFTUS in
197U> allocated a month for "production" in which all members of
trade unions were asked to work an extra two hours per day for the
whole of the month. This was also repeated in 1975 and 1976. In
addition, the GITUS introduced a productivity competition among
workers, where financial prizes, as well as other means of remunera¬
tion, were provided to those who showed outstanding records of
production.
Although this policy suggests the beginning of a change in the trade
unions* role, it is diffioult to assess its outcome or impact on
labour without further research which might be left to future
investigation.
(1) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria, Khitat *Amal
Al-ltlhad Al-'am Li Naaabat Al-ummal Fi Al-qitr Al-'Arabl
Al-SUri Lil Bawra Al-Intikhabla Al-tham-tria ' aaVi-m (A PI an of
Action for the GFTUS* Eighteenth Session), (GFTUS, Damascus,
1973)» pp.8-16, (in Arabic).
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Comparison of the Development of Trade Unions in the Three Countries
The development of trade unions followed similar patterns in Iraq,
Egypt and Syria. During the foreign administrations a few trade
unions were formed. They remained weak, their activities very
limited and subjected to government suppression.
Under the traditional systems, the situation became slightly more
favourable for trade unions in Egypt and Syria, but remained
unchanged for Iraqi trade unions. In Iraq, a severe setback of
trade unionism was witnessed, because the Iraqi monarchist regime
saw in organised labour a potential political danger to the backing
from the landowners which it was relying on. In Egypt, trade unions
benefited from the state of acute conflict between the nationally
oriented governments and the dynasty who tried to enlist the co¬
operation of workers and other social groups in their struggle against
each other. Although the position of trade unions showed some
improvement, the activities which they were allowed to carry out
were limited and controlled to prevent government political opponents
using trade unions for their ends. In Syria, the situation was more
favourable for trade unions because of the state of political inr-
stability. Except under the Shishakli's dictatorial regime, the
various political regimes, promised social reforms, backed trade
unionism and introduced comparatively advanced labour legislation.
Under the nationalist systems, trade unions in the three countries
experienced substantial growth. The structure of trade unions was
Ill
changed by legislation, and as a result the unions acquired a high
prestigious social as well as political position. The nationalist
governments viewed labour as a critical but favoured group which was
needed to build up the new economic order. The co-operation of
labour organisations was to be sought and they were to be encouraged
and given the maximum possible support within the limits of the state*s
labour policy. This has positively affected the trade unions* outlook
and activities. They became equal participants in establishing and
administering work place rules, as well as being consulted or becoming
actively involved in, setting national labour policies. They also
became class conscious and much more militant in dealing with
employers and enterprise managers. Nevertheless, their position and
strength have varied in line with their political view vis-ar-vis the
governments in power, and their readiness to accept the state's labour
policies. In Iran and Syria, particularly in the former, oo-
operation between trade unions and governments has increased recently
as a result of which the trade union position has been further
enhanced through new and more advanced legislation. In Egypt, where
some trade unionists have criticised the recent political trends in the
country, the government proposed new legislation aiming at reducing the
influence of trade unions. Although such legislation has not yet
been enforced, the trade unions*position has comparatively become less
influential than in Iraq and Syria.
In the three oountries, within the framework of the state*s labour
policy, trade unions are viewed as agencies contributing to the
process of economic development. Thus, their leadership is
ejected "to be one of co-operating fully with the government in the
pursuit of its economic goals.
The main features of the development of trade unions in the three






























































































































































































































































TRADE OTION MEMBERSHIP AND STRUCTURE
This Chapter continues the analysis (which started in the previous
Chapter) of the development of trade unions in the three countries,
and deals with the growth of trade union membership and trade union
formal structure under the present nationalist systems. Trade
union membership has undergone substantial growth under the present
systems and their structures have been largely influenced by
statutes which reflect the increasing role of the state in industrial
relations.
IRAQ.
(a) Trade Union Membership
Since the revolution of 1958, the trade union movement in Iraq
has undergone almost continuous growth. There have been a few
fluctuations, for example, trade union memberships in 1959 was
about 11*0,000 workers according to the Iraqi Ministry of Labour,(1)
but membership declined to about 7U»000 workers in 1961*. This was
(1) Quoted by Al-Habib, M.M., op. cit.. p.150.
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probably due to the political instability and intern-union conflict
during the Qassem regime. Table 3*1 shows that trade union member¬
ship has continuously increased during the period from 1961+ to
197l+» The increase in union membership since 1961+ is attributable
to frequent changes in labour legislation in favour of unionised
workers, and to the considerable growth of the industrial labour
force(l) as a result of economic and industrial development.
As stated earlier, inter-union conflict during the period 1961+-
1968 adversely affected the rate of membership recruitment and
thus resulted in a fall in the annual rate of increase of membership.
The fluctuations in the rate of increase since 1968 are probably
attributable to changes in some of the employment regulations which
required that certain categories of employees became civil servants
and were thus legally excluded from union membership.
The density(2) of union membership differs among various economic
sectors. Although more than $0/o of the labour force was still
(1) For the purpose of analysis in this Chapter, the term
"industrial labour force" excludes the labour force in
agriculture. Employment in agriculture increased in both Iraq
and Egypt, but declined in Syria. Furthermore, the Syrian
agricultural workers are not unionisable by law. In Iraq
and Egypt, unionisable agricultural workers represent a small
percentage of total agricultural labour force.
(2) The term density of union membership is used to describe the
percentage distribution of union membership to employment, see
Price, R., and Bain, G.S., "Union Growth Revisited! 191+8-1971+
in Perspective", British Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol.1l+,
No.3 (November 1976), Table 1, p.21+0.
119
employed, in agriculture between 1969 and 197U> the density of trade
union membership in this sector was only 3% in 1969 and i+% in 1975
as Table 3.2 shows. This low density of trade union membership is
attributable to the fact that peasants are organised in special
associations which are of a co-operative nature and have a different
legal status. Only those who are employed in irrigation projects
and agricultural stations are considered "agricultural workers" for
the purpose of trade union organisation. The number of unionisable
agricultural workers was estimated as being about 100,000 workers
in 1974$ taking this figure into account, union membership in
agriculture would constitute about 71% of the total number of workers
permitted to join trade unions in this sector. The Table shows an
increase in union membership in all sectors between 19^9 and 1974*
a reflection of the constant increase in overall union membership.
However, industry represented the highest rate of increase (by 38
percentage points). Nevertheless the oil and mining sector
continued to be in the lead in terms of density of union membership
at S$P/0 in. 1969 and 83% in 197^» The low density of trade union
membership in the (commerce and (services (sector is due to the fact
that the majority of this sector*s employees are covered by
regulations of employment other than the Labour Code and thus are
not entitled to join trade unions.
The distribution of trade union membership also differs by provinces
In 197l+» Baghdad alone accounted for 1+0% (about 265,000 members)
of total union membership; Basra for 13% (about 85,000 members);
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TABLE 3.1











1964 19 117 74
1965 19 118 121
1966 19 121 166
1967 19 121 197
1968 19 121 221
1969 16 137 316
1970 13 137 392
1971 13 144 506
1972 13 144 984




(1) The 1974 figures are based on a membership survey which was
conducted by GFTOT between May 10 and June 10, 1975* The
figures were as on June 10, 1975*
Sourcei General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Report
Presented to the Third Congress, p,32; Iraq's Annual
Abstract of Statistics, 1973, p.378; and General
Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Jadawil Al-'Idhwiya
Fi 1974 - Fi 10 Huzairan 1975 (Tables on Trade Union






















































































































































































and Mosul for 9% (about £8,000 members). Thus, the three largest
oities accounted for 62% of total union membership while the rest
of the provinces accounted for only 38% of total union membership.(1)
This is an indication of the concentration of employment in these
three cities which account for 62% of employment (excluding
employment in agriculture) in the country.(2)
(b) The Present Formal Structure of Trade Unions
The present trade union structure is based on the provisions of
the Labour Code No. 1£1 of 1970. According to this Code, unions
are to be organised on an industrial basis, but unions in similar
industries are permitted to amalgamate. Thus, a typical trade
union tends to cover a wide range of industrial activities rather
than a specific industry.(3)
(1) Calculated from General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq.,
Tables on Trade Union Membership, 197iu
(2) Calculated from Republic of Iraq (Ministry of Planning),
op. oit.. p.£7.
(3) The nationwide unions established under the present Labour
Code No. 1£1 of 1970 are called "general unions". They
are so called to distinguish them from the provincial unions
(i.e. union branches) and does not mean that they are organised
on a general basis. The same applies to the Egyptian
organisations. To avoid confusion, I shall henceforth refer
to "general unions" as central unions.
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The present hierarchical structure of trade -unions as stipulated
by the Code is shown in Chart 3.1 below.
CHART 3.1



















Sources General Federation of Trade Unions. Iraq.
Under the Labour Code No. 151 of 1970, a group of fifty or more
workers in an industry or occupation may establish a union but
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there must he only one union in the said industry or occupation in
eaoh province. This union, which under the repealed Labour Law
Mo. 1 of 1958 was a branch of the central union, is now in theory
a separate entity. However, in practice and under the Internal
Constitution of the GFTUI, unions in the provinces are branches of
the general (central) unions. They are subject to the authority
of the overall trade union organisation.
In firms employing less than twenty workers, there would be one
union representative who directly reports to the union branch.
In firms employing twenty or more workers union branches can form
shop stewards committees made up of 3-7 members. All union
branohes are affiliated to their respective central union and
local federations which in turn are both affiliates of the GFTUI.
The present structure it seems is preferred by the GFTUI because
it combines both industrial activities and geographical location
as the basis for its organisation. Nevertheless, it does entail
some major problems of jurisdiction and communications.
The geographical structure of trade unions attempts to lessen the
effects of excessive centralisation by allowing decision making at
provincial level. This is mainly accomplished through the local
federations in the provinces. Eaoh local federation is allowed to
make decisions connected with trade union problems in the province
without taking the matter to the national level of the GFTUI.
Meanwhile, the principle of industrial unions ensures one union per
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plant and enables all workers to join one union. This it is
hoped will contribute to the unification of the trade union movement
and reduce inter-union disputes. This structure is intended to
produce a mechanism for reconciling conflicting loyalties usually
existing in large organisations such as the GFTUI (which is a
representative of labour in different geographical areas and covering
a wide variety of trades and industries). (c.f. Transport and
General Workers Union (TGWU) in Brltain)(l)
However the GFTUI in practice exercises a central authority over
all subordinate organisations. This practice appears to clash with
the principle of geographical decentralisation, but the GFTUI
believes that it is justifiably exercising this authority in central
matters, while local issues are left to be dealt with by local
organisations.(2)
Formally, the GFTUI communicates its polioies, decisions and
instructions downward and receives upward feedback via the
subordinate organisations. In practice, the shop stewards
committees are the only union groups who are in direct daily contact
with rank and file workers, but these are usually the least
(1) See Roberts, B.C., Trade Union Government and Administration in
Great Britain. (Bell, London, 1956), pp.122-123.
(2) See Wai* Al-Ummal (Labour Review) (Organ of GFTUI), Vol. 3,
No.101, (April 2k, 1971), P.38, (In Arabic).
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educated and the least experienced among union officials.
The turnover of members is relatively high. The GFl'Ul Report to
the Fourth Congress indicates that about 50% of the shop stewards
oontinue in office for the full term of three years. The percentage
goes up to about 75% in the case of union branch officials, and 82%
in the case of local federations, 85% in the case of central unions,
and 95$ in the case of the GFTUI's executives.(1) This affects the
building up of a permanent relationship between shop stewards and
rank and file members on the one hand, and between shop stewards and
senior union officials on the other. For instance, shop stewards
attend meetings of their union branches irregularly and may not even
report certain grievances. In addition, written reports are not
produced of these meetings, and in the absence of an effective shop
stewards committee a communications gap exists because most workers
are unable to make direct contact with union branches. In order to
keep informed, union branches send their officials to visit the
work-place and keep abreast of the news. Informal meetings of
union branches are useful in that workers are informed of the deci¬
sions of the leadership while the rank-and-file members discuss
grievances which may be communicated to upper echelons. The same
can be said of informal contact between workers and their shop
stewards on the shop floor which usually take place during breaks.
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Al-taarir Al-muqadam
Lil Mu'tamar Al-rabi' Lil Ithad Al-'am Li Naqabat Al-ummal yj
Al-qitr Al-'Iraqi (Report Presented to the Fourth Congress of
the General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq.), (Unpublished
Report, Baghdad, June 1971+)» P»112 (in Arabic).
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In addition, some shop stewards committees have installed suggestion
sohemes, while others, for example, in the Bata Shoe Company and the
Post Office Work Shops have issued "notice-boards" covering union,
eoonomic and political information.(1)
At present trade union management is based on what is known as
"union democracy"j that is, union constitutions provide for elections
of offioials. They also provide for checking and reviewing the
performance of officials. This seems to be consistent with the
Webbs' classic theory of trade union management, thats
"Trade unions are demooraciess that is to say, their internal
constitutions are all based on the principle of government
of the people by the people for the people."(2)
According to the present Internal Constitution of the GFTUI, all
trade union organisations at various levels are governed by executive
committees (in the case of the GFTUI, it is called the Executive
Bureau). The number of members of each executive is determined by
the GFTUI. The procedure of elections is that rank-and-file members
form the shop floor general assembly which elects the shop stewards
committee. Elected shop stewards are automatically made members
of their union branch conference. The conference elects the branch
(1) See Wai.' Al-^™rnial (Labour Review Vol.U» No. 1^1+ (March 4, 1972),
p.21;. (In Arabic).
(2) Webb, S. andB., Industrial Democracy. (Longmans, New York,
1897), pp. xix-xx.
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council and executive. This process is carried out at a higher
level so that elected members of the central unions* executives and
executives of local federations comprise the GFTUI*s Congress. The
Congress eleots a general assembly which in turn elects the Central
Council and the Executive Bureau of the GFTUI. All officers are
eleoted for a three-year term. At all organisational levels,
elections are supervised entirely by the unions without intervention
of the Ministry of Labour.
The present procedure raises two problems; namely, the efficiency of
and the control over, executives. Office holders often change
through elections, particularly at the lower levels of the trade
union organisation. This has prevented the development of profess¬
ional trade union leadership. It has also indirectly affected union
communications with shop stewards, because of the high turnover of
shop stewards who are in direct contact with the rank-and-file
members.
Prolonging the interval between two elections to three years helped
in tackling the problem, and the Gif'rux Report to the Fourth Congress,
for example, points out that the turnover of shop stewards was
about 1% during the 1969-71 ^e:rm (compared to about $CP/0 during the
1971-7U term).(l) However the GPTTJI has mainly tried to appoint
permanent staff to run its non-negotiating affairs. But such a
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Report to the Fourth
Congress, p.112.
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move, as Roberts suggests with respect to trade union administration
in Britain, may lead to "sacrificing democratic control for
administrative efficiency".(1)
Union councils are supposed to meet periodically to check on the
executives, evaluate their performance and even take disciplinary
actions against them when neoessary. These councils, however, are
composed of the executives concerned and their subordinate officers.
The hierarchical relationship between the two organisational levels
prevents an effective exercise of the councils1 controlling activities
over their higher executives. While the general assemblies are
the supreme decision making bodies they only meet annually and cannot
hope to exercise control of the executives.
(1) Roberts, B.C., op. clt.. p.1*59
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EGYPT
(a) Trade Union Membership
Under the nationalist government in Egypt, particularly after the
enactment of the socialist laws in 1961 and 1963, trade unionism
has spread rapidly. Tahle 3*3 shows that trade union membership
has continuously increased during the period from 1965 to 1972.
This indioates the prestigious position which the trade union
movement has acquired under the government's new labour policy.
The 1965 figure in particular represents a very large increase in
membership compared to previous years, from about J4O9,000 workers
in 1963 to about 1,291,000 which means that membership more than
trebled between 1963 and 1965* Union branches also increased their
number from 288 branches in 1963 to I4I+8 branches in 1965. However,
the number of union branches had dropped to 316 by 1973, owing to
amalgamations of central unions as ordered by the Ministry of Manpower
(which replaced the Ministry of Labour). Trade union membership
dropped by about 12% in 1973 as a result of the call-up of a large
number of workers for national servioe during the October 1973 War.
Membership thereafter began to grow again.
Like Iraq, the density of union membership in Egypt differs widely
among economic sectors (see Table 3»^)« It is at its highest level
in transport and communication where the density of union membership
increased from 62% in 1968 to ^Wo in 1975*
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3.3











1965 27 1)1)8 1.291
1966 27 10)8 1.355
1967 27 ¥)8 1,1)70
1968 27 1)1)8 1,1)95
1969 27 14)8 1,511
1970 27 1)1)8 1,559
1971 25 Uoo 1,568
1972 29 1)00 1,590
1973 16 316 1,399
1971) 16 316 1,1)63
1975 16 316 1,592
Source« Khalid, M., pp. 83-81); Aral) Republic of Egypt (Ministry of
Manpower): Annual Book of Labour. 1969/1970 (Cairo, 1971),
p. 111; Arab Republic of Egypt (Ministry of Manpower):
Annual Book of Labour. 1970/71 (Cairo, 1972), p.120) and
Arab Republic of Egypt (Ministry of Manpower): Labour
Statiatios (Unpublished), Tables 9-8, (letter to K.I.












































































































































































In agriculture union membership declined sharply with a fall in the
density of union membership from 11% in 1968 to only 2% in 1975*
This decline is mainly attributable to land reform and the increase
in the number of peasant collective associations which agricultural
workers are joining. Under existing legislation these workers have
to resign their trade union membership onoe they become members of
the peasant association.
Another noticeable change in union membership is in industry and
electricity. Despite the increase in the size of union membership
in this sector, the density of membership fell by ^ percentage points
between 1968 and 1975* This indicates that the rate of increase in
union membership in this sector was lower than the rate of increase
in employment.
The distribution of union membership also differs by geographical
location. As in Iraq., the main urban centres accounted for the
highest concentration. In 1975» Cairo alone accounted for about
35% of the total union membership and Alexandria accounted for about
18%, and 23% and 10% of union branches respectively. (1)
(1) Calculated from Arab Republic of Egypt (Ministry of Manpower),
Labour Statistics, 1975 (Unpublished), (Letter to K.I. Al-Kassab,
dated May 11, 1976), Table 8 (in Arabio).
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(b) The Present Formal Structure of Trade Unions
The present structure of the trade union movement is based on the
Labour Code 91/1959 as amended in I96I4.. Accordingly, "workers
who are engaged in similar or related orafts or industries" may form
a general (central) union. Twenty-seven categories of such
"similar or related orafts and industries" were defined by Ministerial
Decree 30 of 19&U*0) In each of these categories one central
union is allowed. Further redefinition led to several union
amalgamations and thus the number is reduoed at present to sixteen
central unions.
At the plant level union members are allowed to form a shop stewards
committee. The committees automatically beoome affiliates of the
central union to which their members belong. The oentral unions
axe permitted to form one nationwide general trade union federation
(EFL).
In addition to this basic internal structure, central unions are
permitted to organise branches on a provincial basis for administrative
purposes. A similar option of forming provincial (local) federations
is granted to the EFL. Unlike the Iraqi organisation, where union
branches affiliate to the local federations, Egyptian local
(1) United Arab Republic (Ministry of Labour), The New Organisation
of Trade Unions. pp.l4.2-U3*
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federations are inter-industry organisations, drawing membership
from shop stewards committees from across the boundaries of the
central unions, i.e. shop stewards committees from many different
industries may belong to the same local federation (see Chart 3»2).
CHART 3.2
Organisation Chart of the Egyptian Federation of Labour
Source: Egyptian Federation of Labour.
According to this structure local federations have no authority over
union branches, only over shop stewards committees which are
subordinates to union branches. The shop stewards committees are
frequently confused as to which organisation they should contact
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regarding shop floor matters. Although the EFL has defined the
lines of authority and responsibilities of each organisational level,
there continues to be a lack of co-ordination between union branches
and local federations and rivalry between them to control the shop
stewards committees. This has resulted in the shop stewards
committees often contacting central unions or EFL directly.(1) In
turn, this has enhanced the central authority of trade unions and
nullified the intended decentralisation of decision making.
Moreover, trade unions face a problem of representation on the shop
floor. This problem results from the existence of three formal
organisations dealing with workers* affairs on the shop floor.
These ares the shop stewards committees, the ASTJ units, and the Joint
consultative committees. Unlike Iraq, where the shop
stewards committee appoints workers* representatives to Joint
consultative committees from among its members, in Egypt members of
the consultative committees are eleoted independently by workers.
Shop stewards are specifically prohibited from standing for election
on the grounds that they cannot combine two functions. Not
surprisingly, lack of co-ordination and overlapping of functions
has arisen between shop stewards and consultative committee members.
The ASU unit in the plant is basically a political organisation aiming
at rallying workers around the political objectives of the state.
(1) In a discussion held in May 1976 with Zaftawi, the General
Secretary of the EFL, he admitted that this is the case at
present, but he did not provide positive suggestions
how to deal with the problem.
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But, as Kamal, a former senior direotor of a nationalised firm, has
pointed out "the ASTJ unit which is empowered with political
authority usually uses its position to step in and take over from
the shop stewards committee".(1) Shop stewards are nominated to
their posts by the ASU (as are all other elected union officials) and have
no choice hut to submit to the demands of the ASU unit.
Recognising this situation, the EFL has demanded a change in the
legal position of the ASU unit, the shop stewards committees and
the composition of the consultative committee. The aim is to
enable the shop stewards committee to be independent of the ASU
control. It has also proposed that shop stewards should be able
to be members of the consultative oommittees in order to avoid
duplication of representation and conflicting activities.(2)
So far no legislation has been enacted to rationalise the situation.
Unlike Iraq, where all trade union executives at various organisa¬
tional levels must be elected, in Egypt a combination of election
and appointment is followed. Membership of shop stewards oommittees,
central -union executives and the Executive Bureau of the EFL are all
determined by bi-annual elections. Similar to Iraq, shop stewards
are eleoted by a general assembly comprising the rank-and-file
(1) Kamal, R.L., Al-'amll Fi Mai lis Al-Idara (The Worker on the
Board of Directors), (Maktabat Al-qahira il-haditha, Cairo,
1965), p.27. (in Arabic).
(2) Al-'Amal (Labour) (Or^an of EFL), Vol. 1l+, No. 156 (May 1976),
pp. 15-16. (in Arabic).
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members on. the shop floor. Central unions and EFL executives are
also elected by general assemblies. The central union's assembly
consists of representatives chosen from among shop stewards according
to the number of rank-and-file members they represent. The EFL
Congress is composed of representatives from all the affiliated
central unions, and their number is determined by the central unions'
membership.(1)
Local federation executives are appointed by the Executive Bureau
of the EFL and branch executives by their central union's executive.
This is mainly because these are seen by the EFL as co-ordinating
bodies at the local levels; the former to co-ordinate the inter¬
industry union activities, and the latter to co-ordinate the
activities of shop stewards committees locally in each industry.
In contrast to Iraq., there are no controlling bodies in the Egyptian
trade union movement to check the activities and conduct of the
exeoutive bodies. The general assemblies include a large number
of delegates and their bi-annual meetings continue for a period of
three days only. Due to the large membership involved and the short
period of the assembly's meeting, clear and detailed policy scrutiny
is not made possible. Probably a smaller number of delegates and
a longer duration of assemblies would provide for discussions on
policy matters. However, some might argue that a large number of
(1) The basis of the selection of delegates to the central unions'
assemblies is: 1 delegate for the first 2$0 members, 1
delegate for the second 500 members, and 1 delegate for each
extra 1500 members? and for the EFL's Congress is: 1 delegate
for the first 500 members, 1 delegate for the second 1000
members, and 1 delegate for each extra 5000 members.
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delegates provides a better opportunity for the rank-and-file to
participate in policy making. (1)
Thus, it seems the present administrative procedure does not provide
for a system of checks and balances which reconciles leadership with
members* control, and responsibility with responsiveness. To
ensure its re-election, the leadership is more oonoerned with being
nominated by the ASU (as it must do this constitutionally) than
with gaining the consent of its rank-and-file members. Delegates
to the assemblies, like their Iraqi colleagues, are usually constrained
by the absence of an effective yardstick or measure to review the
performance of their executives or judge their conduct. Therefore,
the executives are able to develop bureaucratic behaviour and esta¬
blish their authority over their subordinate organisations.
Another feature of the Egyptian trade unions is that they do not
completely follow democratic procedure. This is because some office
holders are elected and some are not. Office holders in the looal
federations and branches are appointed by their immediate superiors,
and thus are reluctant to challenge the authority of their superiors
if they wish to keep their positions.
In this regard, EPL argues that union democracy is not necessarily
exercised through elections, but more importantly through the
(1) Roberts, B.C., op. clt.. p.169.
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enforcement of collective agreements. These agreements have to "be
approved by workers through an open ballot before being endorsed. (1)
This argument could, however, be refuted because it implies that
union office holders do not need a mandate from their members as
long as the latter approve the outcome of the activities of their
union officers. Furthermore, the consent or disapproval by workers
of collective agreements may be considered by some as undemocratic
because the workers are not consulted in the negotiations. It is
interesting to quote a similar conclusion by Flanders, regarding
•union democracy and collective bargaining in Britain, Flanders
statest
"The actual participation of membership in what is still the
main function of a trade union, the making of a collective
agreement, may be reduced to little more than registering
their collective consent or disapproval."(2)
Under the Ministerial Decree No. 30 of 19&U» trade union elections
were to be held bi-annually and to be supervised by the Ministry of
Labour (i.e. the Ministry of Manpower). The Minister was also
empowered to postpone elections if, at his discretion, new
organisational or legal arrangements were to be enforced. This
right was exercised in 1975 when the elections were postponed, as I
have mentioned earlier. (3) This intervention not only deprived the
(1) Al-^Amal. (La^>^r2r&bfcff' °* No# ^3$ (November
(2) Flanders, A», Trade Unions. (7th edition) (Hutchison, London,
1968), p.1+8.
(3) See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
141
trade union movement of the right to determine its basic constitutional
arrangements, but it also endangered its limited democratic
machinery. It further helped to enhance the bureaucratic practices
of the leadership whose souroe of authority is in practice drawn
from the governmental agency (i.e. the Ministry of Manpower) and its
political machinery (i.e. the ASU) and not from the trade union
members. This is another hindrance to the already limited inter-
union democracy as nominations for elections are the constitutional
prerogative of the AST! only.
The Ministry also stipulated the procedure of elections and it
nominated officials to supervise them. In addition, the law
authorised the Ministry officials to audit the records of the incumbent
executives; and thus deprived the general assemblies of the only
possible means to exercise a check on their executives.
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SYRIA
(a) Trade Union Membership
Despite the uncertainties which confronted trade unions in Syria
during the early 1960*8, trade unionism grew continuously throughout
this period, Tahle 3.5 shows that between 1965 and 1973> trade
union membership inoreased continuously, but that it fell in 1974*
However, the rate of increase fluctuated from year to year. This
fluctuation in the rate of the growth of membership is probably
attributable to fluctuations in the labour force employed in industry
and other sectors where trade unions are active s For
example, the percentage of employment in industry out of total
employment was 11%, 9% and 12% in 1962, 1968 and 197^» respectively.
In construction it was 7%» W> and 6% in these three years respect¬
ively. (1) The decline in total membership in 197i|- is mainly
attributable to celling up the reserves for national service during
the October War, 1973* The annual decline in the number of central
unions and union branches is due to amalgamations between unions in
similar occupations.
The density of union membership as in the case of Iraq, and Egypt,
differed widely among various economic sectors. Table 3*6 shows
(1) Calculated from Syria's Statistical Abstract 1969/1970,
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Damascus, 1973)» P«17 (in Arabic)* and Syrian Arab Republio
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour): The Annual
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that unlike Iraq, and Egypt, agricultural workers are not unionised in
Syria, This is because since 19&U, peasants are organised in
separate co-operative associations which are totally different from
proper trade unions in their method of organisation and in their
activities. The Table also shows that the highest density of union
membership is in Transport and Communication, Industry and Mining
comes in the second place, while, as in the case of Iraq and Egypt,
trade, and services and government have the lowest density. This
is mainly because the majority of employees in the last two sectors
are not unionisable by law. me Table also shows that the density
of union membership has almost doubled between 1968 and 1974, owing
to a combination of decline in total employment and increase in
union membership.
The distribution of union membership also differs by geographical
location. Again, as is the case in Iraq and Egypt, the large urban
centres account for the highest level of unionisation. The three
large cities of Damascus, Alleppo and Hums accounted for 61% of
total union membership in 197l+» Damascus alone had about 51,000
union members (i.e. 29% of total union membership) in 197U, union
membership in Alleppo during that year amounted to about 1+1,000
(i.e. 22% of total membership).(1) This high concentration of union
(1) Calculated from Syrian Arab Republic (Ministry of Social
Affairs and Labour), The Annual Statistical Bulletin of the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (Vol. 13),
(Government Printing Office, Damascus, 197U)» P«91.
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membership in the major urban centres corresponds with the high
degrees of industrial concentration and consequently the high level
of employment in these centres.
(b) The Present Formal Structure of Trade Unions
As I have pointed out earliers the provisions of the Labour Code on
trade unions have been subjected to frequent changes. At present,
the Syrian trade union structure is based on the Trade Union Act 81+./
1968. It resembles to some extent the Iraqi structure, but with
more emphasis on industrial unions.
As shown in Chart 3»3> the structure is relatively more complioated
than those of Iraq and Egypt. The shop stewards committees axe at
the bottom of the organisation. Like Iraq, the oommittees report
to the union branches which are affiliated to the "central unions"
at national level and the looal federation at provincial level.
The union branches have a separate legal entity, but within the



















Sources General Federation of Trade Unions. Syria.
An additional organisational level in the Syrian trade union movement
is that of the "industrial federations". Unlike Iraq and Egypt,
central unions do not directly affiliate to the GFTUS, but to





looal federations are the direct affiliates of the GFTUS. The
purpose of this additional level has been to develop specialisation
of union-activities and to reduce the bulk of GFTUS activities so
that it concentrates only on policy-making. In practice, however,
the GFTUS continues to exercise central authority over the subordinate
organisations. Thus, the extra organisational level has further
exacerbated an existing communications problem.
In my discussions with various unionists within the Syrian trade union
movement, I have found that only the Executive Bureau of the GFTUS
feels positively satisfied with the present structure. Nevertheless,
the Executive admits that it suffers from lack of co-ordination due to
a conflict of authority between central unions and local federations.
However, the question of eliminating one of the two organisations was
dismissed. This is because as GFTUS sees it, eliminating looal
federations would minimise the oo-ordination problem but would lead
to inter-union disputes at the local level, while eliminating central
unions would create a problem of how to deal with nationwide issues. (1)
Although the first argument seems valid, the second could be rejected
on the grounds that the industrial federations could take over
completely. This would also eliminate another co-ordinating
problem, as the present functional relationship between central
unions and their industrial federations is vague and overlapping.
(1) Information based on discussions with members of the Executive
Bureau of the GFTUS held in early June 1976.
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In fact, the present structure is critised by some lower organisations
on the grounds that it does not provide for co-ordination and should
be changed to clear the confusion of overlapping authority between
central unions and looal federations. However, no clear alternative
is being offered, and it seems that each organisational level would
wish that any change should enhance its position or at least preserve
it.
The multiple source of authority has disturbed the flow of communioai-
tions, particularly downwards. Information and instruction received
by union branches are contradictory and conflicting. GFTUS'
communiques reach a branch more quickly through looal federations
than through central unions. The latter receive them directly
through the GFTUS. In such oases, information and communications
are often subject to different interpretation. This, in turn, has
reflected on the performance of union branches and has ied to GFTTJ3
frequently by-passing lower organisations and directly communicating
with union branohes. On the other hand, the latter are increasingly
enoouraged by the GFTUS to by-pass their superior levels, (1) in
order to maintain through the branches GFTUS• hold over the shop
floor. Therefore, one is inclined to suggest that the present
oomplicated organisation seems appropriate for a centralised
authority structure. It needs to be simplified to avoid overlapping
(1) During my field research I observed members of the Executive
Bureau of the GFTUS making telephone oalls to branoh
executives* members through which they transmit directives
which should be transferred via the industrial federations
and oentral unions.
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of authority and defective communications. However, if it is to he
maintained, it will not, apparently, he effective unless authority
is clearly delegated to lower levels, so as to make it practically
a centralised organisation.
However, GFTUS seems happy with the present structure because it
preserves the Federation's dominant authority over lower organisations.
The Federation sees the present structure as "unifying the trade union
movement".(1) But, as explained earlier, lower organisations do not
share this view and would like to see a much more flexible structure.
This entails a possible area of conflict within the leadership (i.e.
between higher and lower organisations). Such conflict is still
confined at present to verbal expression of views and has not yet (to
the best of my knowledge) developed into a real challenge of the
central authority of the GFTUS.
The present procedure of trade union management is almost entirely
arranged in conformity with the provisions of the Trade Union Act 82j/
19^8. To a large extent it resembles that of the Iraqi trade unions.
Exoept for the GFTUS' Executive Bureau, all officials are to be elected
by general meetings held annually. In the case of the GFTUS, its
Executive Bureau is to be elected by the Congress which is held tri-
annually (in the case of Iraq, the Exeoutive Bureau is elected by the
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria, Sharih Qanoon Al-
Tanthim Al-naoabi (Explanation of the Trade Union Act), (GFTUS,
Damascus, 1974), pp.1^-15. (in Arabic).
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General Assembly). At each organisational level (except for shop
stewards committees) there is to be a controlling body (council)
elected by the general meeting. Members of the executives are to
be elected from among council members who get the largest number of
votes; additionally, they retain their council membership. The
numbers of executive and council members are entirely stipulated by
the law, as are the conditions required for elections. The councils
are to meet periodically to review the activities and evaluate the
performance of their executives. They are also authorised to withdraw
support from the members of their executives (collectively or
individually) through a vote of no confidence in cases specified by
the law.(1) However, due to the composition of the councils, where
the members of the executives constitute one-third, the councils cannot
effectively exercise control over the executives. This is because the
latter usually need a few extra votes in addition to their own to ensure
a vote of confidence.
It might seem that the present procedure provides for internal
democracy; this, however, is not sufficiently exercised. Elections
of executives provide the only democratic means to take part in trade
union government. It is more frequently exercised at lower levels
than in Iraq and Egypt, as general meetings and elections are held
annually. Thus, union executives are, in theory, subjected to
possible annual change. Following the same theoretical assumption,
administrative efficiency might suffer and professionalism in trade
(1) The vote of no confidence is authorised in cases where members of
executives violate the provisions of the Trade Union Act and the
internal constitutions, or when their personal conduct as trade
union leaders is questionable.
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unions could be very low. In practice, however, due to the centralised
authority of the GFTUS, the latter has become able to manipulate lower
organisations. Thus, lower executives, to a large extent, derive
their de facto authority from the Federation rather than from their
eleotorate. Because eleotions are held on a "list", rather than an
individual, basis, office holders need to be sponsored by the GFTUS1
list to ensure their re-elections, and this, rather than their
performance in the general meetings, determines their actual conduct
in standing for re-election.
Consequently, concern about efficiency does not seem particularly
important, not because office holders are subjected to frequent change,
but because the relationship between lower union officials and their
superior leaders is based on loyalty rather than performance appraisal.
This, in turn, has developed a bureaucratic phenomenon in the trade
union movement, and the GFTUS agrees with this view. (1) Bureaucracy
in trade unions, as the Webbs hypothesised, is linked with "centralised
administration" so as to ensure a "uniform policy".(2) This might
seem to be the case in the Syrian trade union movement where authority
is largely centralised in the GFTUS. In practice, the bureaucratic
behaviour of union officials is a result of their "secured" positions
(as far as they remain loyal to their leadership) within the framework
of the relationship between the trade union movement and the present
(1) See Al—Ishtirakl (The Socialist) (Organ of GFTUS), No.575
(February 2, 1975;, p.3» (in Arabic).
(2) Webb, S., and B., Industrial Democracy, op. oit.. p.103#
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political system. Bureaucracy in this case is not, however, combined
with efficiency. For example, only five changes among the personnel
holding office in the nine industrial federations took place during
the election years
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria, Al-MuHamar Al-Thamin
'Ashar nil Itihad Al-'Am Linaaabat Al-Ummal Fi Al-Qltr Al-'Arabi
Al-Suri (The Eighteenth Congress of the General Federation of
Trade Unions, Syria) (Damascus, 1971+), p.225. (in Arabic).
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COMPARISON OF TRADE UNION MEMBEBSHTP Aim STRUCTURE
IN THE THREE COUNTRIES
Under the nationalist systems In the three countries, trade unions
have undergone a substantial growth in membership. This is
attributable to two factors i encouragement of trade unionism by the
state, which steadily passed labour laws in favour of trade unions;
and the considerable increase in the size of the industrial labour
force as a result of economic and industrial development.
However, despite the growth in unionisation during this period, the
density of trade union membership is still small. Table 3.7 shows
that in 197lu the total density of trade union membership was 2TA in
Iraq. In Syria, the density was only 1196 in 197li. and in Egypt it was
13%) in 1975. This is mainly because only those workers who are
covered by the provision of the labour oodes are entitled to join trade
unions and these constitute not more than one-third of the total labour
force in each of the three countries. This also explains why the
density of union membership is high in the sectors where a large number
of employees are covered by the labour codes, such as industry and
transport. Meanwhile, the density is very low in the seotors where
most of the employees are either treated as civil servants (such as
in services) or are oovered by other regulations of employment (such
as in agriculture). Thus, if one excludes agriculture, for example,
the total density of trade union membership more than doubles in Iraq,

































































































































































































































The present trade union structures In the three countries are
chiefly determined by legislation. The law permit# the formation
of nationwide industrial unions and their affiliation to one general
federation. The law also classifies the industries in which these
unions are to operate, and this restriots the number of central unions.
In all the three countries, provincial unions become branches of the
central unions, but they also are affiliated to local federations which,
in turn, are affiliates of the general federations. Thus, these
branches are incorporated in the overall structure of a unified and
centrally controlled trade union movement.
There are some variations among the three trade union movements as
regards the type of authority structures and channels of communications.
In Iraq, amalgamations at a central level are frequently encouraged
so that unions are oovering wider economic activities than a specific
industry. This provides a more unified trade union movement and avoids
problems of inter-union disputes. However, owing to the complexity of
organisation, such problems, though reduced, have not yet been
completely overcome. In Egypt, a similar structure to that of Iraq
Is encouraged, and it aims at increasing the efficiency of the
organisation and enhanoing the central authority of the EFL. But,
on the other hand, this has created an inter-union authority conflict
and has developed bureaucratic practices among the leadership.
In Syria, on the other hand, the structure is made more complicated
than in the other two countries by affiliating central unions to
industrial federations which directly report to the GFTUS. This is
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meant to ensure decentralisation and specialisation, but, in practice
it has complicated intern-union communications. Meanwhile, as it is
not acoompanied by sufficient delegation of authority, the structure
has indirectly affected the efficiency of lower organisations and
enhanced the authority of the OTTO'S.
The procedures of managing trade unions, like their structures, are
largely determined by legislation. This indicates the increasing
role of the state in shaping industrial relations structure. There
is a great deal of similarity between the method of administering trade
unions in the three countries. Each organisational level is governed
by an elected body (except for local federations and union branches in
Egypt). The difference is in the type of electorate, composition of
delegates and the method of checking and controlling executives.
In Iraq, all delegates to the conferences and the OTTUI Congress are
elected by their constituent members. In addition to electing their
executives, conferences elect councils to meet periodically and review
the performance of their executives. For the same purpose, the
conferences themselves are also transferred to annual general
assemblies. The composition of the councils, however, also includes
executives' members. Thus, the effectiveness of their control over
the executives is to a degree reduced by the executives. In Egypt,
however, executives are elected by their general assemblies. The
composition of the latter varied at each organisational level in
accordance with the size of union membership. These are the only
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union bodies which exercise control over their executives. Because
they meet less frequently, compared to the Iraqi councils and
assemblies, control over their leadership is less effective. In Syria,
a similar procedure to that of Iraq is followed. However, elections
(except for the GFTUS' Executive Bureau) is held annually. In theory,
this means that rank-and-file members frequently exercise the right to
change their leadership, while preventing the development of professional
trade union leadership. In practice, however, GETTJS exercises firm
authority in determining the election list and consequently the lower
levels of leadership.
An illustrative summary of trade union membership and structure under
the present nationalist systems in the three oountries is given on
the following page.
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Trade Union Membership and Structure in Iraq, Egypt and Syria











1. Trade unions underwent substan¬
tial growth in membership because
of the encouragement of trade
unions by the state and because
of expansion in employment.
2. Density of union membership
varies among different economic
sectors.lt is very high in
sectors such as in oil and indus¬
try where employees are covered
by the provisions of the Labour
Code and thus are entitled to
join trade unions. It is very-
low in sectors where the majority
of employees are covered by other
legislation and thus are not
entitled to join trade unions,
such as in agriculture; because
these comprise -§ of total number
of employees, total density of
union membership is small.
3. Membership is highly con¬
centrated in large cities where -
employment is concentrated
1. Trade unions underwent substan¬
tial growth in membership because
of the encouragement of trade
unions by the state and because
of expansion in employment.
2. Density of union membership
varies among different economic
sectors. It is high in
sectors where employees are
covered by the provisions of the
Labour Code and thus are entitled
to join trade unions, such as in
transport and industry. It is
very low in sectors where employ¬
ees are covered by other legis¬
lation such as in commerce, or
have the choice to join collec¬
tive associations, such as in
agriculture. Because employees
of the last two categories con¬
stitute about §- of total employ¬
ees, total density of union
membership is very small.
3. Membership is highly con¬
centrated in large cities where
employment is concentrated.
1. Trade unions underwent substan¬
tial growth in membership because
of the encouragement of trade
unions by the state.
2. Density of union membership
varies among different economic
sectors. It is high in
sectors such as in
industry where employees are
covered by the provisions of the
Labour Code and thus are entitled
to join trade unions. It is very
low in sectors where the majority
of employees are covered by other
legislation and thus are not
entitled to join trade unions,
such as in services. Agricultu¬
ral workers are not entitled to
join trade unions.
3. Membership is highly con¬





1. Present trade union structure
is chiefly determined by
legislation.
2. Larg-e central industrially-
based organisations, affiliated
to one nationwide general
federation which exercises cen¬
tral authority over subordinate
organisations. Because of
frequent amalgamation? at a
central level unions often cover
more than one industry each.
3. Formal and informal communi¬
cations are encouraged.
U. Managed by elected officials
who are controlled by annual
assemblies and periodically held
councils.
1. Present trade union structure
is chiefly determined by
legislation.
2. Large ce. .tral industrially-
based organisations, affiliated
to one nationwide general
federation which exercises cen¬
tral authority over subordinate
organisations.
3. Formal vertical communica¬
tions are usually delayed and
interrupted. By-passing inter¬
mediate levels is a usual
phenomenon.
It. Managed by a combination of
elected officials and officials
appointed by the general
federation and controlled by
biannual assemblies.
1. Present trade union structure
is chiefly determined by
legislation.
2. Large central industrially-
based organisations, affiliated
to one nationwide general
federation. The overall structure
is more complicated than in Iraq
and Egypt, but the general federa¬
tion also exercises central
authority over subordinate organi¬
sations.
3. By-passing of formal channels
of communications is frequently
used in upward and downward
communications.
1|. Managed by elected officials
who are controlled by perioidi-
cally held councils.
CHAPTER h
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS AMD OF EMPLOYERS1 ASSOCIATIONS
This Chapter discusses the development of the role of employers and
of employers* associations in Iraq, Egypt and Syria. In dealing
with employers' associations, the investigation is limited to those
involved directly in industrial relations, suoh as the federations
and chambers of industries. Associations which promote employers'
business interests only and do not represent them in (or deal with)
industrial relations affairs, such as the merchants and automobile
owners associations are excluded.
IRAQ
(a) Employers Under the British Mandate (1920-1932)
During the Ottoman rule, the chambers of commerce in the three large
cities, Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, were acting as associations of
commercial and industrial employers. The number of non-handicraft
industries was small, mainly in export-processing and usually
controlled by foreign firms. The chambers of commerce promoted the
commercial interests of their members and did not deal with employer-
labour relations.(1)
(1) Salim, S.A.K., op. cit.. p.167.
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Under the British mandate and as a result of the expansion in public
services and the emergence of some modern industries, the industrial
labour force began to grow, and trade unions began to emerge. By
the end of the Mandate, the industrial labour force was still small
in size and the trade union movement was still in an early stage of
development. In this situation, Iraqi employers in the modern
industries felt that there was no need for them to establish an
employers* organisation. They were protected by legislation and by
their social status. They could meet informally at any time and,
being few in number, could easily decide on a course of action. In
the few strikes which ocourred employers left the matter to government
authorities who, they knew, would intervene on their behalf.(1) In
the handicraft industries, on the other hand, the master-servant
relations were governed by social, religious and kinship customs,
but these industries were declining at that stage.
(b) Employers Under the Monarchy (1932-1952)
During the early years of the Monarchy, no change took place in the
position of trade unions or in the status of employers which might
have required a review of the employers* strategy. Until the end of
the Second World War, industrial disputes were very few and
insignificant. They were handled mainly within the individual firms.
(1) Ibid.. pp. 170 and 173.
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In oases where firms were unable to deal with the disputes, the
Ministry of Sooial Affairs used to oome into the picture, nominally
as a conciliator, but actually acted as a negotiator who sided
with the employers.
After the Second World War, a new industrial elite emerged from
among the old mercantile group. Motivated by profit opportunities
this elite embarked on a speedy industrialisation programme, although
it was confronted by a rather indifferent or even discouraging
government. The government which relied mainly on the support of
landowners and tribal sheikhs, was reluctant to alienate them by
encouraging an industrial programme which might lead to strengthening
the working-clans - a class which the government feared could be a
source of political agitation. The new industrial elite, in
pursuing the goal of industrialisation, began to realise that changes
in existing management-labour relations were required if better co¬
operation with organised labour and industrial growth and prosperity
were to be achieved. Better oo-operation would make it possible
for employers and workers to participate* in accordance with their
roles, in the process of developing national industries. As
discussed earlier, these approaches were welcomed by trade unionists
who considered these industrialists as their "periodical allies in
the struggle against the ruling oligarchy".(1) Other employers
of that period were classified by trade unions into two categoriest (2)




1. Foreign employers! these were usually prepared to co-operate
with the government and with government agencies in dealing with
labour affairs. They were very much aware of the importance of the
role of labour in their firms, and therefore introduced better
working and employment conditions. They were, however, frightened
of labour's political orientation, and thus strongly opposed to
organised labour. They dealt firmly with worker protests, and
requested police intervention to suppress strikes on more than one
occasion. The task of dealing directly with labour relations was
kept in the hand of foreign managerial staff; this employment policy
was probably adopted because of apprehension that Iraqi managers
might be lenient with labour and not committed to company policy.
The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), the Bata Shoe Company, the Vimpey
Construction Company and Caterpillar-Iraq were an example of this
type of employer.(1) Foreign employers tended to recruit unskilled
labour on a tribal and religious basis. For example, the IPC
consulted tribal and religious leaders about the recruitment of
unskilled labour for work on pipelines to make sure of their support. (2)
By doing this the Company hoped that the tribal loyalty of unskilled
workers would prevent their involvement in collective action.
(1) A list of these foreign firms, of the number of strikes which
took place in the firms during the post-War period of the
Monarchy and a description of companies' attitudes to strikes,
are presented in Al-Hablb, M.M. j, A Study of the Sooial.
Political. Economic and Cultural Institutions and the Labor,
Movement in the Middle East, pp.786-787.
(2) The IPC also sought the support of the tribal and religious
leaders by providing the pipeline areas with some welfare and
educational facilities which were desparately needed. See
Kinch, E.A., "Sooial EffeotB of the Oil Industry in Iraq",
International Labour Review. Vol.75> No.3 (March 1957)» P«197»
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2. Small employers: these were still influenced by the traditional
management-labour relations of the handicraft industries. They were
not liked by trade unionists because of their paternalistic approach
and of their firm reliance on government.
The foreign employers and the small employers did not change their
industrial relations practices and showed no interest in the
formation of an employers* association. The new industrial elite,
on the other hand, concluded that the promotion of their business
interests would require them to deal collectively with the government.
In the late 19U0's, therefore, they began to campaign for the
establishment of an employers • organisation? but their efforts
failed because of lack of oo-operation from the small and foreign
employers.
During the 1950's changes in the economic situation led to the
government*s adoption of economic planning, and included the initia¬
tion of a few industrial projects? this strengthened the position
of the new industrial elite indirectly. Also, the elite began to
be represented politically by a recognised opposition party, the
"National Democratic Party". Hadid, the Deputy Chairman of the
party was a prominent industrialist and a founder of the Iraqi
Federation of Industries (iFl). Khaddouri, who became later the
President of IFI, was a member of the Executive Committee of the Party.
The formation of a political organisation was important for dealing
with a government which, it was felt, would never abandon its
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reliance on the feudal sheikhs, although it might tolerate some
industrial development. The combination of political pressure
and the new economic situation eventually made it possible for the
industrial elite to establish an "industrial" association. Thus
in August 1956, a Law was promulgated for the formation of the
Iraqi Federation of Industries (iFl) "to accelerate the process of
industrialisation and to promote and protect industries" but also
"to represent employers in dealing with matters related to
industrial relations affairs".(1) The Federation played only a
minor role in industrial relations affairs during the period between
its formation and the 1908 revolution beoause of setbacks in the
development of trade unionism. This minor role was one of
arbitrator in a number of disputes which arose during that period.
(c) Employers Under the Nationalist System (1958-1976)
After the revolution, the IFI was to begin with quiet and apprehensive
in dealing with the emerging new unionism^ Although it tried to
maintain the alliance with the trade unions which had been developed
under the previous regime. However, once it was properly estar-
blished the GFTUI (General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq) brou^it
this alliance to an end because the circumstances which had made
(1) Iraqi Federation of Industries, Iraqi Federation of Industries
(1961A (Azhax Press, Baghdad, 1961+), p.21*.
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-Uae alliance necessary no longer existed. Under the revolutionary
regime, the GFTUI criticised employers because of their "exploitation
of the toil of the working-class to accumulate higher profits".(1)
In response, the HT felt that it needed to change its strategies
to defend its interests. To do so, it sought the support of the
political machinery represented by Prime Minister Qassem. On
November 27, 1959, a delegation of the IFI met the Prime Minister.
The delegation was headed by Sulaiman Fattah, the President of IFI,
and included Hadid, the Minister of Finance who, from among his
Cabinet colleagues, was the closest to Qassem. The delegates, while
stressing their oonoem to develop Iraqi industry, pointed out that
"a substantial decline in production had been witnessed as a result
of industrial unrest and labour disputes".(2) They demanded that
the government should intervene and put an end to suoh a situation.
They reminded the Prime Minister of a memorandum which they had
submitted to him early in February 1959* In that memorandum they
had stressed their support for the formation of trade unions as a
sign of healthy industrial relations and had suggested that workers
who were direoted by a certain political group (ICP) were to be
blamed for recent industrial unrest and for frequent strikes.
They also pointed out that the IFI was in principle not against pay
increases but that these "should not be given emotionally for
political gains without concern for the financial state or production
(1) See Akhajadoor, A., op. pit., p.15*
(2) See Iraqi Federation of Industries, Al-kitab Al-sanawi Lil
Sana* 1959-1960. (The Annual Book for the Year 1959-60),
(Rabita Press, Baghdad, 19^0), PP»38-39» (in Arabic).
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difficulties of industries".(1)
This move by the IFI further angered trade unions, and represented
the end of the alliance between the two groups.
The 1960 IFI elections brought to the presidency of DPI, Saffar,
the representative of the textile industries and a member of the
Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party - the Party
which had offered unqualified support for the government. Prior to
this, in March 1959, the Director of IFI, Shaibani, had become a
Minister of Planning. In January i960 he was succeeded by Jamil,
another National Democrat, as Director of the Federation. Thus,
by the early 1960's when the trade union movements relations with
the government were clouded with frictions, IFI influence over the
government seemed very strong.
At the beginning of 1960 the IFI changed its tactics concerning trade
unions. Industrial action was no longer tolerated, and employers
were encouraged to deal with the rival underground movement so as
to weaken the formal trade union leadership. (2) This policy was
not totally successful because the underground trade unionists
(although keen to challenge the official trade union leadership of
the UP ) showed little enthusiasm for accepting support for their
(1) See Iraqi Federation of Industries, Al-kitaD Al-sanawiLll
Sana1 1958-59. (The Annual Book for the Year 1958-1959),
(Rabita Press, Bagdad, 1959), PP» 170-173. (in Arabic;.
(2) See Muhsin, H.A., op. cit.. Yol.Y., pp.17-18.
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cause from employers. They knew that they ought to he seen by
their supporters as adopting a harder attitude to employers than the
official trade union leadership.
Upon Saffax's death in October 1960, the IFI acted shrewdly and
elected Khaddouri, the representative of the soft drink industries,
as President; as a member of the Executive Committee of the National
Democratic Party he was acceptable to the government. Jadir, the
new representative of the textile industries who had distinguished
himself as a nationalist, was elected Vice President. He thus was
in a good position to deal with unions controlled by the nationalist
political opposition with which he was on friendly terms.
After the nationalisation measures of 1961+, the public sector had
the same number of seats on the HPI Board as the private sector.
Nevertheless the representatives of the public sector on the Board
were able to enforce their will because the public sector controlled
the majority of the large firms. These public sector representatives
who lacked managerial experience and were drawn from the army and
civil service, developed a hostile attitude to trade unions and to
worker demands for better terms.(1) Their attitude influenced the
(1) This type of manager was accustomed to firm discipline and
expected unquestioned obedience from his employees. They were
entrusted to run the nationalised firms and implement the new
labour legislation and participation measures which on the
whole enhanced the practice of labours-management joint regulations -
a practice introduced under the 1958 Labour Law. These
managers never wholeheartedly accepted the new role assigned to
labour, and until their gradual replacement in the late 1960*s,
they continuously tried to manipulate trade unions. For further
details, see Baya', M.H., "Waqi* Al-jihaz Al-idari Pi' 1-• Iraq
Va Mafhoom Al-wathifa Al-idaria" (The State of Iraqi Management
and the Concept of the Managerial Job), Business Administration
(Iraqi Management Association Magazine), No.7 (March-June, 1970),
pp.18-20.
169
IFI's industrial relations policy and the stand taken by the
Federation in various disputes and other central issues related to
labour affairs.
The IFI now argued that disputes caused by issues related to wages
and changes in working regulations were "caused by unjustified
demands".(1) It called for the government to be "less lenient
and more firm in applying the law", and also blamed the government
for being responsible for the occurrence of strikes. This was
because the government did not take any action against illegal
strikes and because its agencies usually intervened on behalf of
workers.(2)
Further expansion of the public sector and the change of government
in 1968 (when the Ba'th Party came to power) resulted in gradual
replacement of top management of the public enterprises by socialist
managers who came from lower middle-class origin and who were fully
committed to the government's labour policy. This and the fact
that the government had become the largest employer , made a change
in the role, composition and structure of the IFI necessary. In
1973» a new IFI Law was promulgated and a new internal constitution
was introduced which rearranged the structure of the Federation.
The representation of the public sector was expanded and the Ministry
(1) See Al-Sinai (The Industrialist) (Organ of IFI), Vol.9, No.3
(September 1968), p.123» (in Arabic).
(2) Araji, A., "Bahith Fi L-ithrab" (A Study of Strikes), Al-Slnai
(The Industrialist) (Organ of IFI), Vol.9» Nos.1-2 (January-
June 1968)» pp.79-80. (in Arabic).
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of Industry was given administrative authority over the Federation's
policy-making decisions. The co-ordination of the activities and
interests of the two different sectors, however, turned out to be
a difficult task. The majority of the private employers represented
medium and small-sized firms which were wholly or mostly owned by
them. These employers were motivated by their commercial interests
in deciding on the Federation's policy. The public sector's
representatives, as government employees, held different views and
were fully committed to the policy set by the government agency
which employed them, namely the Ministry of Industry. To these
managers, according to Al-Sinai•, workers were colleagues who had
different job responsibilities that matched with their abilities,
skills and qualifications but who also had a leading role to play in
(1)
developing the national industry.N '
To deal with these conflicting views a new IFI law was promulgated
in May 1975* This laid down that the Federation was to represent
only the private firms and the mixed firms (i.e. those jointly owned
by the government and private employers).(2) In dealing with
industrial relations the management of the public enterprises were
now to be represented by their respective Industrial Organisations.^)
(1) See Al-Sinai' (The Industrialist) (Organ of IFI), Vol.1f>, No.2
(June 1975)» (in Arabic).
(2) Republic of Iraq. (Ministry of Information) Al-Waqai' Al-
'Iraqia (Official Gazette), Law No. of 1975> Iraqi Federation
of Industries Law, Article 2 (1), No.2i*70, (dated May 17> 197i>)»
(3) An "Industrial Organisation" inoludes a number of state-
owned companies.
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The new Lav was not put Into effect until August 1976, and it is
too early to assess its effects on industrial relations.
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EGYPT
(a) Tfrnpi oy^rs Under the British Administration (1882-1922)
Most of the employers in Egypt daring the British administration
were foreigners. From the start, this group attempted to limit
the authority of workers and to prevent the establishment of trade
unions. Their strategies inoluded replacing workers, seeking the
help of the police in breaking up strikes, and resisting worker
demands. Only one company concluded an agreement with workers
during this period. This was in 1919 when the Cairo Tram Company
accepted most of the workers' demands after the Prime Minister had
intervened in the dispute. (1)
The newly emerging national industrialists tried in 1911 to form a
federation which would promote industrial development but the
British administration, because of its anti-nationalist policy did
not give permission to form such a federation. During the first
World War, the national industrialists became involved in the War
Commission which was formed to deal with wartime shortages and
industrial problems. (2) However, it was not until Egypt established
its independence in 1922 that the national industrialists were able
to form a federation.
(1) See 'Izzal-Din, A., op. oik , p.27.
(2) See Owen, E.R.J., op. pit.. p.l*97»
(b) Employers Under the Monarchy (1922-1952)
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During the British administration Egyptian nationals controlled but
a small portion of recently established modern plants. During and
after the First World War, the number of plants owned by Egyptian
nationals began to increase, particularly after the establishment of
the Misr (Egypt) Bank in 1920. Their efforts to form a federation
finally succeeded and in 1922 the Federation of Egyptian Industries
(FEl) was formed. The group of employers who formed the Misr Bank
and the FEI were drawn from the Egyptian aristocracy and from upper
middle-class businessmen, many of whom were influential politicians
and ex-government officials. Some of them had led, or had
participated in, the national movement during the 1919 revolution,
had national aspirations, and hoped for the country's political and
economic independence; notable among them was Talat Harb, the
founder of the Misr Bank.
Once independence was achieved, these industrialists were satisfied
with the protective measures set out by the government to promote
local industries. Gradually, throughout the 1930's many of the
traditional aristocrats, politicians and landowners, motivated by
profit, started to invest their wealth in industry.(1) These groups
joined and dominated the FEI during the 1930's and early 191+0's.
By 19l+5» the Harb group of nationally-inspired industrialists totally
(1) A study of the Egyptian Management conducted in 19&7 > shows
that by the late 1930's and throughout the 191+0's, almost all
prime min sters, many of the ministers, members of the Senate
and of the Royal Family had invested in the Misr Bank group and
other firms. Some of these persons became chairmen and/or
directors of between 10 to 20 companies. See Kassem, M.S.,
The Hew Management Elite in Egypt. (Ph.D. Thesis, New York
University, 1967)» p.72.
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disappeared. During this period, Abboud, a dynamic industrialist,
emerged as leader of the FEI and embarked on diversified industrial
activities. The fear that organised labour would be a threat to
employer authority and interest provoked FEI to take a firm stand
to prevent or limit the strengthening of the trade unions* position.(1)
During the Second World War the moderate pro-trade union attitude of
the Wafd government was strongly opposed by the FEI. FEI member
influence in part of the administrative machinery and the indirect
support of the Eoyal Palace, made it possible for the FEI to prevent
the introduction of many labour laws and to delay the passage of
trade union legislation. The Trade Union Act 191*2, which was passed
by the Wafd government, had many limitations and was severely opposed
by some FEU members on the grounds that Egyptian workers had not yet
achieved a level of "literacy" to understand and appreciate the right
of trade union recognition. (2) After the War, when the ban on
strikes was lifted, many FEI affiliated firms, including those of
Abboud, relied on the polioe in breaking up strikes, particularly
during the 191*6-191*8 industrial unrest. (3)
The FEI was the prime promoter of Egyptian manufacturing industry
(1) See Tomiche, F.J., Syndicalism Et Certains Aspects Du Travail
En Republique Arab Unle (Egyptah 1900-1967. (G.-P. Maisonnuve
et Larose, Paris, 1971;)» pp.23-21*.
(2) Ibid.. p.l*0.
(3) See Hekheili, S.M., op. oit.. pp.21*0-21*8.
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throughout this period. In addition to industrial investment, it
carried out research and feasibility studies and campaigned for the
establishment of industrial chambers to concentrate on specialised
industries. In response to this campaign, the Chambers of Industries
Law of 1914.7(1) set up separate chambers within the FEI, each
promoting a different sector of industry. Through these specialised
chambers, the FEI contributed considerably to the growth of industrial
employment in Egypt.
As a reaction to the Trade Union Act 19U2 which permitted labour
organisation in commerce and finance as well as in industry,
employers in the commercial and financial sector began to realise
that they ought to form an employers' organisation to enable them to
deal with trade unions. Between 1914-5 and 1952, therefore,
employers' associations were founded in the banking and insurance
industries. Compared to the FEI, which was mainly oonfined to
manufacturing industry, these organisations played only a minor role
in representing their members in industrial relations affairs.
As stated earlier, the FEI was mainly controlled by large Egyptian
employers of whom the majority were members of the ruling aristooracy.
Most of the small-sized firms in the manufacturing industry remained
outside the Federation. Many of these firms were not obliged by
law to be unionised because they employed less than fifty workers.
(1) See Federation of Egyptian Industries, Al-kitab Al-thahabi,
1922-1972.(The Golden Book, 1922-1972), (FEI, Cairo, 1972),
p.8.(In Arabic).
As trade union influence did not reach these firms, employers'
authority in making industrial relations rules was hardly ever
challenged. Paternal concern for dependent workers was the
employers' guide in their relations with workers.(1)
The majority of the foreign firms chose not to join the FEI, probably
because they viewed it as a federation confined to Egyptian employers -
as was the aim when the FEI was established in 1922. These foreign
firms shared anti-union views with the FEI - views which they had
held since the early days of trade unionism under the British
occupation. The views of the foreign employers were inspired by
their fear that organised labour was politically oriented. (2)
Yet, unlike the FEI, once the Trade Union Act of 191+2 was passed,
many of the foreign firms complied with its provisions and recognised
trade unions. To normalise their relations with unions, some of
these firms, such as the Royal Butch Shell Company, concluded
collective agreements with the unions and involved union officials in
various work place committees.(3)
This change of attitude by foreign employers was probably motivated
(1) See Kassem, M.S., op. oit.. p.65. Some of the large Egyptian
firms also sought to enlist the loyalties of their workers by
various paternalistic measures, such as company housing and
canteens. For details see Harbison, F.H., "Management in Modern
Egypt", in Harbison, F.H. and Myers, C.A., Management in the
Industrial World; an international comparison.(McGraw-Hill.
New York, 1959), p. 161+.
(.2) See Tomiche, F.J., op. oit.. p.22.
(3) The Shell Company in particular was the foous of attack by the
pro-trade union newspapers and magazines as a privileged foreign
concern, despite the Company's efforts to normalise relations
with trade unions and introduce advanced working conditions.
However, the number of strikes declined impressively throughout
the 1940*b» there had been only two strikes between 191+2-1950
compared to eight strikes between 1938-191+1 • For further details,
see Nekheili, S.M., op. cit.. pp.323-325.
by their desire not to oppose the host government's legislation
(i.e. the new law on trade unions)but also probably beoauae they
realised that trade unionism was spreading rapidly, and that they
oould no longer oppose it if they wished to avoid industrial unrest,
especially,since foreign, they were the focus of labour protest.
(o) Employers Under the Nationalist System (1952-1976)
During the early years of the new regime, employers' associations
were not directly affected by government measures. However,
because of their connection with the old regime, the property of many
large employers was sequestrated. The government did not consider
sequestration as being taken against Egyptian industrialists but
rather against certain corrupt elements who collaborated with the
previous regime.(1)
Apart from this measure, private enterprise was protected and
encouraged during the early period of the revolution. This policy
was confirmed under the 1956 Constitution by a guarantee. Yet the
same Constitution made it clear that the government's sympathy was on
the side of labour in their relations with employers, by laying
down the principle of the "protection of the masses and the
(1) El-Sadat, A., or. oit.. p.i*.
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unprivileged classes against the exploitation by the landowners and
the capitalist classes".(1)
After the revolution, employers realised fairly soon that the change
of political system would eventually lead to a decline in their
privileges. This became more apparent with the enactment of the
Trade Union Act 1952. This not only made it an offence for any
employer to refuse to recognise trade unions, but it also compelled him
legally to negotiate working and employment conditions and to
conclude collective agreements with worker representatives.(2)
Such explioit legal provisions forced employers to initiate changes
in their relations with unions, while the oollapse of their political
influence deprived them of an effective means of maintaining and
strengthening their position vis-ar-vis trade unions.
In spite of this decline in their authority and in spite of being
forced to submit to worker demands, employers rarely changed their
overall labour polioies. Only a few organisations developed
relatively well-formulated or explioitly-stated labour policies.
EEI policies in particular were "reactions" to the growth of trade
unionism, and resulted in attempts to weaken trade unions. There
were a few attempts to control unions through corrupting their
leadership. For example, in 1957i an investigation by the
(1) Quoted by Mansour, M.B., op. cit.. p. 190.
(2) See Harbison, F.H., and Ibrahim, I.A., op. oit.. p.181.
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government's Labour Inspectorate took place concerning an accusation
made by the Cairo Textile Union that the management of the Nile
Textile Company, one of the largest in Cairo, had reached certain
"informal agreements" with two members of the company's union
representatives. As a result of this investigation, the personnel
manager of the company and the two union officials involved were
advised to resign.(1)
With the increasing size of the public sector, particularly after
the nationalisation measures of 1961 and 1963, state-owned organisations
gradually began to dominate the FBI and its Board of Directors.
The managers of these organisations were quite different from private
sector employers in their attitude to trade unions. Being government
employees, they were generally ohosen from among people loyal to the
regime who became members of the ASU and were ejected to follow the
guidelines for labour policy as laid down by the government. (2)
These managers have oome from lower-middle olass origin, and(as a
study dealing with the managerial elite in Egypt revealed) shared
with the government and trade unions the same hatred of the old
regime. (3) The majority of this type of manager were members of
the Wafd Party before the revolution. They found themselves
(1) See Amin, M.F., , pp* 116—117.
(2) See United Arab Republic (information Agency), The National
Charter, p.126.
(3) See Kassn, M.S., op. cit.. p.259.
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thereafter in agreement with the ideology of the new regime and thus
expressed readiness to co-operate with it.(l) This group of managers
was ready to co-operate with trade unions. However, conflict
developed between them and trade unions after the introduction of
worker participation schemes in 1961. The strength of the trade
unions, and their demands for union participation in selecting worker
representatives on the boards of directors,(2) left the managers of
the public enterprises with an insecure feeling regarding their
authority in running their firms. (3) They began to stress a kind of
constitutional management-labour relationship rather than viewing
trade unions as "partners".(U) However, because of trade union
pressure, the present government does not yet seem prepared to
abandon the notion of "partnership".
The decline in the size and influence of the private sector, as well
as the expansion of the public sector, have made the FEI less
effective as an organisation for protecting employer interests in
(1) Idem.
(2) The Egyptian Worker-Directors Act 1 lii/1961 was vague about the
right of union officials to be elected for the board membership,
it also required that worker-directors be elected by all eligible
workers in the firm, thus unions have no clearly established role
in determining workers' representation on the board. Unions' effort
to change this situation has been up to now fruitless. For
further details see Chapter ^ of this thesis.
(3) Although management authority still prevails, it is continuously
challenged by trade unions who interpret the notion of "partnership"
as "to be consulted on all aspects of management-labour relations",
see Khalid, M., op. oit..pp.6 and 290.
(I+) See Al-Ahram (Daily Newspaper of Cairo), Vol.96, No.3035U,
(January 18, 1970), p.12. (in Arabic).
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dealing with labour. The nationalisation measures resulted in a
reorganisation of the struoture and operation of the new state-
owned enterprises, which stressed, among other things, the importance
of oompany management in dealing with industrial relations.
Industry-wide matters of industrial relations, including the role of
the FEI, declined as a result. Gradually, FEI activities have been
mainly confined to industrial research and publications. Although
the private sector has been revived in recent years, the role of the
FEI in industrial relations is still limited to expressing views and
to making suggestions on legislation, employment and cases of industrial
dispute. (1) This (present) situation may be so for two main
reasons. Firstly, the management of the public enterprises it
seems prefer to deal direotly with industrial relations affairs at
company level. Secondly, it seems the government would like to see
the present situation oontinue because it is afraid that a shift to
nationwide negotiations could result in strengthening the central
authority of the FEI, which might encourage the FEI to make a firmer
stand at the central level.
(1) Information supplied on May 11+, 1976 by Ahmed Tawfiq,
Director General of FEI.
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SYRIA
(a) TCmpl nyars Under the French Mandate (1920-191x6)
During the French Mandate, the small handicraft firms in Syria were
mainly governed by the guild system. After the disappearance of
the guilds, firms which were usually owned by one person or one
family and managed by the owner or the owners, maintained many of the
paternalistic characteristics of guilds.(1)
Modern industry grew up slowly but gradually. Some of the artisans
of the handicraft industries mechanised their production but the
main initiative for modernisation came from the old mercantile group
which was transformed into a dynamic industrial elite. At the
beginning, and in order to promote industrial investment, this group
had to work through the chambers of commerce which had been founded
under the Ottoman rule. In the mid 1930's, it became clear to a
group of Damascus industrialists that their chamber of commerce was
unable to pursue a different economic activity from that for which it
was originally established. In 1935, therefore, these industrialists
formed the "Damascus Chamber of Industry" (DCl) to "promote
industrial investment and look after the affairs of its memberrfi(2)
No reference was made to dealing with industrial relations affairs
(1) See Kassm, M.R., op. cit., p.38.
(2) Government of Syria (Directorate General of Information),
Syria (Vol.Ill), p.178.
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or representing the members in dealing with trade unions (and it
seems that at that stage the founders felt no need for this).
In 1936, Alleppo industrialists followed their Damascus oolleagues
and formed their own Chamber of Industry. (1) The reason behind the
formation of a city-chamber rather than a nationwide organisation was
that, in the absence of specific legislation allowing employers to
organise, they had to make their application in accordance with the
Ottoman Law of Association which only permitted the formation of
district associations. Whereas trade unions were able to form a
nationwide federation once the Guild Code was repealed, there was no
specific legislation to allow the formation of employers* associations,
probably because (unlike trade unions) employers had not expressed
an interest in such legislation. However, in practice the DCI acted
as a representative of industrialists in other districts and hence
emerged as a nationwide, rather than a district, organisation.
As management-labouivstate relations developed, the chambers began to
find that they had to involve themselves in industrial relations
affairs. They began to intervene aa direct representatives of their
members, by offering advice to the latter and by making the necessary
contacts with government agencies on behalf of their members.
The first clear change In attitude was demonstrated by the DCI's
reaction to the trade union conference held in March 1938. The
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conference resulted in the formation of a trade union federation.
It demanded, among other things, wage increases, minimum wage fixing,
paid holidays and other improvements in employment and working
conditions. The DCI reacted furiously by opposing vigorously any
radical changes in the rules regulating conditions of employment; it
urged the government to act "with great prudence".(1) This hint was
ignored by the government which wanted to preserve industrial peace
during the critical pre-War period and realised that some of the main
worker demands had to be met.
In 191+1, the Hums Chamber was formed, followed in 19U3 by the Hamma
Chamber, and in 19U8 by the L&takia Chamber, and the chambers'
involvement in industrial relations activities increased considerably
with industrial expansion and the growth of trade unionism.
As in Egypt, foreign firms chose not to Join the chambers of
industries. These firms, compared to Egypt, were small in number
and concentrated mainly in oil pipelines (iPC-Syria), power genera¬
tion, construction and trade. They relied on foreign managers or well
trained immigrants (i.e., Greeks, Italians and Armenians) to run their
firms. These firms recognised the fact that they were politically the
oentre of labour protest, and thus developed a rather cautious
approach in their relations with trade unions. IPC (Syria) in
particular, which was the largest foreign concern in the country,
had encouraged informal arrangements between management and trade
unions, such as the establishment of suggestion committees, the
(1) Petran, T., op. oit.. p.73*
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provision of educational and welfare services and consultation with
unions on matters related to social and religious anniversaries.(1)
!This policy was totally in contrast with that followed by the same
company in Iraq., where the political situation was different. In
Iraq, IPC consulted religious and tribal leaders on the provision of
educational and welfare services and refused to permit the formation
of trade unions in the company.
Unfortunately, no statistical data or reports are available regarding
the effect of this approach by foreign firms in Syria on management-
labour relations. The incidence of strikes could not be used as an
indication because strikes were banned during the War period. (2)
However, factors such as the relatively higher wages, and the increas¬
ing tendency by workers to seek employment in foreign firms, (3)
indicate that management-labour relations were in a healthier
position in these firms than in the nationally-owned companies.
Nevertheless, a recent account by the GFTUS claims that foreign
employers during that period followed a policy of "favouring
workers* demands only to avoid the anger of the working-class
against the collaboration of the management of these firms with
(1) See Lenozowski, G., op. oit.. p.276.
(2) Despite the ban on strikes during the Second World War, a
handful of strikes took place in nationally-owned firms, but no
strike was reported in foreign firms.
(3) See Nabulsi, H.M.S., op. oit.. pp.295-296.
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the French administration". (1) Hanna also suggests that foreign
firms had. on many occasions collaborated with the French administrar-
tion on issues related to labour. (2) However, neither the GFTUS*
claim nor Hanna's clarify the nature and extent of such collaboration.
But one is inclined to suggest that as trade unions were usually
suspicious of foreign employers, the latter were bound to seek the
provision of the administration's protection, while at the same
time they had to be much more flexible in dealing with workers1
demands than the national employers, in order to avoid worker protest.
(b) Employers Under the Traditional System (19U6-1958)
Under the traditional regime, the private industrial sector received
all possible encouragement from the government and was largely given
a free hand in formulating the country's industrial polioy. Modern
industry expanded gradually and employers enjoyed a privileged
position. The DCI in particular was very influential in determining
the government's industrial policies and was often consulted by the
Minister of National Economy on issues related to both local and
foreign investments.(3)
(1) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria, op. cit., p.33*
(2) See Hanna, A., op. cit.. pp.396-397.
(3) Sa'id, M., Bahith Fi As-sina'a Al-'Arabia Va Mustaqbaluha.
(A Study in the Arabic Industry and Its Future), (IFI,
Baghdad, 1963)* (in Arabic).
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Two important points should be notedi
1. Trade unions, except under the Shishakli regime, received
encouragement throughout this period, or at least some governments
adopted a neutral attitude towards trade union-employer relations.
2. While the government encouraged the private sector, the extent
to which the government gave in to the employers* influence varied
with the type of government in power. During the parliamentary
period 191+6 to 191+9 (i.e. before the start of the series of coups)
the government was very much under the influence of the industrial
elite represented mainly by the DCI and the Alleppo Chamber of
Industry. The influence of employers could be seen in the pressure
they exerted on government as regarded its industrial policy and the
regulation of management-labour relations.
In the industrial context, the government accepted the chambers*
recommendations for tariff protection and started negotiations to
bring to an end the Customs Union with Lebanon. (1) With regard to
industrial relations affairs, employers were the major forraulators of
the Labour Code of 191+6, whioh recognised collective bargaining and
established compulsory arbitration boards. (2) In contrast with pre-
Second World War employers, the post-War period, employers began to
develop a semi-constitutional approach to dealing with trade •unions,
and began to appreciate that unions were there to stay. They
expressed a readiness to negotiate employment and working conditions
(1) This Union was established under the French Mandate and aimed to
encourage the dumping policy which I referred to in Chapter 1
of this thesis.
(2) Allouni, A., on. oit.. pp.72-73*
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as long as their authority to establish basic work place rules
(such as the right of hiring and firing and of establishing work
procedures) was unquestioned, (1) a situation which was generally
accepted by trade unions though not wholeheartedly.
She same type of employer-union relationship was pursued, with
slight modifications, during the parliamentary period 195<U to 1958.
The only change was that the ABSP was very influential inside the
government and was able to bring pressure on the government to adopt
a more favourable labour policy. The general characteristics of a
semi-constitutional management-labour relations alliance, however,
remained dominant throughout this period. The employers* dominance
in establishing certain work place rules also remained intact.
In certain individual cases, because of political pressure, employers
submitted to "excessive" union demands for participation in recruit¬
ment and redundancy procedures (which employers had retained in their
hand after consultation with their chambers and with the Ministry of
National Economy).(2) For example, in 1956, the Textile Union of
Damascus after intervention by the Ministry of National Economy,
agreed to call off a strike in a major textile plant in Damascus on
condition that management would not lay off twenty workers and would
consult the union about future redundancies.(3)
(1) Nabulsi, H.M.S., on. cit.. pp.361-362.
(2) This is because in 1953t a new Act for the Chambersof Industries
was passed according to which employers could consult their
chambers before approaching the Ministry of National Economy.
(3) See Kassm, M.R., op. oit., pp.91-92.
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During the period of ooup d'etats (19U9-51) no specific change took
place as regarded employer-union-government relationships, "but,
occasionally, declarations were made by military leaders expressing
the intention to make radical changes. Such declarations annoyed
the chambers which welcomed the collapse of these regimes enthusiasti¬
cally.
It was under the Shishakli regime that employers, represented by the
DCI, enjoyed a very favourable position. They constituted the social
basis of this regime and often determined its orientations.
Mamoun Kuzbari, the Chairman of the Khumasia Company (the largest
industrial complex in Syria)(1) became one of the Shishakli's
proteges, his legal adviser and, in 1953, Speaker of his Parliament.
Under the DCI, and particularly on Kuzbari's advice, Shishakli
pursued a pro-West policy and strengthened Syria's economio relations
with the West. Under his influence, a special Act for the Chambers
of Industries was passed. The Act regulated the activities of the
chambers and reorganised relations between them.
Although the Law maintained the separate city chambers, the DCI was
authorised to represent them in cases of a central nature or on a
written authorisation by them in each separate case. The purpose
was, in the words of employers, "to ease oo-ordlnation and maintain
(1) Mamoun Kuzbari was also the Legal Adviser of the DCI during the
1950*8. He then became Syria's Prime Minister during the
early Separatist rule in 1961.
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flexibility within various chambers".(1) More importantly, the new
law authorised, employers, who were members of the chambers, to refer
to their chambers and consult them in matters related to recruitment
and redundancy of unskilled workers before approaching the Ministry
of national Economy. This provision did not bring any practical
change in the authority of the employers but it did give them a legal
right which, in theory, could not be waived in future negotiations.
As mentioned already, employers were forced on some occasions to
waive this provision because of union pressure and government
intervention.
This explicit bias towards employers by the state, which was new,
provoked the antagonism of trade unions who had already suffered
under the Shishakli's dictatorship, and a number of strikes took
place, based on the acousation that employers were collaborating
with the government to change and abolish the relatively equal
rights of trade unions. These actions were quickly and severely
suppressed by the government and industrial peace was restored.(2)
The employers* reaction represented by the DCI was that as far as
they were concerned there had been no change in the basis of their
(1) Nabulsi, H.M.S., op. cit.. p.3*>3» The reason for maintaining
separate district chambers during this period was probably due
to a political conflict which had developed between the Alleppo
group affiliated to the People's Party and the Damascus group
affiliated to the National Bloc.
(2) GFTTJS, The Labour Movement in the Syrian Arab Country.
op. cit.. p.itO.
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relations with the unions. The Law regulating the chambers'
activities was an inevitable progressive step to help the promotion
of Syrian industry and had nothing to do with the "rights" of trade
unions or of any other group. (1) This argument was of a defensive
nature as the Act was promulgated by a government known to be pro-
employer and hostile to trade unions, and its provisions aimed to
strengthening the employers' legal position vis-a-vis trade unions.
Throughout the period from 195U to 1958 numerous efforts were made
by trade unions to change this provision in the Chambers Act but
they all failed.
During the period of the traditional regimes, foreign firms oontinued
to provide better employment and working conditions than their Syrian
counterparts. They also maintained their friendly attitudes towards
trade unions. Nevertheless, trade unions, who were largely
controlled by the nationalist political groups (particularly during
the period 195U-1958), intensified their attack against foreign firms
and demanded an end to their privileged positions, as these firms,
apart from the main provisions of the Labour Code of 19^6» established
their own employment rules. Having lost government protection many
of these firms sought protection through the chambers of industries
and subsequently joined than (as the IPC-Syria and the French
"Damasous Electricity Authority" did). (2) The IPC (Syria) in
(1) See Nabulsi, H.M.S., op. clt.. p.363.
(2) See Ibid., p.87.
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particular maintained close co-operation with the DCI by providing
training facilities in the field of labour relations (as well as in
other managerial fields) to Syrian managers in national DCI's
members firms.(1)
(0) Employers Under the Nationalist Regimes (1958-1976)
After the formation of the UAE in 1958, the industrial activities and
the influence in industrial relations affairs of the chambers of
industries began to decline.
This first became apparent when the Labour Code 1959 was enacted.
The new Code repealed the 19^6 Labour Code which had established a
semi-constitutional status of management-labour relations, in which
employers played a dominant role. The new Code gave the government
oertain rights hitherto either jointly exercised by employers and
unions, or exclusively by employers. For example, the fixing of
minimum wages of unskilled labour under the new Code was to be
decided exclusively by the Ministry of Labour, and many of the work
place rules were replaced by ministerial directives. The Code, to
the advantage of employers, (and drawing on Egyptian experience)
introduced a detailed disciplinary procedure to be unilaterally
applied by employers without consultation with trade unions. This
(1) See Sarkis, N., Al-haraka Ai-naqabiya Wa Atharuha 'aia Shroot
Al-1 giniaal Fi Sin**at Al-pitrol Al-'Arabi. (The Trade Union Movement
and Its Influence on Labour Conditions in the Arab Oil Industry),
(The Lebanese University, Beirut, 19^9)> pp.28-29. (in Arabic).
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measure brought severe criticism from trade unions.(1)
The enactment of the Social Insurance Act 1959 represented another
blow regarding the authority of employers in Syria. This Act
compulsory required employers to introduce Social Security schemes,
and no longer gave them scope for discretion with regard to the
introduction of schemes and with regard to the employers1 maximum
contribution.
The biggest blow to the chambers and individual employers came
through the socialist laws of 1961. Among other things, these
laws fully nationalised twenty-four large industrial firms (including
the Khumasia complex) and partially nationalised thirty-seven others.
In the nationalised firms the Laws introduced schemes of worker-
directors, profit-sharing and Joint consultation. In the long run
these acts aimed to strengthen the trade union position vis-a-vis
employers and to increase their role in the process of decision¬
making in industry. Although employers regained their influence and
the nationalised firms were reinstated to their original owners,
under the separatist rule the old position of the employers was never
fully regained. The government did not dare to repeal the acts of
worker participation nor were the employers able (in the face of a
militant trade union movement) to retain their authority to establish
certain work place rules. Their period of triumph was short and
with the ABSP in control in March 1963, there began a new era of
(1) See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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government intervention in economic activities and of expansion of
the public sector.
The state gradually became the major employer, and the chambers'
role in industrial relations affairs declined sharply. In 19&7»
the Law of the Chambers of Industries was amended to limit their
activities and membership to private enterprises.(1) This meant
that all nationalised and other state-owned industrial firms had to
withdraw from the chambers. This affected 158 firms representing
almost all large and medium-sized enterprises in Syria. Although
these firms represented less than 50% of industrial production and
about 25% of the labour force employed in manufacturing industry in
19^7»(2) that majority of the remaining firms were small-sized
establishments, mainly employing less than fifty workers. In these
firms, management-labour relations were (and still are) less compli¬
cated and were largely (and still are) governed by paternalism.
This has limited the potential role that the chambers might have
played in formulating industrial relations policies.
The expansion of the public sector resulted in the recruitment of
socialist managers who generally came from middle-class origins and
whose loyalty to the regime was a considerable factor in selecting
(1) Arudki, Y., Al-iqtisad Al-suri Al-hadith, (Modern Economics of
Syria), (Vol. 1), (National Guidance and Culture Press,
Damascus, 1972), p.306. (in Arabic).
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them. (1) The socialist managers could not ideologically see eye to
eye with the management of the private sector within the framework of
the chambers as employers* organisations. Instead of controlling
the chambers, as was the ca3e in Iraq and Egypt, the public sector
managers chose to boycott them. Being employed by the state, they
were largely governed by the regulations of the Ministry of Industry
and restricted by the state's labour policy. As individual managers,
they found increasingly when dealing with trade unions that they were
facing unified and powerful organisations. As a result they began to
bring pressure on the government to found an organisation for public
seotor management. At the beginning these managers viewed workers
as their colleagues on the other side of the production line who
differed from them only in the amount and type of responsibility which
they exercised. This view was not shared by trade unions. The
latter continued to stress the "class struggle" and "class difference"
in formulating their attitude towards the management of the public
sector. They made a distinction between the government as an owner
of the public sector and the management of the public enterprises as
government employees. To trade unions the public sector is owned by
the state and thus it is "directly in the people's ownership".
Therefore, it is the responsibility of workers and unions to increase
(1) The majority of these managers had either very limited or no
managerial experience prior to their assumption of the top
management positions in the public sector. An unpublished
report by the Syrian Management Development and Productivity
Centre points out that by 197U» 30% of the top management jobs in
the manufacturing public sector were occupied by people who
assumed managerial post for the first time, another 15% were chosen
from among junior civil servants and 8% had academic experience
before taking a top managerial post, the rest had limited experience
at junior and middle-management levels. See Syrian Arab Republic
(Ministry of Industry-Management Development and Productivity
Centre), Taqrir 'An Tatwur Al-idara Al-sina'ia Pi Surla.(Report on
the Development of the Syrian Industrial Management) (Unpublished),
(Damascus, 1975)» P»8. (in Arabic).
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production in order to protect and develop the public seotor.
The managers in this sector, being government employees, are bound
to "develop bureaucratic tendencies in running their firms, and to
have bourgoeois aspirations that conflict with the interests of the
working-class".(1) These differences in the attitudes between trade
unions and the management of the public sector inevitably brought
management into daily conflict with trade unions. For example,
management welcomed the GFTUS' move towards increasing production and
allocating a "month for production", but at the same time, union
demands for participation in production planning were resisted by
many of the public sector directors. They considered them as
"irresponsible demands which did not take into account technical
requirements for the process of planning production".(2) These
conflicting views held by the management of the public seotor
points to management's lack of experience, particularly with regard
to the complexity of management-labour relations in the Syrian industry.
Trade unions, irrespective of their political affiliation, had developed
a class-consciousness within the Syrian labour movement! labour
demands and the solidarity of the working-class came first.
Management might be accepted politically by trade unions but they
remained a group of a different class and had different interests.
For the sake of the national economy, -unions might try not to clash
with them. However, they wanted to bargain with them and if
necessary they would fight against them.(3)
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria, A Plan of Action for
the GFTUS* Eighteenth Session, p.11.
(2) Quoted by Al-Ishtiraki. (The Socialist), (Organ of GFTUS),
No.632 (April 6, 1976), p.8. (in Arabic).
(3) Idem.
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In 1967, under the pressure from the Syrian public sector management,
the state enterprises were excluded from the chambers' rules and a new
law established three federations for the management of the public
sector, namely»
1. The Federation of the Textile Industry.
2. The Federation of the Foodstuff Industry.
3. The Federation of the Engineering Industry.
Each of these three federations comprises a board of seven directors,
who are elected by affiliated companies' directors from among them¬
selves. Workers' representatives to the companies boards are
neither allowed to stand for the federations' posts, nor to partici¬
pate in the elections, thereby stressing that the federations were
and are exclusively employers' organisations. In practice, one
would expect, therefore, that company-directors as government
employees (i.e. employed by the Ministry of Industry) would be
influenced by the Ministry's preferences as to who should stand for
the federation boards. In addition to creating a conflict of
interests within the boards, the inclusion of worker-directors would
probably result in a refusal to endorse the Ministry's candidates if
the worker-directors did not agree with the nominations.
The federations, in addition to representing the management of the
public sector in dealing with industry-wide industrial relations
matters, are responsible for sectoral industrial planning, subject
to the approval of the Ministry of Industry. They are also
responsible for advising the Ministry on various affairs related to
the government's industrialisation policy and for implementing the
Ministry's industrial programme. Public enterprise managers are
required by law to be members of their federations.(1)
Sinoe 1968, the federations began to negotiate about mutual matters
at the Industrial level with the GFTUS, and by the end of 197U» nine
industry-wide collective agreements had been concluded. During the
same period they were also involved, as representatives of their
member companies, in nineteen arbitration cases of an industry-wide
nature at Labour Court hearings.(2)
(1) See Syrian Arab Republic (Ministry of Industry), Al-taqrir
Al-sanawi 197li/1975.(Annual Report 197U/1975) (Unpublished),
(Damascus, 1975)» pp.1+2-1+1+. (in Arabic).
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COMPARISON OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS AND OF
EMPLOYERS* ASSOCIATIONS IN THE THREE COUNTRIES
Up to the end of the foreign administratir>nn. i.e., in Iraq up to
1932 and in Egypt up to 1922, the state acted on behalf of employers
in dealing with labour protest and trade unions were too weak to
provoke a reaction from employers. Therefore no employers*
organisations were formed. In Syria, the Franch Mandate lasted until
after the Second World War and in the latter part of the period
industry grew more rapidly, and employers felt a need for organisa¬
tions to deal collectively with the French authorities who were
hostile to industrialisation. As management-labour-state relations
developed in Syria, these organisations eventually had to involve
themselves in industrial relations affairs, mainly adopting a hostile
attitude to the growing trade union movement. In Iraq and Egypt,
foreign employers dominated thefew modern industries which had emerged.
These employers, particularly in Egypt, attempted to limit the
authority of workers and to prevent the establishment of trade unions.
Like their national counterparts, they relied on government interven¬
tion to deal with worker protest. In Syria, on the other hand,
foreign firms were very few in number, and developed a rather
cautious attitude in their relations with trade unions. This attitude
was inspired by the fact that these companies became the focus of
attack by the developing trade union movement.
Despite the gradual growth of modem industries, the majority of firms
during the period of foreign administrations in the three countries
200
were small-sized, and the handicraft industries, although they were
declining, remained dominant. In these small-sized
establishments, management-labour relations were mainly of a paternar-
listic nature, resulting from a mixture of social and religious
customs.
Under the traditional regimes, the case for having an employer
organisation became apparent because of the industrial growth which
was brought about meanly by War conditions. In Egypt, the
Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEl) emerged as a result of the
new national drive which was developed during and after the First
World War. In Iraa, the establishment of the Iraqi Federation of
Industries (iFl) followed the emergence of the new industrial elite
during and after the Second World War.
In Egypt and Syria, employers1 associations gave utmost priority to
industrial relations activities, as a response to the growth of
trade unionism, although their tactics were different. The FEI
opposed trade unions and refused to recognise the unions for fear
of interference with their authority. In Syria, the chambers of
industries developed a semi-constitutional approach to dealing with
trade unions, and began to appreciate that unions were there to stay.
In Iraq, where trade unions were very weak and national employers
themselves were in conflict with the ruling oligarchy, the IFI did
not give priority to industrial relations activities until after the
revolution, when the situation had changed.
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Under the traditional regimes the policies adopted by foreign
employers in the three countries, also changed in accordance with the
changes in the governments' labour policies. In Iraq, where they
had the state's backing, they did not tolerate trade unionism, and
like the government, feared the political inspiration behind the
trade union movement. In Egypt and Syria, where the law forced them
to recognise trade unions, they recognised trade unions and tried to
soften relations with them, though not very successfully (particularly
in Syria).
Under the nationalist regimes(1) the importance of employers'
associations in dealing with industrial relations matters has
declined because of the nationalisation measures and the growth of
the public sector. The management of publio enterprise^ which came
from lower middle-class origin and adopted socialist ideology,
began to take the lead in dealing with industrial relations affairs.
There were some local variations in each country. In Iraq, the IFI
acquired a prominent role during the early days of the revolution
because of its pre-revolution oampaign for the industrialisation of
the country and its opposition of the economic policy of the monarchist
regime. Although the IFI role declined and although its work has
been confined to the private and mixed sectors, it still plays an
important role in dealing with trade unions in these sectors as the
sole legal representative of employers.
(1) As most of the foreign concerns were nationalised in the three
countries, the few remaining foreign firms had little role to
play in industrial relations, and were completely subject to the
state's labour legislation.
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In Egypt, in contrast with Iraq, the FEI*s role was a restricted one
after the revolution. As far as industrial relations were concerned
the FEI was confined to only advisory and legal services. This was
mainly due to the employers* opposition to the revolution and to their
connection with the previous regime. The growth of the public
sector provided the management of state-owned enterprises with an
enhanced authority to deal with industrial relations affairs at
company-level without involving the FEI.
In Syria, the ideological conflict between private employers and the
management of the public enterprises and the latter*s need to deal
with unified and powerful trade unions and their pressure to have a
separate employers' organisation, resulted in restructuring the
chambers of industries so as they now only represented private
employers, and in the formation of three industrial federations
established within the Ministry of Industry to represent the manage¬
ment of public enterprises.
The main features of the development of the role of employers and of
employers* associations are summarised on the separate page which
follows.
The Development of the Role of Employers and of Employers' Associations









Employers (foreign ar.d nationals)
in the newly emerged modern
industry opposed trade unionism
and relied on government to deal
with worker protest. The majority
of firms were small-sized and
adopted a paternalistic approach
to management-labour relations.
No employers' associations were
founded.
(1882-1922)
Foreign employers controlled most
of the newly emerged modem firms
who tried to limit workers
authority and relied on govern¬
ment intervention to deal with
worker protest. Handicraft
industries and small-sized firms
were dominant and adopted a
paternalistic approach to
management-labour relations.
No employers' associations were
founded.
(1920-19U6)
In the emerging modem industry,
employers' associations emerged in
response to the need to promote
industry, confined to Syrian
employers and organised on provin¬
cial basis. Later were forced to
pay attention to industrial rela¬
tions and opposed trade unionism.
Foreign employers adopted a
cautious attitude to trade unions.
Handicraft industries and small-
sized firms adopted a paternalis¬










A new industrial elite emerged
and, at a later stage, formed
a nationwide association mainly
to promote industry in response
to a hostile government; it
maintained good relations with
trade unions due to their
common opposition to the govern¬
ment. Small employers contin¬
ued their collaboration with
the governments in their anti¬
union stand.
(1922-1952)
Modern Egyptian employers grew
steadily from among the ruling
aristocracy, formed a nationwide
federation and opposed trade
unionism for fear of interven¬
tion with their authority.
Small employers continued their
paternalistic approach. Foreign
firms, at the beginning conti¬
nued their anti-union stand,
but then were forced to accept the
legal recognition of trade unions.
(191*6-1958)
Modern Syrian employers developed
a semi-constitutional approach to
industrial relations but their
dominant authority remained in
tact. Their associationscontinued
as provincial organisations, and
the DCI was authorised to repre¬
sent them in nationwide matters.
Foreign employers joined the
association and sought peace with






The industrial elite and its
federation acquired a promi¬
nent position during the early
stage, and played an important
role in dealing with trade
unions and in the process of
industrialisation. Recently
membership of the federation
was restricted to the private
and mixed sectors. The nation¬
alisation measures resulted in
the disappearance of almost all
foreign firms, and in the
appointment of socialist
managers who believe in the
state's labour policy to the
management of the public
enterprises.
(1952-1976)
The role of private employers
declined and the employers'
federation was confined to an
advisory role in industrial
relations, but recently it has
been reviving slowly. The
nationalisation measures resul¬
ted in the disappearance of
almost all foreign firms,
brought loyal socialist managers
to the management of public
sector. The management of the
public sector became dominant in
determining industrial relations
affairs at company level.
I
(1958-1976)
The role of private employers and
their chambers declined. The
nationalisation measures resulted
in the disappearance of almost all
foreign firms, brought socialist
managers to run the <5- minant
public sector, and resulted in an
ideological conflict between them
and private employers. As a result
in 1967, the chambers were confined
to private employers, and thy.?e
industrial federations were formed
to represent the management of
public enterprises. The federations
are entirely influenced by the
state's industrial relations policy.
CHAPTER g
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the changes in the
labour policies of the three countries under the different governments,
and to examine the effect of these changes on the development of
industrial relations in Iraq., Egypt and Syria.
(a) The British Mandate (1920-1932)
Owing to the weakness of the labour movement during this period, the
government did not intervene in management-labour relations, except
to suppress the few incidents of strikes which took place during the
later years of the British Mandate. For the same reason, only a
few ad hoc regulations were issued throughout the period, and these
were mainly concerned with general rules related to employment in
government and industry. However, when strikes increased in number
and became more disruptive, the government passed the Strike Act
Ho. 70 of 1932. This Act did not prohibit strikes, but restricted
the circumstances in which they were deemed legal. It also
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outlawed picketing and sympathy strikes.(1)
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(b) The Monarchy (1932-1958)
The government under the monarchy in general adopted a policy which
was hostile to the labour movement. It attempted to control labour
activities, to discourage and when necessary suppress trade unions,
and to encourage the dominance of the employers* authority in
establishing work place rules. The pursuance of this policy was
motivated by a mixture of a paternalistic approach to management-
labour relations, and a fear that organised labour would become the
centre of political exploitation by the radical opposition.
Labour Legislation. Following national and international pressure
for the enactment of comprehensive labour legislation,(2) the
first Labour Law Ho. 72 was passed in 1936; aiul was amended by Law
No. 36 of 19^2 and supplemented by a number of ministerial regulations
and instructions, and as a whole represented the essence of the state's
labour policy during the monarchy.
Perhaps the major significance of the Labour Law No. ^2 of 193° has
(1) See International Labour Office (League of Nations),
(Legislative Series 1932-L.N.3, Iraq), ACT: Strikes, "Law
No. 70 of 1912". (Geneva, 1932).
(2) See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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been that it was the first major labour legislation to be passed in
the Arab World. Its enactment paved the way for similar legislation
in other Arab countries. The Law dealt with conditions and hours of
work; compensation for death, injury and diseases; the formation of
trade unions; employment of children and women, government inspection,
as well as a variety of miscellaneous matters. However, the Law only
covered workers employed in industrial undertakings and it excluded
agricultural workers, government employees and workers engaged in
organisations belonging to the commercial sector, v.1)
The most important part of the Law was Chapter Pour, Articles 23-29,
giving workers the right to organise. Trade union objectives were
held to be the protection of the members* economic interests and the
improvement of their educational, social and physical well-being.
The establishment of trade unions was put under the supervision of
the Minister of the Interior (later the Minister of Social Affairs).
The Minister was empowered to give or refuse permission to workers
who applied for trade union organisation. In case of refusal, the
right of appeal to the Cabinet was allowed. The decision of the
Cabinet in this matter was final. The Law spelled out the procedures
which should be adhered to by workers. The base of a union must be
20 workers in similar jobs. The founders must be of good character
and have no criminal convictions. The government was given the power
to supervise union elections; the aim of this provision was to ensure
(1) See Government of Iraq (Ministry of the Interior), Al-VIaqai*
Al-'Iraqia (The Official Gazette), No. 1j?11, (dated April 30,
W3W-
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government control over trade union executives and to exclude
undesirable members from trade union leadership. Government
regulations and control of trade unions affairs was extended to
inspection whenever it was deemed necessary. The Law also authorised the
Minister of the Interior to cancel the union's licence on several
grounds, the most frequently used ones being those of breach of
public security or the safety of the state.
Despite the theoretical opportunities for legal operation of trade
unions, only one union had been granted a licence by 19i+U»(l)
The Law, however, did not regulate wage fixing, industrial disputes,
compensation for industrial accidents other than injury and diseases,
and compensation for layoffs or unemployment. Because of these
weaknesses and of worker pressure, the Law was amended in 19^2 to
introduce provisions concerning minimum wage fixing, settlement of
disputes and industrial safety measures. The 19k2 amendment
authorised the Ministry of Social Affairs to issue detailed regula¬
tions regarding the settlement of disputes, but the first of these
regulations were not issued until 195k' The Ministry was also
authorised to set minimum wages for various categories of workers
and, in this case, the use of the regulations was delayed until 1953*
The Labour Law No. 72 of 193^ was repealed by Labour Law No. 1 of
19E>8. but this Law was not put into effect until after the revolution.
(1) See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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The government also introduced in 1956, a Social Security Act which
was very limited in its coverage and in the amounts of compensation
which it provided. This Act too was not put properly into practice
until after the revolution.
Rule-Making. During the period of the monarchy industrial relations
rule-making was mainly dominated by the government. Employers were
allowed to establish some important work-place rules such as those
relating to recruitment, dismissal and remuneration. Some more
detailed work regulation was exercised by the Ministry of Social Affairs
as the main governmental agency, but these rules applied mainly to
the nationally-owned firms. Foreign concerns, particularly oil
companies were allowed to establish separate rules but had to apply
the main provisions of Labour Law No. 72 of 1936. Workers or their
representatives had little authority to influence employment and work
regulations.
Among the important provisions made by the government during this
period which affirmed its leading role in establishing rules, were
the Wage Fixing regulations of 1953 and the Conciliation and
Arbitration Regulations of 195U» The two sets of regulations were
made under the provisions of the 19U2 amendment to the Labour Law.
Although the Labour Law, as amended in 19b2, authorised the Minister
of Social Affairs to issue regulations related to minimum wage
fixing, in practice the fixing of minimum wages was the prerogative
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of employers until 1953* *n most of the cases employers set
minimum wages on an arbitrary basis without specific standard
regulations. In 1953? the government issued wage fixing regular-
tions which set minimum wages for different categories of unskilled
workers.(1) These regulations aimed to put an end to the arbitrary
policies of employers, and, in practice, the effect was that they
enhanced government oontrol over management-labour relations.
The Conciliation and Arbitration Regulations laid down a procedure
for handling industrial disputes. This procedure required that
disputes be reported by one or both parties to the Minister of Social
Affairs who would endeavour to settle them by conciliation. If he
failed, he would refer the dispute with the consent of the parties
concerned to an arbitrator or a board of arbitration representing
both parties as well as the government. The arbitration award would
be final and enforceable. (2) The regulations required that in cases
where disputes were settled by conciliation or arbitration, written
agreements had to be drawn up. However, employers usually did not
honour such agreements once the situation returned to normal.
In addition, the regulations stipulated that strikes and lockouts
should be treated as illegal unless the Minister had been notified
(1) See Government of Iraq (Ministry of the Interior), Al-V/aqai'
Al-'Iraqia (The Official Gazette), No. 3333 (dated December 17,
1953JI
(2) See International Labour Office, (Legislative Series, 19$k>
Iraq-1), Regulations Respecting- Conciliation and Arbitration fox-
Settling of Disputes Between Employers and Workers, "No. 63 of
195It"?CGeneva. 1935)»
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fourteen days ahead of their occurrence of the proposed date and of the
reason for the strike or lockout. This provision aimed to give
the government ample time to prevent the occurrence of strikes whether
by persuasion or force. To avoid government intervention, however,
and in breach of the law, almost all strikes which took place between
195^4- and 1958 did not give prior notice.
(c) The Nationalist System (1958-1976)
The revolution brought a complete change in the state's industrial
relations policy. In conformity with its policy of intervention in
economic activities and developing a socialist society, tne 3tate
assumed a more positive and dominant role in management-labour
relations. Its intervention in shaping the structure of the industrial
relations system is witnessed through labour legislation, through
various governmental agencies and through participation in tripartite
bodies consisting of trade unions, government and employers.
Labour Legislation. Shortly before the revolution, as already
mentioned, the monarchist government had enacted the new Labour Law
Ho. 1 of 1958.(1) This Law, however, was not put into effect until
after the revolution. The Law, which was amended several times there¬
after, represented the essence of the nationalist government's labour
(1) See International Labour Office, (Legislative Series, 19&1, Iraq.-1),
Labour Law Ho. 1 of 1958 as Amended by Laws Nos. 82 of 1958;
No. 71 of 1959; Ho. 18U of 1959, (Geneva, 1962).
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policy until 1970. In that year the Law was repealed and replaced by
the present Labour Code Mo. 151 of 1970.
Though not a perfect answer to the complexity of labour problems, the
Labour Law of 1958 wan an improvement over the 193^ Act. The
coverage was extended to workers in commercial and financial establish¬
ments and to blue collar government employees. The Law, however, did
not cover agricultural workers, but these were given better employment
and working conditions, including the right to organise, under the
Agrarian Reform Act of 1958.
The Labour Law of 1958 also set up procedures for minimum wage
determination, extended the types and benefits awarded to workers as
a result of occupational diseases and dismissal; regulated some
working conditions; established comprehensive rules for labour
inspection; regulated the work of the employment agencies; (1)
introduced compulsory joint consultation at plant level; and set up
procedures for the settlement of disputes. The procedures for
handling disputes laid down by this Law, however, did not differ from
the Conciliation and Arbitration Regulations of 1954.
Most importantly, the Labour Law of 1958 recognised the right to the
establishment of employers' and workers' organisations. The
(1) Employment Agencies were established as governmental bodies in
194b. However, they were ineffective. The Labour Law No. 1
of 1958 had also failed to make them effective, and thus under
the present Code they are a tripartite agency - The Labour
Establishment of Employment.
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Minister of Social Affairs (and since 19&3 the Minister of Labour and
Social Affairs) was empowered to issue regulations stipulating the
procedures for trade union government and for the structure of trade
union organisation. These procedures, which were passed in late 1958,
allowed the Ministry to supervise union elections and, if necessary,
to amalgamate unions in similar industries. Hie Ministry thereafter
often used this power to bring pressure on unions which challenged
its authority.
With the expansion in the state's socialist policy that occurred during
the late 1960*s, and the development of trade union and management
ideologies, it was deemed necessary to introduce a new and much more
comprehensive labour code. Therefore, Labour Code No. 1 51 of 1970,
which replaced the Labour Law No. 1 of 1958, was put into effect on
the first of January 1971* It has been amended several times since.
The code and its amendments represent the most advanced labour legis¬
lation in the Arab World. For instance, its coverage and the rights
given to workers, are more progressive than the Egyptian Labour Code
of 1959 and subsequent labour legislation in Egypt and Syria.
The Code comprises the following eighteen chapters: Basic Principles:
Definition and General Provisions; The Contract of Employment;
Wages and Wage Fixing; Hours of Work, Rest, Vacation Leave and Public
Holidays; Employment of Women and Young Persons; Work in Mines and
Quarries; General Industrial Safety and Preventive Measures;
Collective Agreements; Joint Organisation of Work on Projects and
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Undertakings; Industrial Disputes and Lawful Strikes; Labour
Inspection; Special Provisions Respecting Working in the Public
Sector; Labour Courts; The Labour Establishment for Employment,
Training and Rehabilitation; Trade Union Organisation; Incentive
and Sanctions; and Transitional and Miscellaneous Provisions.(1)
The provisions of the Code have wide implications for industrial
relations. These provisions have strengthened the leading role of
the state, although they aimed to strengthen the position of labour,
and particularly of trade unions.
The 1970 Labour Code introduced the principle of joint regulation of
certain rules which were hitherto either established by the state or
by employers unilaterally. However, the state, under the provisions
of the Code, retains the dominant authority in establishing most of
the national, as well as many of the work place rules. Most
importantly, the Code implicitly left collective bargaining as a
voluntary arrangement but laid down that collect ve agreements were to
become legally binding. (2)
The principles laid down by the Code involve fundamental changes in
the state's labour policy to match the emphasis given to socialism.
In this respect, the Code considers "work" as a natural right which
(1) For full account of the Code's provisions, see Republic of Iraq.
(Ministry of Information), Al-Waqai' Al-'Iraqia (Official
Gazette), No. 1906 (dated August 10, 1970). Henceforth will be
cited Irani Labour Code No. 151 of 1970.
(2) The provisions of the Code on collective agreements are to be
discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
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must be provided to every citizen who is able and willing to perform
it, under conditions and opportunities equal to all without distinction.
Article One of the Code asserts:
•'Work is the characteristic which distinguishes human activity.
It is the source of all production, wealth, civilisation and
prosperity. It is therefore the individual^ natural right
and his sacred duty."(l)
Compared to previous legislation, therefore, the Code made it the
state's responsibility to find suitable employment for all able and
willing citizens. Accordingly, the Labour Establishment for Employment
founded under the Code was to act as a tripartite agency supervised
by the government to fulfil this task. It is not a labour exchange
bureau as was the case with the employment agencies which were
established under the previous law.
Furthermore, the Code safeguarded the freedom of trade union organisation.
The government undertook to provide all the moral and material
guarantees which enable the trade union movement to pursue its functions
and carry out its tasks. However, the functions which were to be
pursued by trade unions were stipulated by the Code itself, and thus
the trade unions' freedom to pursue their functions is practically
limited to those stipulated by the Code. The Code also stipulated
provisions for trade union organisation and structure and the basic
principles of their management. In this regard, it might seem as
if the state took on the responsibility for establishing trade union
(1) Iraqi Labour Code Ho. 151 of 1970, Article 1,
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internal rules. But in practice this was not the case, as union
representatives were an influential party on the committee which
drafted the Bill for the Code. The Bill was discussed by the GFTUT
which suggested many amendments, including those related to trade
union structure and management.(1) Nevertheless, it seemed likely
that to leave the structure and governmental procedure of trade unions
to rigid legal provisions would create considerable organisational
problems, as has happened.(2) Such problems could probably be over-
come if governing bodies of the trade unions were allowed to deal with
them. From the trade unions' point of view, based on their past
experience, it seems that to give a statutory form to their structure
and to the main governmental procedure would protect them from future
ministerial intervention, making undesirable changes.(3)
Until 1970, employers, except for being constrained by legislation and
in a few cases by collective agreements, were free to set the conditions
of employment with or without a written contract. The Labour Code
No. 151 of 1970 makes it compulsory for all employers to agree a
written contract with their employees. The contract must specify
clearly the type of job, hours of work, the amount and method of payment
of wages, and the rights and duties of the workers. It also has to
make reference to other regulations governing employment, and has to
(1) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Munacashat Kashro*
Qanoon Al-'amal Al-muqtarah (Discussion on the Labour Bill),
GFTUI, Baghdad, 1969), (In Arabic).
(2) The formal structure of trade unions was discussed in Chapter 3
of this thesis.
(3) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, op. oit.. PP.3I4-39.
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specify that the worker is free to join or not to join trade unions.(1)
The provisions of the Code represent the minimum rights and benefits
offered to workers, but where establishments offer better regulations
than these must apply,(2) and the provisions of the contract should
clearly state which better provisions are applied.
In this regard, it seems the Code has protected and safeguarded the
individual employee from non-contractual employment and/or unfair
contracts. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is
possible for employers to manipulate the contract or give different
interpretations to its clauses. In this context, the labour courts
are empowered to interpret the clauses of any contract, but this
applies only when one of the two parties concerned files a complaint
to the court about the abuse of the contract by the other.
Finally, the Code expanded the number and activities of the governmental
agencies which are empowered to supervise its application and which
implement the state's labour policy. Some of these bodies are of a
tripartite nature as their responsibilities are shared by unions and
employers.
From 1956 to 1969» three social security acts were passed. (3)
Although each of them was more advanced than the other in coverage and
(1) Under the Code, the closed shop is illegal and workers are free
to join or not to join trade unions.
(2) Irani Labour Code Ho. 191 of 1970. Article 8.
(3) These were: Lav/ No. 27 of 1956, Law No. 1^0 of I96I4 and
Law No. 112 of 1969.
in the extent of benefits, many categories of workers were not
covered and the benefits were limited. The GFTUI severely criticised
the deficiences of the acts and campaigned for comprehensive legislar-
tion which would cover all workers and extend benefits to include
retirement and old age pensions and other major aspects of social
security.(1)
The Labour Code No. 151 of 1970 stipulated that all workers covered by
its provisions are automatically covered by the social security
legislation.(2) This made the application of the earlier Social
Security Act (Law No. 112 of 19&9) much more complicated and necessi¬
tated an enactment of new legislation to match the requirement of the
Labour Code No. 151 of 1970 and to conform with the state's policy of
social justice and the welfare of the masses. Accordingly, in 1971 a
comprehensive Act was promulgated (The Workers' Pension and Social
Security Act No. 39 of 1971)»(3) The new Act authorised the
Organisation of Workers' Pensions and Social Security to supervise
its application. The Organisation is technically attached to the
Ministry of Labour, but it is financially and administratively
independent. It is managed by a board of directors which includes
representatives of the government, the GFTUI and the IFI.
The Act introduced the principle of life pensions to male workers
(1) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Report Presented
to the Third Congress of the General Federation of Trade Unions.
Iraq, pp.92-93.
(2) Iraqi Labour Code No. 151 of 1970, Article 7.
(3) For the full provisions of the Act, see Republic of Iraq,
(Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs). The Workers Pension
and Social Security Act No. 39 of 1971. (Government Press,
Baghdad, 1971).
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who have completed thirty years of service and to female workers who
have completed twenty-five years of service. If a male worker has
attained the age of sixty (in the case of a female worker, the age of
fifty-five) and has been insured for a period of service not less than
twenty years, then he (or she) is eligible for a life pension. If a
worker dies, then a survivor*s pension is payable to his (or her)
dependants, regardless of his (or her) length of service or the amount
of contribution paid on his (or her) behalf.
In addition, the Act introduced comprehensive provisions regarding
sickness benefits; long service benefits; accident and disability
benefits; and social and welfare benefits. All or most of these
types of benefits were already included under the previous laws but
with far less coverage and advantages. More importantly, the Act
made the labour courts the judicial bodies which arbitrate in cases
arising from its application and appeals against their decisions can
only be made to the High Labour Court whose decisions are final.
Statutory joint consultation was introduced under the Labour Law of
1958 and then expanded under the present Labour Code. In addition,
two other forms of worker participation were legally introduced as a
result of the nationalisation measures of 196k> namelys She Worker-
Directors Act and the Profit-Sharing Act. Both Acts which were
thereafter subjected to amendments and changes, were introduced on the
Egyptian model. The application of these Acts, and the attitudes of
unions and employers towards them are to be discussed in Chapter 7 of
this study.
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Governmental . genices. Under the Labour Law No. 1 of 19S8» various
governmental agencies were created to implement the state's induetriai¬
re!ations policy. These agencies were modified and further extended
in accordance with the provisions of the present Labour Code No. 1$1,
of 1970. The main agency in this respect is the Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs. The Ministry was founded originally in 191+1 as a
welfare institution entrusted, among other things, to supervise the
implementation of the Labour Law. In 19^3, it was renamed the Ministry
of Labour and Social Affairs, and in 1972 was reorganised to include
two main divisions: Social affairs and Labour.
The labour division is subdivided into four- sections: the ministerial
headquarters; the general directorate; the tripartite agencies; and
the labour courts. The tripartite agencies and the labour courts are
technically supervised by the Ministry but both are administratively,
financially and judicially independent. Three general directorates
are responsible for carrying out the government's labour policy.
These are: The General Directorate of Labour, the General Directorate
of Planning and the Labour Inspectorate. (1) The General Directorate
of Labour is responsible for implementing the Labour Code and other
governmental labour regulations. The Directorate of Planning is the
section which sets the Ministry's overall plan and follows-up the
departmental implementation. The Labour Inspectorate is not officially
(1) The present structure of the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs is based on Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1972. For
full details, see Republic of Iraq (Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs), The Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs 1972, 1973. 1971+ (Par As-Sa* Press,
Baghdad, 1975), PP.9-13*
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independent from the Ministry's jurisdiction, hut under the present
Labour Code Mo. 151 of 1970 > it carries out its functions jointly
with trade unions.
The Labour Inspectorate investigates the application of the provisions
of the labour legislation through unscheduled inspections. It seems
that the Inspectorate has been effective in enforcing labour regulations.
Table 5«1 shows that while the number of visits to firms by inspectors
increased gradually between 1966 and 1972, the number of violations
of labour regulations by employers which were recorded by the
inspectors gradually declined between the two years. The decline is
particularly noticeable between 1971-1972 following the application of
the present Labour Code No. 151 of 1970 (which came into force on
1st January, 1971 )• This is probably because the Code has introduced
heavy fines against employers who violate labour regulations; however,
the GFTUI claims that this decline in the number of recorded violations
has resulted from the involvement of trade union officials in
inspection.(1) Although the number of visits to firms by inspectors
has declined in 1973 ahd 197U and the numbers of recorded violations
have increased compared to those of 1971-1972, the level of violations
remained below that of pre 1971*
Tripartite Agencies. Hinder the provisions of the Labour Code No. 151
of 1970, a number of tripartite agencies were created. The
(1) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Report Presented to
the Fourth Congress, p.85.
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TABLE 5.1
Labour Inspection and Cases of Violation of Labour
Regulations in Iraq. 1966-197U












(1) A recorded violation means that the offence requires a Labour
Court prosecution. The number of recorded violations is out
of the total number of visits.
Sources Computed from Republic of Iraq (Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs), Al-Taqrir Al-Sanawai, Tamuz 19o8-Tamuz 19o9
(Annual Report, July 1968-July 1969), (Al-Azhar Press,
Baghdad, 1969)» P»129 (in Arabic); Ministry of Labour,
Statistics on Labour Laspeotions for the Years 1969, 1970
and 1971 (Unpublished). (Letter to K.I. Al-Kassab Ho. 11.
599, dated October 2, 1975) (in Arabic); and Ministry of
Labour, The Statistical Bulletin 1972, 1973 and 197U,
p. 9h and 182.
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determination of the policies, as well as the administration of these
agexicies, are jointly shared between government, trade unions and
employers. These organisations axe: the Organisation of Workers1
Pension and Social Security: the Labour Establishment for Employment.
Vocational Training and Rehabilitation; and the Establishment of
Workers* Education: and the Wage Fixing Board.
The main aim of the Labour Establishment for Employment, Vocational
Training and Rehabilitation, as stated by the Code, is to "free work
from the domination of market monopoly, and to enable every citizen
willing to work to obtain employment honourably as a natural right
guaranteed by the law".(l) Other aims include the training of persons
wishing to learn a trade or occupation and wishing to practice the
same; increasing and improving the experience of employed persons;
providing vocational rehabilitation for disabled workers and enabling
them to recover their working capacity.
The main activities of the Establishment of Workers* Education are to
educate workers of various levels; to combat illiteracy among workers;
to conduct research on labour problems and to publish literature
related to labour affairs. The Labour Establishment of Employment
and the Establishment of Workers* Education operate at national as well
as local levels.
The Wage Fixing Board has replaced the ineffective statutory wage
fixing regulations. The new Board is responsible for a periodical
(1) Iraqi Labour Code ho. 1b'1 of 1970. Article 160.
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review of minimum wages of various categories of skills.
Bule-Making. Although the state remains the party which establishes
the main rules of industrial relations, a considerable change has
been witnessed towards sharing the establishment of national rules
with trade unions and employers. This became obvious with the
creating of the tripartite agencies which have been discussed above.
The trend towards establishing joint union-management rules has
increased throughout the period, particularly with the development of
collective bargaining. This change is due to the stronger position
of trade unions which are now able to negotiate job regulation on an
equal footing with employers. But it is also a result of the state
labour policy which encourages trade unionism and favours labour as a
critical group needed for industrialisation. Even so, the basic
national industrial relations rules are still completely regulated by
the state*s legislative machinery. In addition, many of these rules




(a) The British Administration (1882-1922)
During the early period of the British occupation, when there had been
no labour organisation, as was the case in Iraq., the government did
not intervene in management-labour relations, except for providing
protection through the police to employers and workers who did not
participate in strikes, and for enacting a series of licensing rules.
However, two important measures were taken by the government during
this period, which immensely influenced the development of industrial
relations in Egypt, As I have discussed in Chapter 1, these were the
abolition of the corvee (forced labour) and the guild system in 1890.
After 1900, the increase in the number and violence of strikes led the
government to intervene frequently in management-labour relations,
mainly through the police.
Under pressure from the Nationalist Party, the government passed
several laws from WOk to 1908, which dealt with the prevention of
hazardous conditions in factories, the employment of children in
cotton processing establishments and the provision of pensions for
government employees.(1)
The government attempted to weaken the position of trade unions by
(1) See Amin, M.F., op, cit.. p.80.
various means. A law dealing with unemployed individuals did not
provide solutions to the problem of unemployment; rather it called
for the imprisonment of unemployed individuals if they joined trade
unions. Intervention in strikes increased during the period from
1908 to 1911» and during the 1919 revolution. It was officially
estimated that more than a thousand persons were killed during the
revolution. (1)
Violent strikes in 1919 induced the government to take more positive
measures for dealing with industrial disputes, and so the Cabinet
issued a decree which established a central conciliation committee.
The chairman and one member of the committee were British officials;
there was also a representative of the employers, but no worker
representative.
00 The Monarchy (1922-1952)
The Wafd government, which assumed office after independence, became
concerned with labour problems. In 1921+, the central conciliation
committee was abolished, and regional conciliation committees were
established in the provinces. These committees could only recommend
a proposed solution to a problem and had no power to enforce their
recommendations. The recommendations were often ignored, especially
(1) See 'Izz al-Din, A., op. oit., p.20.
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by employers. In 1930» the Directorate of Labour was established end
attached to the Ministry of the Interior, its main function being that
of controlling strikes.
Labour Legislation. In 1931, the government decided to request
assistance from the IL0 in the form of sending an advisory commission
to Egypt to study working and employment conditions and to make any
necessary recommendations for the establishment of an appropriate
labour administration. A commission which became known as the
Butler Commission because it was headed by H.B. Butler, the then
Deputy Director of the IL0, arrived in Egypt and made the first
comprehensive survey of employment and working conditions. The
commission recommended the establishment of a directorate of labour
which was to be completely independent from the police and the Ministry
of the Interior. The commission also recommended the establishment
of an advisory labour council, and the immediate enactment of a
labour code concerning the employment of women and children, compensa¬
tion for industrial accidents, health and safety, hours of work, weekly
rest periods, contracts of employment, unemployment benefits and
industrial disputes.(1)
In 1933> the government accepted four of the Butler Commission1s
recommendations. The Directorate of Labour was transferred to the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (later to the Ministry of Social
(1) For details of these recommendations, see Butler, H.B.,
Report On Labour Conditions in Egypt with Suggestions for
Future Social Legislation, (Government Press, Cairo, 1932).
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Affairs) and an advisory labour council was established. The
council was supposed to suggest labour legislation and advise the
government with regard to its labour policy, but it remained ineffec¬
tive. Only four lawB were enacted between 1933 and 193&. These
were related to the employment of children in industry; the minimum
requirements for the employment of women in industry and commerce;
the hours of work for males in specific industries; and compensation
for industrial accidents. These laws, however, were poorly administered
and only partially enforced. (1)
When the Wafd government was brought to power with the help of the
British in 19k2, it passed a number of labour laws. Of particular
importance among these was the Trade Union Act 19li2. which gave legal
recognition to trade unions.(2) The passage of this Act and other
labour laws was an indication of the Wafd,s acceptance of the trade
union movement, and the Wafd,s adoption of a social reform programme.
Nevertheless, the Trade Union Act brought strict government control
over the trade union movement, and specifically forbade agricultural
workers and government employees from organising trade unions. In
addition, the Law limited the financial activities of trade unions,
for they were not permitted to invest their funds in any commercial
or industrial ventures. Also, trade unions were required to spend
at least 2$3/0 of their annual budget on social welfare or health
programmes for their members.
(1) See Harbison, F.H., and Ibrahim, I.A., op. oit.. pp.15U-1f>5*
(2) See Chapter 2 of this thesis
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The Trade Union Act 191+2 also established strict control over the
activities of trade unions; for instance, they were forbidden to
engage in political or religious activities. The police and the
Directorate of Labour had to be notified in advance of the meetings
of every general assembly, and trade unions were also required to keep
records of their membership, minutes of meetings and accounts in
books bearing the seal of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Government
labour inspectors had the authority to inspect these records at any
time without advance notice.
The Act prevented the establishment of a general federation for trade
unions. Workers in the same industry were permitted to establish
trade unions in various parts of the country but not at a centralised
level. Thus, the law prevented the existence of a unified leadership
of the trade union movement.
In spite of the limitations laid down in the Trade Union Act 191+2, it
was (as discussed earlier) received with enthusiasm by workers and
with anger by employers. It represented a progressive step by the
Wafd government which had national aspirations and which introduced
reform programmes. 'The need for industrial peace during the War
period was another determining factor in the passage of the Act.
Like Iraq., where in 191+2 the Labour Law of 193& was amended, and in
Syria where the French authority passed a few legislative decrees,
worker co-operation in operating the production machinery without
interruption was an important factor in the passage of the Act.
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Rule-Making* Until 19^4-2, the rules relating to the employment
relationship were mostly established by employers, except for the
laws which were passed in accordance with the Butler recommendations.
The increasing pressure of worker and labour problems on the one hand,
arid the V/afd's desire to obtain the support of labour in its conflict
with the Palace and the aristocracy on the other, induced the Wafd
government to initiate a series of labour laws. The government
started to share rule-making with employers, and gradually increased
its authority in controlling the rules established by employers or
jointly between them and trade unions.
In 19^4-2, a law was passed which made it compulsory for companies to
provide accident insurance. Three other important laws were later
passed by the government. These were the Contract of Employment Act
of 19J+U; the Conciliation and Arbitration Acts of 19U8; and the
Collective Agreements Act of 1950.
The Contract of Employment Act of 19lUi. which was passed by the Wafd
government, constituted the core of the Egyptian labour policy until
1952. It dealt with wages and allowances; overtime and holidays;
assignment of work; disciplinary measures; social welfare and health
programmes; and layoffs and discharges. The Act covered workers
employed in industrial and commercial establishments which employed
more than five employees.(1)
(1) For further details on the Contract of Employment Act of "\9kbi
see Murad, M.H., op. cit.. pp.66-68.
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The provisions of the Contract of Employment Act provided detailed
procedures for work place rules related to stipulated issues. In
addition to authorising the government to share with employers the
establishment of work place rules, the Act provided legal protection
for workers regarding employment and working conditions. In pursuance
of this policy, two other acts were passed in 1950 which provided for
compensation for accidents and diseases resulting from work conditions;
and a social insurance law was passed in the same year. (1)
The Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 19U8 established a compulsory-
dispute procedure, while the Collective Agreements Act of 1950
required that all collective agreements be investigated by the Labour
Office and the government was given authority to reject agreements
reached between unions and employers within thirty days. Furthermore,
a summary of the agreement must be published in the official newspaper.(2)
(c) The Nationalist System (1952-1975)
Since the revolution, the influence of the Egyptian government in the
industrial relations sphere has been increasing through legislation,
(1) Ibid.. pp.71-72.
(2) For further details on the Collective Agreements Act of 1950,
see Ibid.. pp.69-70; and for a summary of the Conciliation and
Arbitration Act of 19^8, see Harbison, F.H. and Ibrahim, I.A.,
op. cit.. p.173.
through direct intervention by specialised agencies, and through
participation with employers and trade unions in tripartite agencies
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Labour Legislation. The new Trade Union Act 1952 was passed, as
already mentioned in Chapter 2, soon after the revolutionary regime
assumed power in 1952. The new Act gave agricultural workers the
right to form trade unions, permitted the establishment of a nationwide
federation and promoted the trade union closed shop and the check off
of union dues.
The Act, however, banned strikes and prohibited trade unions from
engaging in political and religious activities. In addition, trade
unions were required to allocate one-third of their annual budget to
social, welfare and health activities. The Law also prohibited
government employees, members of the armed forces and the police from
organising in trade unions.
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, the aim of the Act was to
strengthen trade unions and the Act has greatly influenced the growth
of union membership.
The increase of government intervention in economic activities and
the adoption of socialism resulted in new state-management-labour
relations. Labour and management were now viewed as "partners" in
pur-suing the new economic order. This necessitated a further change
in state labour policy to match the new situation. Accordingly, in
1959 the comprehensive Labour Code Ho. 91 of 1959 was promulgated.
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As I have pointed out earlier, this Code, along with ministerial
decrees, constitutes the present industrial relations policy in Egypt,
Part of the Code aimed to strengthen trade unions further. The Code
also dealt with other major aspects of management-labour relations,
namely: organisation of the work place; conciliation and arbitration
in industrial disputes; apprenticeship and vocational training of
labour; labour inspection and judicial police; and disciplinary
measures and penalties.
However, the most important feature of the Code, in my view, is in
respect to trade unions. In accordance with its provisions, the
numerous small-sized trade unions which existed had to be wound up
and the organisational structure of the trade union movement was to
be based on large industrial unions composed of persons engaged in a
given trade, craft or occupation over the whole country. Called
"general unions",(1) the large scale organisations could set up union
branches in each province, and shop steward committees in establishments
employing fifty and more workers.
Hie change in the organisational structure of the trade union movement
aimed to create a more unified trade union movement with national
leaxiership which would have effective control over local unions and
shop steward committees. The Code, therefore, transformed the
concentration of power from the plant unions to national level.
(1) The term "general unions" in this context means "central unions"
which are industrially-based. Thus, it has a different meaning
to what are called "general tx'ade unions" in Britain.
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As the power of public enterprise management in dealing with
industrial relations affairs at company level increased, the new
trade union organisation created a communication gap between general
unions and their local branches, resulting from the central authority
of general unions which usually negotiated directly with company
management.
To deal with this problem the provisions of the Code were amended
in 196li b?/- Presidential Decree Mo. 62. This amendment of the Code was
discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesi3 while dealing with the
development of trade unionism in Egypt.
In dealing with other aspects of management-labour relations, the Code
provided comprehensive provisions and created various governmental
agencies to supervise, either unilaterally or jointly with unions and
employers, the application of the Code. These provisions and their
impact on industrial relations are to be dealt with later in this
chapter.
In early 1976 new labour and trade union laws were enacted but they
have not yet been put into effect because of the opposition from trade
unions regarding some of the clauses of the two laws. The new
labour code deals with employment conditions; apprenticeship and
vocational training; collective agreements; joint consultation;
wage fixing; industrial disputes; labour inspection; and disciplinary
measures. The new Code is somewhat similar to the Iraqi Labour Code
Ho. 151 of 1970, but in contrast to the Iraqi Code, it has introduced
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new limitations on the right of unions to conclude collective
agreements and has reduced unions' (and employers') participation in
the tripartite agencies. The new trade union act aims to increase
the government's authority in determining trade union structure, and
for this reason is being criticised by trade unions.(1)
In the pursuance of its policy to ensure social justice and welfare
of the masses, and in order to further enhance the position of labour,
the government combined the Labour Code with the Social Insurance Act
Mo. 92 of 1959. Prior to the promulgation of this Act, only a small
number of firms were covered by the provisions of the Social Insurance
Act of 19^0, and the benefits available to workers were very limited.
However, some employers had voluntarily introduced social security
schemes in their firms. These employers themselves laid down the
provisions of contribution and entitlement to the schemes.
The Social Insurance Act No. 92 of 1959. as amended in "\96li, (2)
introduced a comprehensive compulsory scheme of social security
applicable to all firms covered by the provisions of the Labour Code.
The Act also set down the amounts of the employers' and of the workers'
contributions, the benefit entitlements, and the procedures for
application for benefits. The main provisions of the Act sis amended
in I96I4., were the following:
1 - Payment of full or partial pension in cases of industrial
injuries, retirement for old age, permanent disability, and for
(1) See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
(2) For the text of the original Act, see International Labour Office,
(Legislative Series, 1959-UAR 2), Law Mo. 92 to promulgate the
Sooial Insurance Code. (Geneva, 19^0).
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survivors in case of death.
2 - Compensation for long service (i.e. less than that required for
pension entitlement), for minor injuries, and for other disadvantageous
hazards.
3 - Health and unemployment insurance.
I4. - Welfare, social and educational services (suoh as maternity
allowances, leave, housing loans, and child nurseries).
The Law authorised the Social Insurance Administration as a governmental
agency to supervise the application of the Law. Similar to the Iraqi
Act of 1971 (which was probably influenced by the Egyptian Act), the
labour courts in Egypt, established under the provisions of the Labour
Code No. 91 of 19S>9> were authorised to interpret the provisions of the
Social Insurance Act and handle individual disputes arising from its
implementation. However, unlike Iraq where the government is not
represented in the labour courtthe Egyptian labour courts are
dominated by government representatives. This means that the
government is indirectly entrusted with the authority to make the
essential decisions related to social security. This Act represented
a revolutionary advance in social security, not only in the UAH but
also in comparison with existing similar legislation in other Arab
countries.
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In the package of the socialist measures of 19&1, and consistent with
the concept of "partnership", the government introduced two statutory
schemes of worker participation in the management of industrial
undertakings, namely: worker-directors and profit-sharing. The
application of these schemes was later on extended to cover establish¬
ments in sectors other than industry, such as commerce, finance,
transport and co-operatives. A third statutory scheme of participa¬
tion has been already in operation in accordance with the provisions
of the Labour Code No. 9"\ of 1959. Section III (Chapter 1) of the
Code provided for the formation, procedure and functions of joint
consultative committees in firms employing fifty or more workers.
The application of this section of the Code, as well as the worker-
directors and profit-sharing acts are to be discussed later in Chapter
7 of this thesis.
Governmental Agencies, The Ministry of Labour, established in 19^1?
is the main agency in charge of the implementation of the national
industrial relations policy. The Ministry was reorganised in 19^2,
196ij. and 1968. In 1971. the Ministry of Labour was divided into
two Ministries: the Ministry of Social Insurance, which supervises
the application of the Social Insurance Act and the regulations
supplementing it; and the Ministry of Manpower, which supervises the
application of the Labour Code and various labour regulations, except
for those related to social insurance. Presidential Decree Ho. 8 of
1971 specified the main functions of the Ministry of Manpower and its
various departments. (1) Accordingly, the Ministry has included the
(1) For the Text of this Decree, see Arab Republic of Egypt (Ministry
of Manpower), Annual Book of Labour 1970/71, pp.8-10.
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Labour Inspectorate, the Central Agency for Management Training;
The Establishment of Workers* Education, the Establishment of Manpower;
the Labour Courts; and seventeen other specialised departments.
The Labour Inspectorate investigates the application of the provisions
of labour legislation through periodic and unscheduled inspections
carried out by government inspectors. In contrast to Iraq., trade
unions in Egypt do not participate in inspections. The Inspectorate
has been effeotive in enforcing industrial safety regulations.
Table 5.2 shows that while the number of visits by labour officials
with regard to industrial safety measures increased from about 23>000
in 1970 to about 28,000 in 1975> the total number of violations of
safety regulations by employers as recorded by labour inspectors out of
total number of visits declined from about 550 in 1970 to about 390 in
1975.
It appears that inspection with regard to compliance with labour laws
was less effective than inspection of industrial safety measures.
The Table shows that the percentage of recorded violations to total
visits had increased, although slightly, between 1970 and 1975*
Other governmental agencies such as the Agency for Management Training
and the Establishment of Workers* Education are responsible for
planning and supervising the activities of various governmental and
private institutions of managerial, technical and vocational skills
development. The Manpower Establishment acts as an employment agency
through which employers have to hire their -unskilled, semi-skilled,
TABLE 5.2
Labour Inspection and Gases of Violations of Labour
Regulations in Egypt in 1970. 1972-1973, and 1975(1)










1972 21*. 0 0.1*6
1973 26.0 0.1*2
1975 28.0 0.39
B - Employers Violations of Labour Regulations as Revealed







No. of Recorded (2) as a
Violations 96 of (1)
(000*s)
(2)
1970 52.0 1.3 2.5
1972 5U.0 1.1* 2.6
1973 55.0 1.8 3.2
1975 57.0 1.9 3.3
(1) Total numbers of recorded violations are not available for
the years 1971 and 1971*.
Source» Calculated from Arah Republic of Egypt (Ministry of
Manpower), Annual Book of Labour. 1969/1970. p.15 and
1*7» Arab Republic of Egypt (Ministry of Manpower),
Annual Book of Labour. 1972/1973. p.12 and 51+5 and Arab
Republic of Egypt (Ministry of Manpower, Labour Statistics.
1975 (Unpublished), (Letter to K.I. Al-Kassab, dated
May 11, 1976), Tables Nos. 1 and 5> (in Arabic).
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and certain categories of skilled labour. Both employers and trade
unions are rpresented on the board of the Establishment, but the
majority of the seats, as well as the chairmanship of the board, are
retained by government representatives.
'■Tripartite Agencies: In addition to the increasing role of government
in unilaterally establishing and administering rules related to
industrial relations, it has created tripartite agencies to realise
its concept of "partnership". Through these agencies, the government
shares with employers and trade unions the process of making national
rules, as well as work place rules.
Among the main agencies in this regard are the labour courts. 'These
courts were created under the provisions of the Labour Gode No. 91 of
1959 to act as compulsory conciliation and arbitration bodies and to
interpret collective agreements and various provisions of labour laws.
Their decisions are final and there is no right of appeal, whereas in
Iraq, an appeal can be made to the High Labour Court whose decisions
are final.(1)
Other tripartite agencies include the Advisory Labour Council? the
Supreme Council for Co-ordination of Labour Services; The Consultative
Committee on Manpower Planning; the Supreme Council for Industrial
Safety; the Supreme Council for Health Insurance; the National Centre
(1) The activities of the labour courts are to be discussed in the
section on industrial disputes in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
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for Industrial Safety Research; the Supreme Committee for Industrial
Progress and Vocational Training and the Joint Committee for Wage
Fixing. (1)
Most of these bodies operate at national level, but a few of them,
such as the Consultative Committee on Manpower Planning and the Wage
Fixing Committee, also operate at district level. In all cases the
representation of employers and trade unions is proportionately lower
than that of the government. Most of these establishments are of an
advisory nature confined to recommendations and suggestions while the
final decision rests with the Minister of Manpower or the Minister
of Social Insurance, each in accordance with his authority. It Is
expected that the Minister concerned will give serious consideration
to these recommendations. (2) This does not change the fact that the
government, by holding the majority of representation, retains control
over the activities of these bodies.
Unilateral Government Rules. Since 1952, the government has enacted
various rules which regulate different aspects of employment
relationships. These rules were either incorporated into the basic
labour laws or issued separately through presidential and ministerial
decrees. They have two main characteristics, namely: the high
(1) For an account of the activities, procedures of work and methods
of representation of these agencies, see Barsoum, F.F.,
Ishtirak Al-mmaal Wa Ashab Al-'amal Fi Al-takhtit (Participation
of Workers and Employers in Planning) (Unpublished Survey),
(EFL, Cairo, 1972;, pp.M+-71 (in Arabic).
(2) See Ibid.. p.1*3.
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degree of detail and the similarity of rules which apply to the majority
of workers. The rules established by the government cover recruit¬
ment, promotion, wages, holidays, disciplinary measures, dismissal
procedures, hours of work, industrial safety, compensation for work
accidents and diseases, pensions, health insurances, and settlement of
disputes.
In 1961, a Presidential Decree (ho. 600 of 1961) was enacted which
extended the application of the rules regulating employment in
governmental departments to all employees of the publio sector.(1)
In 1962, new rules governing all employees in the publio sector were
promulgated by Presidential Decree Mo. 35U6 of 1962.(2) Subsequent
amendments were made to the law and it was finally replaced by Law
No. 61 of 1971«(3) This Law involved detailed rules, including a
safary scale, to be applied to all employees of publio enterprises.
This confirms that the extent of government intervention in industrial
relations activities is not limited to national aspects of employment,
but also covers work place aspects.
(1) For the Text of Presidential Decree No. 606 of 1961, see United
Arab Republic (information Department), Socialist Laws,.1961-
196li, (Government Press, Cairo, 196I+), p.32.
(2) For the Text of Presidential Decree No. 35b& of 1962, see Ibid.,
PP.33-38.
(3) For the Text of Law, see Arab Republic of Egypt (Ministry of
Manpower), Annual Book of Labour 1970/71. pp.1^-20.
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SYRIA
(a) The French Mandate (1920-19U6)
During the early period of the French administration, management-
labour relations in Syria were largely regulated by the guild system.
The guild associations bound together skilled and unskilled workers,
as well as employers engaged in the same occupation. The guild
system had its legal basis in the Ottoman Code of the Guilds.
However, with the increase of foreign imports and the emergence of
the factory system, the guilds began to disintegrate and gradually
declined.
The hard economic conditions of the urbanised labour force and the
absence of protection owing to the decline of the guild system led
to worker solidarity in establishing trade unions. The rapid
advances of the labour movement which followed alerted the French who
reacted quickly by enacting Legislative Decree Ho. 152 of 1935.
This Decree had abolished the Ottoman Code of the Guilds but placed
many restrictions on trade union functions.
The political and economic changes brought about by the outbreak of
the Second World War and the pressure brought by trade unions forced
the French authority to make some concessions to workers. For
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instance, the trade union federation through its president, Subhi
Khatih, succeeded in negotiating the enactment of a few labour laws.
Legislative Decree Mo. 276 A.S., passed in July 19U2, gave dismissed
workers the right to claim an indemnity at the rate of one month's
wages for each year prior to the dismissal. Another Legislative
Decree, Mo. 268 A.S. of November 191+2, regulated the fixing of wages
and provided for the setting-up of rate-fixing boards.(1)
In 19U3» two other legislative decrees were passed; these paved the
way for the later promulgation of the Labour Code. Legislative
Decree No. 1x8 of July 19li3. provided for the establishment of private
employment bonuses and the regulation of activities of such offices.
The second Decree, No. 137 of July 19li3, related to indemnities payable
to employees in lieu of notice, and to widows in case of the death of
the husband, and outlined the provisions for the computation of these
payments. In addition, the French High Commissioner issued in March
19h3* a Decree, No. 10U F.C. which provided compensation in cases of
termination of service, and industrial accidents.(2)
Although these decrees had paved the way for the passage into law of
a labour code, they made few improvements to labour conditions or
the legal position of trade unions, and the latter continued to
campaign for the enactment of a labour code. However, it was not




until after the termination of the French Mandate that the enactment
of a labour code was given any effective consideration.
(b) She Traditional System (l9lu-1958)
Labour Legislation. The new independent government, which was
anxious to win the support of various political and social groups
including workers, adopted a semi-constitutional policy regarding
management-labour relations. Among its early measures was the
passing of Labour Code Mo. 279 of 19L.6. Although the application of
this Code encountered difficulties, and was also subjected to frequent
changes, it remained the basic legal document which formulated the
government's labour policy during this period.
At the time of its enactment, the Labour Code Mo. 279 of 19ii6 was
probably the most progressive labour legislation in the Arab
countries of the Middle East. Borrowing heavily from Western con¬
cepts of labour rights and organisation, it covered almost the entire
field of management-labour relations, and fulfilled many labour
aspirations. The Code regulated wages and hours of work, prescribed
holidays, determined sick leave and sick pay, specified restrictions
on the employment of children, and defined the structure, government
and organisation of trade unions and their federations. Finally, it
provided for the setting up of a Directorate of Labour and Social
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Welfare to supervise the enforcement of the Code's provisions. This
Directorate became the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour in 1958.(1)
The enactment of the Code, however, was motivated by both political
and economic factors. Politically, the new government needed the
support of trade unions, and had to prove to them its concern for
their major demands. Economically, the country needed a period of
industrial peace after independence to embark on economic development,
and the co-operation of trade union leaders was essential for this.
Despite the enactment of the Code, however, this last objective was
not achieved, as economic difficulties and political instability
followed and led later to the outbreak of industrial unrest.
The practical application of the Code did not measure up to its
promise. Long-established vested interests soon found ways to
circumvent its restrictive provisions, and abuses and violations became
commonplace. Even the workers who stood to benefit from compliance,
offered little help in ensuring its proper application. Despite
their efforts, trade unionists failed to develop an awareness of
working class identity. This was because the majority of workers
were illiterate, employed in small firms, and steeped in tradition.
They did not consider themselves oppressed and accepted their hard lot
as a manifestation of the will of God. As a result, it did not occur
to them to make demands for the sweeping new radical rights that they
(1) For a summary of the Code's text, see Ibid.. pp.161-162;
and Allouni, A., op. cit., pp.67-69.
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were entitled to. This explains why the actual active labour
movement was limited to the main large urban centres where the large
firms were located. In these firms workers were relatively literate
and responded positively to organisation.
Nevertheless, even with the abuses and restricted application, the
Code gave to Syrian labour both advantages and stature unequalled
at the time in the Arab world.
Despite the difficulties which confronted the application of the 191+6
Labour Code and the violent political changes which followed the
formation of the independent government, no serious change in the
government*s labour policy was observed until the early 1950's.
During the early 1950*8, two events took place which required some
changes in, and modifications of, the Labour Code. Firstly, the
changing regimes, to fulfil their promises for social and welfare
reforms, felt constrained to leave their imprint on legislation.
Secondly, workers, owing to trade union campaigns to educate and
organise them, became less passive and more demanding.
Early changes in legislation were initiated by the Shishakli regime.
Shishakli's excessive reliance on private investors strengthened the
role of employers vis-a-vis labour by passing the Chambers of
Industries Act in 195>3« Among other things, this Act affirmed
employers* right to establish certain work-place rules which indirectly
reduced the rights given to workers under the 191+6 Labour Code.(l)
(1) See Chapter of this thesis.
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However, in order to minimise worker protest in response to the pro-
employer bias, the Shishakli regime introduced some legislation
which was favourable to workers. A great step forward in favour of
trade unionism was taken in 195^> when the Legislative Decree Ho. 15
of 1952 laid down that state assistance could be given to funds
established by trade unions to help workers in cases of industrial
accidents and diseases. The Decree also extended the financial
assistance to workers* education, to vocational training, to subsidies
for medical treatment and housing schemes, and to the building of
social centres. In November 1952, another Decree was passed,
Decree No. 138 of 1952. which empowered the Ministry of National
Economy to make decisions concerning the fixing of weekly holidays,
working hours, opening and closing hours, and the allocation of funds
for social assistance to trade unions.(1) Moreover, the 1953
Constitution considered the freedom of association to be a constitu¬
tional right for both workers and employers which could not be waived
by any legislation. (2)
Rule-Making. Despite the semi-constitutional approach adopted by the
state regarding management-labour relations on the shop-floor, it
seems from the nature of the laws which were passed that the state
was the major rule-making party during this period. Almost all
nationwide rules were established by the government and administered
by its agencies. However, there were a few cases in which rules
(1) Allouni, A., op. cit.. pp.69-70.
(2) Hallsworth, J.A., op. cit.. p.373*
248
were laid down jointly by government, unions and employers; this was
particularly true in the case of minimum wage fixing and arbitration.
Work-place rules in the unionised firms were jointly established
between trade unions and employers, except for those related to
recruitment and redundancy which remained the prerogative of employers.
In the non-unionised firms and almost all small establishments, work¬
place rules were entirely determined by employers.
(c) The Rationalist Regimes (1958-1976)
In common with Iraq, and Egypt under the revolutionary regimes the
role of the state in industrial relations affairs has increased
considerably in Syria since the unity with Egypt in 1958* 'The
intervention of the state expanded in parallel with the growth of the
public sector and the socialist measures taken by the government.
The intervention is exemplified by the legislation and the activities
of governmental agencies, mainly the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labour. Unlike Iraq, and Egypt, the number of tripartite agencies
in Syria is limited to the labour courts and the joint committees for
wage fixing (both established in accordance with Labour Code No. 91
of 1959). The composition and activities of these two bodies are
similar to those of Egypt, as they are based on a similar legal
basis. The reason for the absence of national tripartite agencies
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In Syria is that more emphasis is given to work-place participation
than national and regional participation. Nevertheless, tripartite
ad hoc committees are occasionally formed to deal with or make
recommendations on issues arising periodically such as the committees
on productivity, vocational training, and amendments of certain labour
regulations.(1) In all these cases, the work of the committees is
advisory, and the final decision rests with the minister concerned.
Labour Legislation. The Labour Code No. 91 of 1959> the Social
Insurance Act No. 92 of 1959? and the socialist laws of 19&1, passed
during the unity between Syria and Egypt, applied to Syria as well
as Egypt (they continue to remain in force, although amendments have
since been made). There were a few amendments to the Labour Code and
the Social Insurance Act, but these were mainly procedural, and have
not changed the essence or the content of the laws. However, section
four of the Labour Code on trade union organisation was cancelled in
1962, by the Legislative Decree No. 50. Although this section of
the Code was later reinstated when the Decree was repealed in 19^3,
it was again replaced by the Trade Union Act No. 31 of I96I4., and
subsequently the present Trade Union Act No. 81^. of 1968.(2)
The application of the participation laws, as in Egypt, was extended
to cover establishments other than those in the industrial sector,
(1) For an account of the formation, composition and work of these
committees, see Syrian Arab Republic (Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labour), Dal11 Al-'amel (Labour Guide), (Government Printing
Office, Damascus, 1972), pp.523-533» (in Arabic).
(2) See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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and later some of the provisions of these laws were amended. In
addition, the government issued, in 196l+» baw No. 55 for Y/orkers
Co-lianagement (i.e. self-management)(1), "but as I shall discuss
later in Chapter J, the application of this Law met great practical
problems, and it was finally abandoned in 1967 (though it was not
officially repealed).
As I have discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the separatist
government (1961-1963) repealed section four of the Labour Code
No. 91 of 1959 on trade unions and replaced it by Legislative Decree
No. 50 of 1962. This Decree provoked strong opposition from trade
unions because it aimed at weakening their organisations. Due to
this opposition, the Decree was repealed in 19&3> f11 1961+ the
ABSP government enacted the new Trade Union Law No. 31 of 196I+. (2)
This Law removed some of the restrictions applied to trade unions
under the Labour Code. It encouraged the formation of trade unions
and provided for a new structure for their organisation. The new
union organisation required that union branches should affiliate
to central unions at national level and to local federations at
regional level. The aim was to combine the advantages of both
central and local organisations. In practice, however, this structure
led to authority-conflict between central unions and local federations
as to which body the union branch should report to and which of the
two organisations should exercise disciplinary authority over the
(1) Government of Syria (Directorate General of Information,
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya (Official Gazette), No. 1 (April 1961+).
(2) ILO (Legislative Series, 196l+-Syr. 1), Legislative Decree No. 31
to promulgate the Act Respecting Trade Unions. (Geneva, 1964).
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union branch. The intervention of the GFTUS could not solve the
problem due to its inability to control the internal constitutions
of its subordinate organisations. This factor together with
frequent political changes which affected the activities and
organisation of trade unions, necessitated the change of the Trade
Union Act of 1961*.
The present Trade Union Act No. 81; of 1968(1) was promulgated to
replace the 1961+ Act. The Law was partly enacted in response to
the organisational problem of the trade union movement, but the
main policy aim of the state was to try to bring the trade union
movement under its control. This policy was based on the belief
that trade unions should be encouraged as builders of socialism but
that their activities must be supervised and checked by governmental
agencies in order to keep them in line with the economic policy of
the state.
The Trade Union Act No. 81+ of 1968 reorganised the structure of trade
unions, reshaped their governing bodies and intervened in the use of
their funds. This means that the new Act has indirectly increased
government intervention in trade •union internal affairs and thus
has enabled the government to control the trade union movement.
Under the new Act, union branches were, in theory anyway, given
(1) Government of Syria (Directorate General of Information),
Al-Jarida Al-llasmiqa (Official Gazette), No. 30 (July 1968).
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separate entities; they could affiliate to local federations and
central unions but the former would be a co-ordinating organisation
and the latter would only intervene in national matters. In
practice, union branches lost their separate entities to their
respective local federations and central unions, because the GFTUS
failed to co-ordinate the activities of central unions and local
federations. As these last two organisations continued to compete
with each other over their relations with union branches, and because
of the central nature of the authority-structure of the trade union
movement as laid down by the new Act, union branches eventually
became subordinates to their local federations and central unions.
This means that the new Act has failed to solve the organisational
dilemmas of the trade union movement.
Despite these drawbacks, the Act has strengthened the position of
trade unions. It has encouraged unionisation by offering advantageous
benefits to unionised workers and by expanding trade union functions
to cover participation in the vocational and technical training of
illed workers and establishment and administration of workers co-operatives
Whereas in Iraq, the Establishment of Labour Employment is a tripartite
agency and in Egypt both unions and employers axe represented on the
board of the Manpower Establishment, the regulation of the labour
market is entirely determined by the state in Syria and the implementation
is carried out by state-owned employment agencies. As supplements
to the Labour Code, a series of employment legislation were passed to
regulate recruitment, promotion, dismissal procedures and skill
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classifications in all public enterprises and in private firms
employing more than fifteen workers. These regulations were
amended several times and finally brought together in a single
document in 19&9»0) These regulations have two main characteris¬
tics: they are applicable to all categories of non-managerial
employees, and they go into considerable detail leaving very
limited room for shop floor manipulation.
According to the Ministry's senior officials, the concentration in
the hands of the state of such high authority to deal with employment
was based on the case for "protecting workers from the employers*
inadequate and unjust employment conditions. (2) The Ministry does
admit that the absence of union and employer representation on the
governing bodies of the employment agencies is a legal deficiency
which needs to be corrected? and yet they argue that unions and
employers are consulted on many decisions of the agencies.(3)
However, consultation is not the same as participation in making
rules regarding conditions.
Governmental Agenioes. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour in
Syria is the main agency which has been entrusted with carrying out
(1) For the full text, see Syrian Arab Republic (Ministry of Social
Affairs and Labour), Hithan Al-istikhdam (Employment Regulations),
(Government Printing Office, Damascus, 1970)• (in Arabic).
(2) Information supplied by Messrs H. Hasson, the Undersecretary of
the Ministry of Labour and H. Madani, the Director of Labour.
(3) Ibid.
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the government• s industrial relations policy. The Ministry was
established in 1958 to implement the social and labour policies of
the government. As with the Iraqi Ministry of Labour, the Syrian
Ministry is at present divided into two undersecretariats: labour
and social affairs. The labour undersecretariat is composed of the
following six sections: the Directorate of Labour; the Directorate
of Legislation and Legal Studies; the Directorate of Labour
Statistics; The Labour Inspectorate; the Directorate of
Administration and Services; and the Employment Agencies. The
Social Insurance Administration is technically attached to the
Ministry, though it is financially and administratively independent.
The labour courts are in theory tripartite bodies, and independent
of the Ministry of Labour, but, as in Egypt, government representation
in these courts is higher than that of unions and employers. The
wage fixing committees have similar status to the labour courts in
terms of independence and majority government representation. The
employment agencies are established on a regional basis with a central
office in Damascus. They follow-up the implementation of the
state1 s employment regulations and act as labour exchange bureaux.
Other sections of the Ministry are responsible, in accordance with
their specialist functions, for implementing various aspects of
the government's industrial relations policy.
The Labour Inspectorate in particular supervises the implementation
of labour legislation and regulations at plant level. As in Egypt,
inspection can only be carried out by government officials in
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accordance with the Labour Code, and unlike Iraq, trade unions are
not involved in inspection. However, unlike Iraq and Egypt, the
Labour Inspectorate in Syria does not seem to be effective in
carrying out its functions. Table 5»3 shows that from 1966 to
"\97kf the annual visits by government inspectors ranged from about
2^00 to about 2900 visits. Compared to Iraq (Table 9*1) and Egypt
(Table 5*2), this represents a low record of visits. The number
of recorded violations fluctuated annually between 1966 and 1971+5
and it declined gradually between 1971 and 197U* However, because
of the low number of inspector visits, the number of recorded
violations does not provide a true indication of employers' viola¬
tions of labour regulations.
Rule-Makings Since 195^1 the state has become the prime regulator
of industrial relations. This is consistent with the state's
socialist policy and its protection of workers as documented in the
Syrian Provisional Constitution of 1961+5 which set forth the following
general principles in Article 18j
"The state shall protect labour, safeguard the payment of a
just remuneration to workers, fix working hours, provide
social insurance, and regulate the right to holidays and
rest." (1)
The role of the state in formulating industrial relations rules in
Syria has been greater than that of Iraq and Egypt. It has a
constitutional basis which cannot be changed unless the Constitution
itself is amended.
(1) Quoted by Khareet, M. and Jamal, R., op. cit.. p. 16.
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TABLE 5. 3
Labour Inspection and Cases of Violation of Labour
Regulations in Syria 1966-197U
No. of O•O












Source: Computed from Syrian Aral) Republic (Ministry of
Social Affairs and Labour), The Annual Labour Statistical
Bulletin (Vol. 13), p.66.
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COMPARISON OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE BT INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS Bf THE THESE COIMITtlBS
The foreign administrations in Iraq, Egypt and Syria adopted
similar industrial relations policies (■*■) "the re were some
differences which were mainly caused by differences in the dates
of the periods of the foreign administration and in the
development of industrialisation in the three countries. In
general, during this period, the three countries did not favour
trade unionism and backed the authority of employers over labour.
In Iraq and Egypt the government suppressed the activities of the
infant trade union movement to prevent their growth. In Syria,
where the French Mandate continued for a longer period, the government
was forced by events to change its attitude to trade unions and to
tolerate their activities. This meant that the Syrian government,
which was backing the authority of employers over labour, had to
pass legislation which required employers to recognise trade unions.
In Iraq and Egypt by contrast the state not only backed the authority
of employers over labour but stepped in to protect them, by suppress¬
ing collective action by workers.
The backing of employers by the state did not extend to the
economic sphere that is to fostering industrial expansion.
Instead, the foreign administrations in the three countries
encouraged an agricultural economy to serve the needs of their home
countries. The French authority in Syria, however, was forced by
(1) Paradoxically the French colonial policies were in this
case more similar to those of Britain than to the usual
French policies stfjieh explains the similarity of the early
ladustrial relations developments in the three countries.
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wartime needs to change direction and to encourage move towards
limited industrialisation.
In Iraq, the size of the industrial labour force was small and the
emerging trade union movement was very weak. The state felt no
need for labour legislation, and except for a few ad hoc regulations,
it was left entirely to employers to establish and administer rules
related to industrial relations.
In Egypt too, legislation was very limited and its main aim was to
suppress worker protect. However, owing to the persistent demands
of the nationalist movement, a few regulations were passed towards
the end of the British administration to provide for improved working
conditions. As in Iraq., employment rules were generally established
and administered by employers.
In Syria, the situation was again different. The government was
forced by political and economic events to provide for legal
recognition of trade unions and to pass some labour laws. But
these were mainly related to social and welfare benefits. Trade
unions occasionally participated with employers in establishing
some work-place rules but the majority of the rules were established
unilaterally by employers.
Under the traditional systems there were clear-cut differences in
the industrial relations policy of the governments of the three
countries, arising from political circumstances and the composition
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of the political elite.
Tr. TVflfi, where the tribal sheikhs were the pillar of the monarchist
system, the state adopted an unfavourable attitude towards trade
unions. Hie latter were seen as a source of political agitation
and were discouraged and severely suppressed, while the authority
of employers over labour was backed by the state. But the
government discouraged industrial expansion, particularly during
the early stage of this period, and this eventually brought employ-errs
and trade unions together to oppose the government. The state was
the main regulator of industrial relations but legislation was
confined to basic labour law supplemented by regulations and
ministerial instructions. The labour law and its supplements were
very limited in aspects and coverage. Employers were allowed to
regulate work-place employment relationships while joint management-
labour rules were discouraged.
In Egypt, the conflict between the Royal Palace and government
resulted in both sides trying to win the support of various social
groups, including trade unions. Trade unionism was theoretically-
encouraged, hut because of the influence of employers, their
activities were restricted. The employers were given almost
complete authority to deal with lai-our, and occasionally the
government stepped in to provide protection for their interests and
used the police to suppress workers' protest. Because of this, the
employers' authority .in establishing work-place rules was not
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challenged for a long time. The wartime and post-War political
and economic conditions forced the government to pass a number of
laws dealing with many aspects of industrial relations, though these
were limited in extent and coverage. These laws laid down that the
government should share the regulation of industrial relations
affairs with employers, and that there should be in certain cases
joint union-employer rule-making.
In Syria, the situation was very different. The independent
government, which pursued economic development and needed the
support of various political and social groups, encouraged semi-
constitutional management-labour relationships. The development
of trade unions was encouraged and given constitutional protection.
Because the employers* influence was greater, however, government
bias towards employers was present in the maintenance of the semi-
constitutional relationship. Within this framework wider labour
legislation than that of Iraq and Egypt provided for a better
coverage of employment groups and employment aspects. The state
retained the right to establish basic national rules but, at the
work-place, rules were usually established jointly by unions and
employers but the employers retained the right to make certain rules
unilaterally, such as those related to recruitment and redundancy.
Only under union pressure were these practices occasionally modified.
Under the Nationalist Systemst because they were so similar in nature,
the industrial relations policies in the three countries have also
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been, to a large extent, similar.
The three systems favour labour as a critical group in the process
of industrialisation and encourage trade unions as "partners" in
economic development. Owing to increasing government intervention
in economic activities, the public sector has become dominant. The
management of this sector is expected to be guided by the state*s
labour policy, and private employers are also expected to function
within the framework of the state*s industrial relations policy, a
policy which is being increasingly stressed by legislation.
Numerous labour laws have been enacted with two aims: to ensure the
welfare of the masses, and also to make the concept of "partnership"
effective. There are, however, a few differences in the scope of
the legislation in the three countries.
In Iraq, labour laws cover all workers and are extended to include the
majority of industrial relations aspects. Other aspects are
regulated by either tripartite agencies or jointly by trade unions
and employers. This applies particularly to those rules related
to the work-place.
In Egypt, labour laws cover the majority of workers and most
industrial relations aspects. Tripartite and joint management-
union rules are also observed but to a lesser extent than in Iraq..
In Syria, as in Egypt, labour laws cover the majority of workers but
the state exercises a wider role in industrial relations. It has
become the prime regulator, and labour laws have been laid down for
almost all aspects of industrial relations. For this reason, joint
management-union rules are mainly confined to small firms which are
not covered by the Labour Code or the Employment Eegulations.
The main elements of the role of the state in industrial relations




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































COLLECTIVE BAR&AINIKG AMD INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
&£&
(a) Collective Bargaining
Under the British Mandate, negotiations which took place as a result
of collective action did not take the form of collective bargaining as
they were unsystematic and largely disorganised. Management aimed to
end disputes without dealing with the causes of the disputes. This
state of affairs did not change much under the monarchy. Collective
agreements were introduced by foreign firms towards the end of the
monarchy to reduce tension among workers and to act as a substitute
for trade unionism. "Workers' representatives" in negotiations were
chosen by management on seniority and tribal bases instead of being
elected by the workers themselves.
A first step towards an agreement between the managecent of a private
company and worker representatives was taken in the late 1950* s when
the management of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) which had declined
to recognise trade unions drew up a written agreement about wages and
conditions of employment. It presented it to worker representatives on
their Joint Consultative Committee for signature.(1) Ihe aim was to
defuse worker protests rather than to introduce proper joint regulation.
Labour Law No. 1 of 1958 which was put into force immediately after
the revolution laid down that unions and employers may voluntarily
(1) See Badre, A.Y. and Siksek, S.&., Manpower and Oil in Arab
Countries. (American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1960), p.193.
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and jointly regulate their employment relationship. Once that law
had been passed, unions began to demand annual negotiations of wage
increases, allowances, fringe benefits and other matters related to
employment conditions. At the same time, large firms, realising the
change in their positions, yielded to union pressure and thus
collective agreements began to spread. Most of these agreements
were substantive in nature with no procedural rules governing their
application and termination. However, a few agreements also
included procedural rules regarding the handling of disputes, the
application and termination of the agreement, and the process of
negotiations. Notable among these agreements were those of the
Rafidain Tobaoco Company in 1959 and the IPC's bi-annual agreement
which started in 1961•
In 1970 Labour Code No. 151 replaced Labour Law No. 1. This code
was influenced by the Egyptian Code of 1959 and laid down more
specific provisions for collective bargaining. It outlined the
procedural rules which were to govern negotiations and agreements.
This means that, at the present time, collective agreements may be
concluded between one or many unions, or between the GFTUI and one
or many employers and/or the employers' organisations. They may
be drawn up at plant, company, occupation or industry levels. Once
concluded, agreements must be put in writing and made legally binding.
The duration of an agreement may not exceed two years and can be
terminated before the expiry date if the two parties agree, or if
the labour court makes a decision to this effect. The union
concerned represents all workers in the plant or industry (whether
unionised or not) and the benefits of the agreement extend to all of
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them too# The local labour courts are the only competent bodies
which are authorised to interpret agreements, and the High Labour
Court is the only competent body which is authorised to arbitrate
in disputes arising from the application of agreements.(1)
Since the application of the Code there has been a growing tendency
towards two-year industry agreements regulating wage increases and
employment conditions. Notable among these agreements are those in
the oil industry between the General (Central) Union of Oil and
Mineral Workers and the Iraqi National Oil Company, the Iraqi Company
of Oil Operations (formerly IPC) and the French group of oil
companies ERAP (ALF - Iraq).
The process of collective bargaining in Iraq (as well as in Egypt and
Syria) differs from that in the industrialised countries. In the
three countries the provisions of the collective agreements deal with
rule making but not with issues related to the supply of and demand
for labour. In other words, the state in the three countries (where
there is a shortage of skilled labour and excessive supply of unskilled
workers) considers it to be its responsibility to regulate employment
and to "free labour from market monopoly"(2) in employing labour,
that is, to prevent employers exploiting their market monopoly.
Thus, the exchange of labour is entirely controlled by the employment
agencies which, in turn, are either totally controlled by the state
(as in Syria) or supervised by it (as in Iraq and Egypt).
(1) See Iraqi Labour Code No, 151 of 1970. Articles 100-121.
(2) See Iraqi Labour Code No. 151 of 1970. Article 160.
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The Labour Establishment of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation
in Iraq takes the responsibility of supplying labour but also
indirectly controls the demand for labour. This last function is
pursued through: (1) overall manpower planning in co-ordination
with the Ministry of Planning, and (2) the supervision of skill
training in an attempt to balance the availability of skills with the
demand. Although the Labour Establishment has only recently been
created, it seems to have been reasonably effective in controlling
the process of employment of unskilled labour. The Labour
Establishment has been able to achieve this by annulling any
recruitment undertaken by firms directly and by taking court
proceedings against them. However, the Establishment has not yet
been able to control the supply and demand of skilled labour which is
still subject to free supply and demand. The Establishment has also
not yet been able to fulfil the training needs for skill development,
but this task is pursued by tripartite training agencies which are
part of the Ministry of Industry. The training provided by these
agencies, it is expected, will help the Establishment in gradually
controlling the future supply and demand of skilled workers.
In manpower planning the Labour Establishment takes into consideration
skill development but provides for employment on social grounds by
over-staffing for the surplus of unskilled labourers.
Unlike in Egypt and Syria, collective bargaining in Iraq includes
bargaining about wages although basic minimum wages are determined
by the tripartite Wage Fixing Board. This is because the Labour
Code allows for the possibility of establishing better conditions
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than those laid down by statutory regulations or bodies. Thus,
wage negotiations are not uncommon in Iraq but, as stated earlier,
the outcome of pay negotiations and the bargaining power of the
parties are not necessarily related to the state of the labour
market.
Collective bargaining in Iraq is strongly influenced by political
factors. The government tends to favour trade unions and considers
them to be essential contributors to economic development. This
attitude is a determining factor in the power relationship which
affects collective bargaining. This does not mean that workers
are unable to use the strike weapon but there is not much necessity
for them to use it at the present time.
The fixing of minimum wages by the tripartite Board is used as an
instrument of income re-distribution as well as an economic and
social development policy. Wage rates are related to education,
skills and efforts rather than productivity. Firms cannot legally
cut the labour force when wage rates are increased, so how do they
react? In my e:xperience (looking at manufacturing industries) in
a situation where wage rates have been increased, management tries
to increase efficiency, sales and output in order to reduce labour
costs per unit of output. In this context, therefore, the cost/
benefit rewards theory which determines bargaining power as suggested
by Somers(l) is not applicable to the Iraqi situation (neither to
the Syrian or the Egyptian where almost similar situations exist.)
(1) See Somers, G.G-., "Bargaining Power and Industrial Relations
Theory" in Somers, G.G., (Ed.), Essays in Industrial Relations Theory.
(Iowa State University Press, Iowa, 1969)» PP» 39-53»
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Because wage rates are based on factors related to the relative
importance of the job, job evaluation schemes (mainly point-rating
schemes) have been introduced since 1968. In a survey I carried
out in 1972 for the National Centre for Consultancy and Management
Development, I found that most employers try to use job evaluation
as an alternative to wage negotiations. This has angered unions
whose first reaction was to call for a freezing of the schemes or
a halt to their expansion.(1) But later unions themselves began
to use the schemes of job evaluation as a bargaining process by
negotiating the relaxation of job-grade classifications. In the
Baghdad Iron Tubes Company, for example, union representatives
demanded that a higher grade must be given to certain unskilled
jobs, such as porters and cleaners, as a quid pro quo for the
acceptance of the salary structure which was proposed by
management.(2)
However, in determining the level of wages, trade unions in Iraq
do not take account of the employers' ability to pay or the
profitability of the project. They try to achieve uniformity
for unskilled workers in the same industry.(3) This is not the
case with skilled workers where wages, as pointed out earlier, are
more influenced by supply and demand. Trade unions also tend to
(0 See Al-kassab, K.I., "Tajrubat Takiem Al-*Amal Pi' 1-Iraq",
(The Experiment of Job Evaluation in Iraq), Management Development
(Journal of the National Centre for Consultancy and Management
Development, Baghdad), Vol. 1, No. 1 (November 1973)» p.35*
(In Arabic).
(2) I was involved in an advisory capacity in the design of the job
evaluation scheme for this company.
(3) See Al-Araji, A., "Wages Policy in Iraq", Al-Sinai (The
Industrialist), Vol. 10, Nos. 1-2, (January-June 1969), p.21.
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discourage the payment of different sized annual pay increases to
daily paid workers which means inefficient workers get the same rise
as efficient ones. They also try to achieve higher real wages
through negotiating larger pay increases. Because unions are
deeply involved in the politics of the socialist-inspired state,
they tend to exert pressure on the government in order to influence
income distribution. In this context, wage bargaining is different
from some developing countries where the government is not a wage
leader, such as Kenya for example, where a recent paper indicates
that ability to pay proved to be "the most consistent determinant
of inter-industry wage differences".(1)
The conduct of Iraqi unions seems to be based on their realisation
that collective bargaining has little effect on income re-distribution
and only enables them to secure incomes required for basic needs.
Nevertheless, union power to influence wage rates seems to have
increased as a result of the enactment of the Labour Code of 1970
and the Social Security Act of 1971. This, in turn, indirectly
indicates the influence of the state in enhancing the power of trade
unions through progressive legislation, and consequently the
bargaining power of unions vis-a-vis employers. Under the 1970
Code, all workers in the firm or industry are covered by the
provisions of the collective agreements irrespective of being or
(l) See Henley, J.S. and House, W.J., Collective Bargaining. Wage
Determination and Regulation of Employment Conditions in Kenya.
(Unpublished paper presented to the Fourth World Congress of the
International Industrial Relations Association, Geneva,
September 6-10, 1976), p.7»
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not being union members. This means that union influence has
extended to include firms hitherto not unionised: it is also
enhanced because the union now bargain on behalf of all workers.
For example, only three industry-wide agreements covering about
25,000 were concluded between 1968-1970, while twenty industry¬
wide agreements covering about 150,000 were concluded between 1971
and mid 1974. (1)
Wages and their supplements (i.e. overtime and allowances) make up
the bulk of the provisions of collective agreements. The agreements,
however, also regulate certain aspects of work procedures, social and
medical facilities as well as disciplinary measures.
The inclusion of disciplinary measures in the agreements indicates
management concern with regard to ensuring prior union approval to
measures which might represent an aspect of potential disputes.
It also indicates the unions' concern to participate in making rules
which might have an adverse effect on employees.
In spite of the absence of any legal restriction on shop floor
negotiations, agreements are usually concluded at industry or
inter-regional company levels. This is due to the central nature
of the trade union organisation and the sensitivity of the process
of bargaining from the union point of view.
(1) See GFTUI, Report to the Fourth Congress 1 97h.. p.68
(b) Collective Bargaining
The Trade Union Act of 1942 laid down that employers should recognise
trade unions and should negotiate terms and conditions of employment
with trade unions. In spite of this Act, employers refused to
recognise trade unions, and very few collective agreements were
concluded; these were mainly in the oil industry where the
privileged foreign companies (hsso and Shell) chose to normalise
their relations with unions.(l)
The Collective Agreements Law of 1 950 laid down the procedures and
elements of collective bargaining(2) which were to be adopted.
As a result of this law and of the change in the political system
in 1952, collective agreements increased in number. The majority
were company agreements covering either a single subject (mainly
wages) or a few related issues (such as wages, allowances and
overtime). A few industry-wide agreements were also concluded
which concerned a variety of issues related to both economic and
social matters.
The Labour Code 91 of 1959 which is at present in force, laid down
detailed procedures and requirements of collective agreements.
A collective agreement can be concluded between a union or a group
of unions and one or more employers. If the agreement is concluded
(1) See the Arab Petroleum Institute for Labour Studies,
Collective Bargaining in the Arab Petroleum Industry.
(Arab Federation of Petroleum Workers, Cairo, 1967), p.9*
(2) A summary of this Law was given in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
between an employer and more than one union, the unions involved
are required to represent workers in the same industry or craft,
or in industries of related activities. The Code also requires
that a collective agreement be in writing, and approved by the
general meeting of the union. In addition, the agreement has to
be registered with the Ministry of Labour (Manpower). According
to the Labour Code, a collective agreement can be concluded between
the employer and the union for a minimum period of three years, and
if neither the employer nor the union have requested the termination
of the collective agreement, it will remain in force for another
year, or for a period specified by the parties. On the other hand,
the collective agreement could be considered as terminated at the
end of the originally specified period if either party made such a
request three months before the date of termination. In addition,
provisions of a collective agreement apply to all workers of the
enterprise or industry which concluded the agreement if at least
half of the workers are union members at the time of concluding the
agreement, and if it provides more favourable benefits than those
provided under individual contracts of employment. Furthermore,
individual workers, the union(s), or the employer(s) can apply to
the labour court to make a decision about the enforcement of a
collective agreement.
Collective bargaining in Egyptian industry is not as common as in
Iraq and Syria. This is mainly because, in practice, strikes are
controlled by the Government and because the Government have
introduced many detailed rules related to employment and working
Although collective agreements in Egypt are mainly concluded at
company level, shop stewards committees have little effect on the
bargaining process# The Internal Constitution of the EFL (Egyptian
Federation of Labour) has prevented shop stewards from negotiating
collective agreements unless authorised by their branch. In
practice, even union branches have to consult their central unions
and refer every detail to them before concluding an agreement.
This is another reflection of the dominance of the central machinery
in the Egyptian trade union organisation. The EFL does not
particularly like the present arrangement because it indicates the
influence of public sector management who are negotiating at company
level. The FEI (Federation of Egyptian Employers) also does not
like the present arrangement; it would like industrial relations
matters to be centralised so that issues of national concern may be
dealt with at that higher level and the EFL agrees with this view.
However, it must be noted that company-level negotiations do not
necessarily mean shop floor negotiations. This may be illustrated
in the case of multi-plant organisations (in the public sector)
where negotiations between management and unions cover all the plants
of the said company. In a few cases where plants of such companies
are extended to various geographical locations, the agreement has a
nation-wide nature and usually the central union takes over active
negotiations. In most cases public sector companies are located in
a single province. In these cases a problem arises within the trade
union organisation as to whether the local federation should be
consulted or not, and this has been a subject of inter-union
organisational conflict.
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The importance of collective bargaining as a means of regulating
employment and working relationships is much smaller than in Iraq.
This is attributable to the fact that in Iraq all workers are
covered by the process of collective bargaining. While in Egypt
all the workers employed in a factory where half of the workers in
the plant or industry are unionised are legally covered by the terms
of the agreement, in practice this type of situation is rare and this
means that in most companies only unionised workers are covered by
the terms of collective agreements in Egypt.
As in Iraq, the supply of unskilled labour is regulated by a tripartite
body supervised by the government because of the excessive number of
unskilled labourers seeking employment. This surplus labour stems
from population pressures and a high rate of rural immigration to
industrial centres. This problem has been tackled by over-staffing
in public services and the public sector, and has resulted in a very
high level of disguised unemployment.
As in Iraq, the employment of skilled labour is not regulated in this
way but is allowed to be determined by the forces of supply and demand
in the labour market. Trade union membership among skilled workers,
however, is very 1ow(1) in contrast with the situation in Iraq.
For instance, in 1975» in the Nasr Textile Organisation (which controls
the textile industry in the public sector) only U06 out of 6,255
workers (6.5/) categorised as "skilled workers" were union members.
(1) See EFL, Taqrir *An Asus Ziadat Al-Inta.iia (Report on the Means
of Increasing Productivity), (Unpublished Report, Cairo, 1975), p.32.
(in Arabic).
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The EPL blames managerial tactics (which include managerial fringe
benefits and inter-company upgrading to supervisory level) as the
reason of the union's failure to attract skilled employees.(1)
Wage rates are largely determined outside collective bargaining
although earnings other than wage rates are covered by collective
agreements.
In Egypt, government employment regulations include job
classifications and salary structures in the public sector.
The private sector is not covered by these regulations, and wages
may be negotiated jointly by unions and management. In the public
sector wage determination is based on arbitrary cost of living
standards; in the private sector, efforts are made to relate wages
to productivity. Incentive schemes based on piece rates and work
study are very common in these industries.
In Egypt the bargaining power of the trade unions derives mainly
from government support based on the notion of "partnership".
At present, the unions negotiate with company managements in both
the public and private seotor. Management at this level, particularly
in the public sector, has acquired a powerful position derived from
government backing based on the notion of "partnership", namely that
unions and management are partners with the government in fostering
industrialisation. This situation has prevented Egyptian unions
from developing a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis management.
(1) Idem.
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This may have given an impetus to their campaign to move bargaining
to the industrial level.
Company-level negotiations are usually subject to government
intervention through the ASU unit. Since the latter has acquired
a powerful political influence over both management and unions, it
determines the course of negotiations in the majority of cases by
exerting pressures informally on the two sides. The managers of
the public sector, being government appointees, normally implement
the state's industrial relations policy which the ASU (Arab
Socialist Union) Unit in the plant monitors. Trade union officials
have also to co-operate with ASU unit in the plant in order to keep
their jobs. But, unlike the managers of the public sector, they do
not seem satisfied with the intervention of the ASU unit in
management-union negotiations.(1) This is another factor why
unions aim at shifting bargaining to the central level where the
ASU organisations have totally different political objectives, and
thus it would be improbable that they might intervene in collective
bargaining.




The origins of collective bargaining in Syria can be traced back
to the beginning of the Second World War. The concessions then
made by the French administration to the trade union movement as
a result of the political situation led to the conclusion of a few
company arrangements dealing mostly with wages.(l)
The Labour Code of 1946 recognised collective bargaining as a
voluntary process but made collective agreements legally binding
on both parties and this gradually led to an annual process of
negotiations. In these, the threat of a strike was the main
weapon available to the trade unions in negotiations while the
small number of skilled trade union members and the large supply of
unskilled workers gave the employers a powerful position in
negotiations.
The Labour Code 91 of 1959 (which was passed during the period of
Syria's unity with Egypt and applied to both countries simultaneously)
regulated the process of concluding agreements on a basis entirely
similar to those in Egypt (see p.272-3). existence of centrally
based employers* organisations for public sector management, the
tendency towards negotiating industry-wide agreements, as in Iraq,
has increased since the late 1960's.
(1) See Nabulsi.H.M. S..op. cit.. p.67.
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Hie importance of collective bargaining in Syria lies in the
political power of trade unions rather than in their control of
the labour market, as they are favoured by government.
Collective bargaining as a process of determining employment
conditions is limited by two factors:
(1) It is extended only to workers who are covered by the Labour
Code, that is about one-third of the total labour force.
Agricultural workers are totally excluded.
(2) Collective agreements cover only unionised workers in the
plants or industry concerned unless more than half of the total
number of employees are trade union members. This means that
collective agreements in practice seem to cover only a minority of
the labour force.
The rules for employment conditions are mainly unilaterally
stipulated by government. This minimises the scope of collective
bargaining because wages of skilled employees are determined by
government regulation while minimum wage rates are determined by
the tripartite Wage Fixing Committees. While trade unions and
employers are consulted about wage determination it would seem that
such consultation does not involve them in the process of making the
decisions. This means that collective agreements do not set wage
rates but they do deal with wage supplements which affect total
earnings. These include: incentive bonusses, overtime payments,
payments for holidays, dangerous work, etc. In addition, agreements
cover fringe benefits, social, medical and educational services.
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Negotiations take place mainly at industrial level. In case3 where
negotiations take place at company or shop floor level, central
unions, through their branches, intervene by giving orders to shop
stewards. The main concern of the central unions is that
negotiations do not take place in factories which are covered by
industry-wide agreements; also that the subject matter of
negotiations has often not been dealt with in the industrial agreement.
This intervention, which indicates the centralised nature of trade
union organisation, can give rise to inter-union conflict between
local federations and central unions as to who should give orders
to shop stewards or union branches in local negotiations.
Employers try to include two important issues in collective bargaining:
production and discipline. They want to be able to take disciplinary
measures against employees who do not fulfil the standard rate of
production either through ignorance or illiteracy, or wilfully.
These employees, on their part, try to put pressure on management
to relax some of the work standards. Workers are frequently absent
from work in order to attend social and religious functions. To
deal with this behaviour, management emphasise that collective
agreements should include an undertaking by unions to accept strict
disciplinary measures against these workers, and to relate wage
supplements to productivity.(1) Recently, therefore, some
employers have negotiated productivity agreements instead of
ordinary collective agreements.
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria. Al-'amal ffa Al-inta.i
('Work and Production), (&FTUS, Damascus, 1972), pp.96-97.
(in Arabic).
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Incentive schemes are usually based on work study. However, as a
Report by the ILO indicates, the standard rate of an employee's
daily or hourly production has to be set in such a way that it
meets the minimum wage rate conditions. In practice (as wage-
rates per day are mainly determined by the government) there are
no penalties on workers producing less than the standard rate, and
they receive their basic wages in full. Because incentive
bonusses are individually calculated, the loss of production has to
be borne by employers and is not made up by production from workers
producing at more than the standard rate.(l) Although employers can
enforce legal penalties against low-producing workers (such as wage
reduction or withholding increments), they are usually forced by the
informal intervention of the Ministry of Labour to arrive at terms
acceptable to both parties and to avoid industry-wide disputes.
This type of intervention may have fostered the tendency to conclude
industry-wide agreements. It would seem that the government finds it
difficult to exert pressure at company level, but because it controls
the management of the public seotor and the trade union central
organisation, it is more successful at industry level.
The setting of minimum wages by the tripartite Wage Fixing Committee
(which is dominated by government representatives) and the
determination of the vrnge structure by the government is based on the
classification of skills by the Ministry of Labour. Even in cases
(1) International Labour Office (Bureau International Du Travail -
Programme Regulier d'Assistance Technique), Rapport au Government de la
Republioue Arabe Syrienne Sur La Reglementation Pes Salaries Dans
L1Industrie (UnpublishedV. (Geneve. 1971).
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where employees are on piece rates, a skill definition by the
Ministry determines the rate of each piece which means that the
rate is not related to productivity. The application of work
study together with incentive schemes thus serves the sole function
of regulating above standard payments, and not the basic piece rate
prices. Unions, it seems, have endeavoured to put pressure on
government to relax the definition of skills so that more and more
categories of workers can be upgraded to higher scales.
Overall there would appear to exist a "give" and "take" relationship
between unions and government within the notion of "partnership".
That is, in order to ensure union loyalty and avoid any challenge
to government control, the government gives concessions to unions
in matters important to the latter's influence over workers, such
as wages, though the government maintains the authority to make
the decisions on these matters.
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Comparison of Collective Bargaining in the Three Countries
Collective bargaining as a method of regulating employment is new
to the scene of industrial relations in Iraq, Egypt and Syria.
Under the foreign administrations the weakness of trade unions and
the small size of the industrial labour force meant that there was
little scope for collective bargaining. Systematic negotiations
to determine work place rules jointly began to emerge under the
traditional systems. However, the development of collective
bargaining and the factors affecting it differed in each of the
three countries.
In Iraq, where the government severely opposed trade unions and
restricted their activities, employers retained the authority of
making unilateral work-place rules while national industrial
relations rules were laid down by the government. Collective
agreements were introduced by foreign firms towards the end of the
traditional regime to reduce tension among workers and to act as a
substitute for trade unionism. •b/orkers* representatives" in
negotiations were chosen by management on seniority and tribal bases
instead of being elected by the workers themselves.
In Egypt the situation was very different. The industrial labour
force was growing rapidly in line with industrialisation, and trade
unionism gained solid ground among the working class. Trade unions
benefited from the political conflict between the Palace and the
government who both sought their support. Thus, trade unions'
recognition and their right to joint job regulation were given a
legal basis in the Trade Union Act of 1942 and the Collective
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Agreements Act of 1950. Employers who were powerful because of
their role in the industrial development of the private sector,
tried to maintain their authority. They saw the development of
trade unions as a threat to their existence. Their attitude
affected the position of trade unions adversely and the bargaining
power of the unions remained relatively weak throughout this period.
In Syria the position of the trade union movement was even more
favourable than in Egypt. The political instability combined
with the semi-constitutional management-labour relations strengthened
the bargaining power of unions vis-a-vis management. The strike
weapon was often used during this period without fear of violent
suppression by government whereas it could not be used similarly
in Iraq or Egypt. However, the difficult economic situation, the
surplus of unskilled labour, and the division within the trade
union movement itself, resulted in weakening union bargaining power
and restricted their authority in establishing work-place rules.
The nationalist systems in the three countries adopted somewhat
similar approaches to collective bargaining. The state, in
pursuance of its socialist objectives, undertook to secure
employment for every person able and willing to work. Except
for skilled labour, this meant, in practice, that the supply and
demand of labour was to be free of the market monopoly and would
not be subject to management and union regulation of wage rates
and other terms of employment. To achieve this objective, a
combination of intensive programmes of development with open
employment were pursued. Employment in this context was provided
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on social grounds (i.e. over-staffing) but also because of
economic necessity.
In dealing with these problems, however, emphasis was placed on
different aspects in each country related to their different
economic and social circumstances. In Iraq, which is much better
off than the other two countries, industrial programmes are more
intensive and this enables Iraq to provide a higher level of
employment necessitated by economic factors. In Syria and Egypt,
particularly in the latter where there is population pressure,
over-staffing as a means to deal with unemployment is still very high.
In all three countries the state has undertaken to promote the
welfare of the masses. Wages are therefore determined by government
agencies (jointly with management and labour) instead of being
allowed to be determined by collective bargaining. (1)
In Iraq the tripartite Wage Fixing Board is authorised to fix and
review minimum basic wage rates periodically. Wage increases and
differentials, however, are left to joint regulation by managements
and unions. This regulation is slowly being transferred into
systematic collective bargaining. In the case of minimum wages,
the Labour Code permitted the employers and unions to negotiate
higher rates than those fixed by the Wage Fixing Board. The
bargaining power of both parties related to wage matters is based
less on economic factors than on political factors, namely the
influence of the government's labour policy and progressive labour
legislation.
(1) H.Ae Clegg in his book Trade Unionism Under Collective
.Ba xga in ing. (Blackwe 11, Oxford, 1976) puts forward a theoryof trade unionism based on the assumption tha,t collective
bargaining is the main method by which unions try to achieve
their economic objectives. He applies the theory to the
developed countries and it is possible that it may become
applicable to Arab socialist countries at a later stage.
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The situation is similar in Egypt and Syria and it explains why
unions have successfully insisted that collective agreements
should be legally binding on both parties and have to be registered
officially with the government. In Egypt and Syria, however, though
minimum wages are determined by the tripartite committees, wage
scales and differentials are largely determined by government
regulation, which is more wide ranging in Syria than in Egypt.
The surplus of unskilled labour is much higher in these two countries
than in Iraq. Thus, statutory regulations is deemed necessary
because trade unions are in too weak a position to bargain for
uniform wages for unskilled labour. The Syrian trade unions, it
seems, were more suooessful than their Egyptian colleagues in
securing government intervention to relax job classifications which
allowed job up-grading providing higher wage rates.
In the three countries, earnings other than wages, as well as
social and welfare conditions, fall within the scope of collective
bargaining. In Iraq and Syria, where unions mainly negotiate with
employers' organisations, bargaining has largely taken place at
industrial and regional levels. In Egypt, however, historical
developments resulted in concentrating the decision making process
in the hands of the management of the public enterprises at
company level. Thus, despite the wish of the unions (as well as
PEl) to move negotiations to a central level, they have been forced
to bargain at company level.
The main features of the development are summarised on the separate
page which follows.
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Collective Bargaining in Iraq, Egypt and Syria
POLITICAL





1. Because of the weakness of
trade unions and the small size
of the labour force there was
little scope for collective
bargaining.
2. Worker demands usually
pressed through strikes.
(1882-1922)
1.Because of the weakness of
trade unions and the small size
of the labour force there was
little scope for collective
bargaining.
2. Worker demands ustially
pressed through strikes.
(1920-1+6)
1. Because of the weakness of
trade unions and the small size
of the labour force there was
little scope for collective bar¬
gaining early in the period.
Late in the period, when political
and economic conditions changed, a










1. Employers retained their
power of making work-place rules
unilaterally. National
industrial relations rules laid
down by the government.
2. Late in the. period, collec¬
tive agreements were introduced
by foreign firms to reduce ten¬
sion among workers and to act as
a substitute for trade
unionism. Workers' represen¬
tatives in negotiations were
chosen by management and not
elected by workers.
(1922-52)
1. Union right to joint job
regulation recognised by the
law but resisted by employers.
2. The employers' negative
attitude affected union bar¬
gaining power adversely. A
few agreements were concluded
with unions, mainly by foreign
firms which recognised trade
unions.
(191+6-58)
1. Political instability combined
with the semi-leg-al management-
labour relations strengthened the
bargaining power of union vis-a-vis
management. The strike weapon was
often used by workers to improve
the bargaining position of unions.
2. The difficult economic situation,
the surplus of unskilled labour
and the division within the trade
union movement resulted in weaken¬
ing the unions' bargaining position.
3 . A number of company agreements





1. The law recognised collective
bargaining as a voluntary
process and declared that
collective agreements were
legally binding. Procedural
rules for agreements were laid
down by law.
2. The supply of and demand for
unskilled labour is regulated
by the government. It is not
subject to management-union
regulation of wage rates and
terms of employment.
3. The bargaining power of the
parties is based on the
influence of the government's
labour policy and progressive
labour legislation.
l+. Collective agreements are
normally industry-wide, and
unions represent all workers
engaged in the industry.




1. The law recognised collective
bargaining as a voluntary
process and declared that
collective agreements were
legally binding. Procedural
rules for agreements were
laid down by law.
2. The supply of and demand for
unskilled labour is regulated
by the government. It is not
subject to management-union
regulation of terms of
employment.
3. The bargaining power of the
parties is based on the influ¬
ence of the government's
labour policy and progressive
labour legislation.
ij. Collective agreements are
mainly company-wide, and cover
only unionised workers. In the
case of firms where at least
5Q?6 of -workers are unionised,
the terms of collective agree¬
ments cover all workers engaged
in these firms. In the public
sector, the agreements cover
earnings other than wage-rates
and working conditions. In the
private sector they cover wage-
rates and employment regulations
a3 well.
(1958-76)
1. The lav; recognised collective
bargaining as a voluntary
process and declared that
collective agreements were
legally binding. Procedural
rule3 for agreements were laid
down by law.
2. The supply of and demand for
unskilled labour is regulated by
the government. It is not
subject to management-union
regulation of terms of employment
3. The bargaining power of the
parties is based 011 the influence
of the government's labour policy
and progressive labour
legislation.
1+. Collective agreements are
normally industry-wide and cover
only unionised workers. In the
case of firms where at least 50/o
of workers are unionised, the
terms of collective agreements
cover all workers engaged in
these firms. Collective agreements
cover earnings other than wage-
rates and v;orking conditions. Wage
rates and employment regulations





During the British Mandate, when the trade union movement was in
its early stages and still weak, there were no formal procedures
for handling disputes.
Strikes were mainly about poor economic conditions and they were
usually directed either against the mandatory government (for
instance, the general strike of 1931) or against the foreign
concerns (for instance, the Railway and the Baghdad Electricity
Company strikes of 1927, 1930 and 1 931)• This suggests that the
strikes were influenced by nationalist feelings. The frequency
of strikes began to increase during the early 1930's, the
government therefore passed the Strike Act of 1932 forbidding
sympathy strikes and picketing.
During the period of the monarchy, collective action took the form
of worker protests through strikes, sit-ins or violent demonstrations.
Until 1954 there were no legal provisions for handling disputes.
But in 1954 due to increasing political pressure the government
issued the Conciliation and Arbitration Regulations. These
provided for compulsory procedures of conciliation and required
that fourteen days' notice must be given to the Ministry of Social
Affairs prior to any collective action.(l)
(1) The Conciliation and Arbitration Regulations of 1954 have been
discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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Prior to the licensing of trade unions during the last years of
the Second World War, trade unions were very weak and largely
organised underground. On the whole, they chose to pursue their
activities peacefully and concentrated on gaining political
sympathy and support. A handful of strikes and sit-ins took
place, but these were generally poorly organised and easily
suppressed. Once trade unions had obtained licences, they
began to direct their protests chiefly against the government
and foreign firms, taking advantage of the political instability
and the poor economic and social conditions of the workers.
They justified their attacks on the government on the grounds that
it was responsible for these conditions as well as because of its
anti-union stand. Their attacks on foreign firms were based on
the collaboration of these firms with the government and their
refusal to recognise trade unions.
The change in the state's labour policy brought about by the
revolution resulted in a new government outlook towards industrial
disputes and workers' protest. It also resulted in changes in
union and employer tactics as regards collective action.
Although the new dispute procedure introduced under Labour Law
1/1958 did not vary much from the 1954 Regulations, the state
became more tolerant of worker protest, whether legal or illegal,
official or unofficial. State intervention now favoured labour
and was used mainly to put pressure on employers to give in to
worker demands.
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While legal notice had to be given prior to calling a strike,
strikes have not been prohibited under the 1958 Law or the
present Labour Code. This was probably because the influence of
political groups had made it impossible to impose a legal ban on
collective action taken by workers.(l) In spite of this, the
majority of strikes were illegal, that is workers did not give
the required notice. Some strikes were also unofficial, that is,
as defined by Knowles, "not recognised by the executive committee
of a union".(2) These were mainly led by workers representing
political factions opposing that of the union leadership.
During the post-revolution period union tactics changed. No
longer were their actions aimed against the government but against
Iraqi employers with whom alliance ended as a consequence of the
revolution.
Strikes in the pre-revolution period tended to occur suddenly;
in the early post-revolution period they became less violent but
more frequent, and were mainly the result of lack of success in
negotiations. In 19&f to 1968, the incidence of strikes increased
further; for instance, the IFI reported that during 1967 alone,
35 strikes took place.(3) The majority of these strikes were of
(1) Legget, C.J., op, cit.. p.193.
(2) Knowles, K.&.J.C., Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict.
(KLackwell, Oxford 1952), p.30.
(3) Al-Sinai (The Industrialist) (Organ of IFI), "Report of the
Industrial Relations Department", Vol. 9> No. 3 (September 1968),
p.123.
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short duration, lasting between one to three days. This was
mainly attributable to the speedy intervention by the government
which put political pressure on employers to settle the disputes
with the unions. Most of these strikes started unofficially
(and illegally) but unions soon had to recognise them in order to
maintain their control on the shop-floor.
Accurate data on the number and length of strikes or workers
involved and working days lost are not available. As far as
the available data go, they suggest that strike activity was
very high in the construction industry. In 1969 for example,
out of a total of 1020 workers reported as having been involved
in strikes, 924 were construction workers. A loss of 148,000
work hours resulted. In 1970, out of a total of 1,124 workers
involved in strikes, 1090 workers were from the construction
industry, causing a loss of 107,306 work hours.(l) The nature
of the construction industry (i.e. that it is based on contract
work) and the absence of a fixed wage system were probably the
main reasons for the industry's strike proneness.
During the post-revolution period employers changed their tactics
vis-a-vis collective action. They could no longer rely on
government support and had to handle disputes by themselves.
This meant they had to resort either to the legal procedure as
provided by the Labour Law or to establish joint dispute procedures
(l) See Republic of Iraq (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs),
Al-taarir Al-sanawi. 1970 (The Annual Report, 1970)» Al-Azhar
Press, Baghdad 1971» p.156. (In Arabic).
with unions, provided that these procedures did not contradict
the law. Some employers, mainly in foreign and large Iraqi
firms, realised the change in their position vis-a-vis unions,
and unhesitatingly established such procedures and maintained
good co-operation with unions. However, the majority of
employers in the medium and small-sized firms who were still
viewing relations with workers in a paternalistic manner, usually
gave in temporarily to workers* demands, under government
pressure, only to abrogate the agreement they had concluded once
things returned to normal.
In a ffew cases these employers resorted to lock-outs as a counter¬
action to strikes. Thus, the 1960's witnessed, for instance, the
lock-out of the Baghdad Metallic Company in 1962 and the lock-out
of the Dijla (Hgirs) Shoe Company in 1965# In the first case,
in 1962, the owner-manager of the Baghdad Metallic Company whose
small firm was suffering financially and facing a period of slack
business, declined to submit to the union's demand for wage
increases and a reduction of working hours. In response, the
union took official strike action coupled with a sit-in.
Subsequently, the owner, without giving legal notice, locked-out
his firm and declared his intention to close down. The union,
accordingly, in consultation with the Ministry of Labour, took
over the running of the firm exercising a sort of worker self-
management. This situation continued far a few months until the
dispute was settled after lengthy negotiations between the union,
IFI and the Ministry's officials.
The Dijla Shoe Company was a family business whioh, since 1959
had very bad industrial relations. A family conflict had
affected the running of the firm and reflected on relations with
workers. Frequent strikes took place between 1959 and 1965.
In 1965 an unofficial strike took place after a management decision
not to renew an agreement on social benefits that had been reached
three years earlier. Management, accordingly, gave notice of a
lock-out which was implemented effectively. Although the
workers' action was unofficial, the G-FTUI supported them and
agreed that the strike was the only effective weapon against the
employer. The Ministry of Labour which, declaring the strike
illegal, considered the workers* demands to be legitimate. The
dispute was then settled in favour of the workers through informal
consultations between the Ministry, GFTUI and IFI.
As regards the setting up of disputes machinery, the Iraqi Labour
Code No. 151 of 1970 which is now in force failed to distinguish
between collective and individual disputes. This also holds for
the Labour Code No. 91 of 1959 which applied to Egypt and Syria.
Legal experts have suggested that this implicitly meant that any
dispute involving more than one worker was a collective dispute.(l)
The Egyptian and Syrian Ministries of Labour have taken this
implication into consideration in classifying disputes, and so have
(1) See Mansour, S.T., Sharih tjanoon Al-'amal Raqim 151 Li' Sanat
1970; dirasa muqarana (Explanation of Labour Law No. 151 of 1970;
a comparative study), (Dar Al-tiba' Wa Al-Nashir Al-ahlia,
Baghdad, 1971), p.20b. (in Arabic); and Murad, M.H., "Modern
Trends in the UAH Labour Legislation", L'Egypte Contemporaine.
No. 310 (October 1962), p.10.
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The Iraqi Labour Code's definition of a collective dispute is as
follows!
"Labour dispute means any collective difference
of opinion arising between the management or
employer on the one hand and the workers on the
other, associated in one or more projects or
undertakings or within the scope of one or more
occupation, trade or industry, concerning the
application of this Code, the regulations
thereunder, or any collective agreement or
contract of employment(1)
If such a dispute arises then both employer(s) (or management of
public enterprises) and the union concerned should each, on their
own initiative, inform the Ministry of Labour and the GFTUI
simultaneously of the existence of the dispute. The Minister
should then act as a conciliator contacting employers (or management
of the public enterprises) and their associations, and the President
of GFTUI should act as a mediator by contacting the trade union
concerned. If within three days their efforts are successful,
then an agreement would be signed between both parties to the
dispute and would be witnessed by the representatives of the
Ministry and the GFTTJI.
If this machinery fails, then the dispute should be referred to
the High Labour Court which should meet within 48 hours to settle
the dispute. The High Labour Court is obliged to make a decision
their Labour Courts. The data by the Iraqi Ministry of Labour
have not so far made such a distinction.
(l) Iraqi Labour Code No. 151 of 1970. Article 130.
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within a week and its award is final. All parties must abide
by and execute it.
If within three days one party refuses to abide by the award of
the High Labour Court, problems arise. If the managerial side
in the public sector refuses to accept, then they would be
exposed to the penalty of expulsion from the service and be
charged with misuse of authority. Alternatively, if the union
(or the shop stewards committee) refuse to accept the award, then
the executive of the union responsible would be exposed to
possible dissolution and law suits.
If the party refusing to abide by the Court's award is a private
employer, then the workers involved are entitled to cease work,
proceed to a sit-in, or declare a strike. If the employer does
not retreat within two days of the workers' collective action,
the Ministry of Labour in oo-operation with GFTUI and the workers
can take over the firm (or firms) which would be managed by
officials from the Ministry in co-operation with the workers.
The new administration would immediately execute the decision of
the High Labour Court and compensate the -workers for the losses and
damages incurred as a. result of the action of the employer whose
personal assets would be liable for the amount of compensation.
The members of the Labour Courts have a judicial immunity provided
for members of the judiciary branch of the Republic with their
measures and awards being as effective as those of ordinary courts.
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These courts were composed of:
(a) the Labour Courts in the provinces, and
(b) the High Labour Court.
In both cases, the court was presided over by a judicial judge and
composed of equal representatives of unions and employers. Thus,
these labour Courts, unlike those of Egypt and Syria, enjoyed
complete independence from government intervention. This reflected
positively on their awards which, in a few cases, were unfavourable
to government departments.(1) Except in some minor cases relating
to individual claims, the awards of the Labour Courts in the
provinces were subject to appeal to the High Labour Court. The
High Labour Court, whose awards were final, in addition to being a
court of appeal, acted as a compulsory arbitration body in
industrial disputes.
However, time spent in appointing court members and providing court
facilities has prevented the courts from functioning prior to
June 197*1 *(2) By July of that year, the Baghdad court alone had
about 12,000 cases which had not yet been dealt with out of which
(1) -An important example of such an award is to be found in the case
of the President of GFTUI v. the Ministries of the Interior and of
Finance (1971). A disagreement had arisen as to the right of certain
categories of workers, employed by the Ministry of the Interior, to
join unions. The GFTUI presented the case to the Baghdad Labour
Court, which on September 18, 1971 awarded (Award No. 336/AMAL/1 971)
that government 'employees' (that is, those not categorised as
•officials' or 'civil servants') were covered by the provisions of
the Labour Code No. 1 51 of 1970, and were thus entitled to join
trade unions. The Ministries appealed to the High Labour Court,
but the decision was upheld.
(2) Jai' Al-Ummal (Labour Review), Vol. 3, No. 109, (June 19, 1S71)»
p.32.
about 11,000 cases had accumulated since 1966* Cases were
heard at a rate of 25 to 50 per day(l) and "there was a gradual
improvement in the functioning of the courts despite the
pressure of work.





As in Iraq, no systematic dispute procedures existed in Egypt
during the period of the British occupation, particularly in
the early years, apart from the Central Conciliation Committee
set up in 1919* This situation may be attributed to the weakness
of organised labour and the infrequency of workers taking
collective action.
During the last years of the occupation, induced by the nationalist
movement, worker protest began to increase and became more violent.
It was concerned with poor economic conditions but began to be
politically motivated and to be directed against both foreign
firms and the foreign administration. The rise in the cost of
living during the First World War and the outbreak of the 1 91 9
revolution led to the formulation of a new worker strategy.
Thus, the pattern of strikes changed and they begen to be closely
co-ordinated with strikes in other sectors of the country. The
strikes were more violent and of much longer duration than previous
onesj they revealed a considerable solidarity among workers of
various industries. These strikes induced the government to take
more positive measures for dealing with labour disputes, and so the
Cabinet established in 1919 a central conciliation committee which
did not include worker representatives. This committee, however,
was ineffective and was dissolved in 1924 and replaced by provincial
committees in 1 924. These new committees also did not include
worker representatives, and this led, in practice, to the refusal
of workers to refer matters to the committees which were accused
of being biased towards employers.(1)
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As I have mentioned in Chapter 5» there was no significant change
in the state's labour policy during the monarchy until the Second
World War. Employers relied on the police to provide protection
against worker protest, and the state continued to follow the
British authority's policy of suppressing strikes violently.
The Trade Union Act of 1942 required that employers should arrange
to settle disputes jointly with unions. Nevertheless, the angry
reaction of FEI to the Act resulted in the majority of employers
refusing to admit that the unions had a right to dispute matters
related to employment and working conditions. After the Second
World War (with the Wafd government out of office) employers again
resorted to calling in the police to help them break up strikes.
During the post-War period, worker protest took a new direction.
Protest was much more politically motivated due to the active
infiltration among workers of political groups both of the left
and the right, notable among them being the Communist Party and the
Moslem Brothers. Another change was that strikes took place mainly
against Egyptian establishments, chiefly textiles, tobacco and
sugar; an indication of the deep hostilities between unions and
employers because of the employers' continued refusal to recognise
trade unions. This contrasts with the situation in Iraq and Syria
who showed much less hostility towards national employers, because
(1) See Chapter 5 of this thesis.
in Iraq the government's policy of restricting freedom of association
brought the national employers and unions closer together, and in
Syria there existed semi-constitutional management-labour relations.
The hostile employer-trade union relationships in Egypt which have
just been described, induoed the government to enact the Conciliation
and Arbitration Act of 1 %8, an important step forward in labour
relations as there had been practically no formal dispute procedure
hitherto. The Act established a compulsory disputes procedure.
According to this procedure, conciliation and arbitration boards
were created comprising representatives of the government, unions
and employers. Once the dispute had been referred to conciliation
or arbitration, strikes and lock-outs were forbidden.(1)
The nationalist regime in Egypt did not tolerate worker protest
although it viewed workers as "partners in the process of
development". While the pluralistic nature of the industrial
society in Iraq and Syria led to a tolerance of collective action,
in Egypt collective industrial action was considered to be
inconsistent with the notion of partnership and the strategic role
of labour in economic development. Thus, the national government,
from the start, played a large role in the settlement of disputes,
mainly through compulsory arbitration. The workers' right to
strike was banned.
Although strikes were forbidden, there were frequent incidents of
labour unrest during the 1950's and early 1960's. Some of these
(1) See Harbison, F.H., and Ibrahim, I.A., op. cit.. p.173.
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incidents were undoubtedly motivated by political factors, namely
the opposition of various political groups (both of the left and
the right) to the new regime during the early stages. The
government dealt severely and abruptly with these strikes. For
instance, it did not hesitate to hang Mustfa Khamis the leader of
the violent strike at Kafr El-Dawar in December 1953.(1)
Employers, realising the change in their position, gradually
submitted to government pressure to accept the compulsory machinery
of settling disputes. The management of the public sector, as
government appointees, adopted the compulsory dispute procedure as
soon as it was introduced.
Strikes, in recent years, have occurred less frequently and have
usually been settled quickly. This may be due to the effect of
the state's intolerant attitude to strikes and some improvement in
the social and economic conditions of the workers.(2)
(1) See Hussein, M., op. cit.. p.124.
(2) Recently, the Cairo Public Transport workers went on half-day
strikes for two days (18—19 September 1976) demanding a wage
increase and an extra one-month wage to be paid before the Moslem
feast. The Attorney-General took immediate legal action against
the leaders of the strikes, although negotiations to end the
actions peacefully were in progress. (Reported by Al-Thawra
(Daily Newspaper of Baghdad), No. 2494> September 20, 197^» P»1»)
The recent violent demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria (in which
at least eight people were killed and more than 100 others were
injured and which took place between 18-19 January 1977)» although
provoked by the increase in the price of food and involved many
segments of the population, were mainly led by workers from the
Hilwan industrial suburb near Cairo and from Alexandria.
(Reported in The Times (of London), No. 59»912, January 20, 1977»
pp. 1 and 7»)
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The Labour Code and Ministerial Decrees 159/1959 and 134/1964(1)
established the procedures for the settlement of disputes. The
Labour Code, which is in force at present, laid down that
disputes must be referred to the Labour Office in whose
jurisdiction the firm is located, by either of the parties. If
the dispute involves a firm which employs less than 50 workers,
the Labour Office is authorised to make a decision to settle the
dispute within two weeks from the date it is referred. Disputes
which involve firms employing 50 or more workers are to be
referred directly to the Conciliation Committee. Conciliation
Committees are to be established in the provinces. Each committee
is composed of six members, as follows:
(1) the President of the Labour Court in the province,
as a ohairman of the committeej
(2) the Director of the Labour Office in whose
jurisdiction the firm was located;
(3) the employer or his representative;
(4) a representative of the trade union or workers who
were party to the dispute;
(5) a representative of the employers* association
(i.e. PEl), or a businessman to be chosen by the
employer who had no direct relation to the dispute;
(6) a representative of another trade union which had
no direct relation to the dispute and who was to
accompany the workers or the union representative.(2)
The Conciliation Committee has to make a decision within 20 days
from the date it receives the application for dispute settlement.
(1) United States Department of Labor, Labor Law and Practice in
the United /jab Republic (Egypt), p.38.
(2) Egyptian Labour Code No. 91 of 1959. Article 1 94»
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If the dispute is not settled it is referred to the Labour Court
which acts as a Compulsory Arbitration Board. To begin with, the
Labour Court (one existed in each province) was composed of five
members, as follows:
(1 ) a judge of one of the chambers of the Court of
Appeal, who would preside over the Court;
(2) a representative of the Ministry cf Labour;
(3) a representative of either the Ministry of
Industry or the Ministry of Economy;
(4) a representative of the FEI;
(5) a representative of trade unions to be nominated
by the EFL.(l)
The division of the Ministry of Labour into two ministries in 1971
led to an increase in the composition of the Court by one member, as
each of the Ministries of Manpower and Social Insurance were to be
represented in the Court. The addition of the representative of
the Ministries of Industry or Economy meant that the government
representative would be in a dominant position in the Court.
Hie Court's decision is final and has to be considered as judgment
awarded by the Court of Appeal. While conciliation and arbitration
procedures are in progress, strikes and lock-outs are prohibited.
This means, in practice, that collective actions are banned as the
whole procedure is compulsory.
In addition to collective disputes (i.e. disputes involving more than
one worker), labour offices have to refer individual disputes to the
Labour Court, in cases where these offices failed to reach a settlement.
(1) Ibid.. Article 198
Syria
(f) Industrial Disputes
During the French Mandate it was left entirely to employers to
establish procedural rules related to disputes because these
rules usually deprive workers of the right to take collective
action and subject strikers to severe disciplinary measures,
such as a reduction in wages and dismissal. Employers did not
hesitate to call on the government for help to deal with worker
protest. In September 1937, for instance, the management of the
Damascus Knitting Mill found that it could not deal with a strike
by threatening to take disciplinary measures and therefore asked
for government protection to stop the strike,(l)
In spite of their weak position, unions repeatedly protested
against the ways in which employers dealt with disputes. The
Trade Union Conference of 1936 demanded, among other things, that
a joint committee to deal with disputes should be formed. The
government ignored this demand until the new political and economic
situation brought about by the Second World War forced it to seek
union co-operation. Although strikes were banned during the war,
the government issued a decree to foiro a tripartite arbitration
committee, but this committee did not come into being until 1946
when a new Labour Code was enacted.
During the early stages of the French Mandate, strikes were largely
caused by economic factors, namely low wages and harsh employment
(1) Hanna, A,, op, cit.. p.443»
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and working conditions. As time went on, the increasing influence
of the nationalist movement and of political infiltration into the
labour movement led to the co-ordination of worker protests with
those of the nationalist movement and directed against the French
administration.
When the mandate came to an end, the policy of semi-constitutional
management-labour relations adopted under the new "traditional"
type government led to the enactment of the Labour Code of 1 946
which laid down a compulsory procedure for handling disputes.
Conciliation and arbitration boards were formed on a provincial
basis in which unions, employers and the state were equally
represented. The developing semi-constitutional relationships
of management and unions had already led to the establishment
of informal joint disputes procedures in many organisations.
The parties were allowed, under the Labour Code, to use their
informal arrangements without declaring the dispute official and
thereby rendering themselves liable to the compulsory arrangement.
In the early stages of independence (i.e. between 1946 and 1949)
collective action by workers was a familiar phenomenon in Syria
(as pointed out earlier in Chapter 2). Political instability and
inflation were the main factors which led to worker dissatisfaction
and strikes. Most of these strikes were badly organised and lacked
coherence and clearly-stated demands. Allouni describes them as
"poorly staged and, due to lack of funds, of short duration".(1)
(1) Allouni, A., op. cit.. p.75«
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The trade unions were not conscious of their own bargaining power
and of the economic power of the strike weapon. Most worker
demands were concerned with the application of the Labour Code
but were accompanied by grievances of a more personal nature.
A second wave of strikes took place during the period 1954-1 938.
This was mainly inspired by changes in the political atmosphere
and by increasing union involvement in the activities of various
political groups. Worker protest during this period was mainly
directed against foreign concerns which had hitherto enjoyed a
privileged position. These strikes differed also from those of
the late 1940'3; they were now of a longer duration and more
collectively organised.(1)
The change in the nature of the political system under the nationalist
regimes brought a change in the structure of management-labour
relations which affected industrial disputes. Under these regimes,
industrial disputes passed through three stages; the first during
Syria's unity with Egypt (1958-1 9*>1)» the second during the
Separatist period (1961-1963)* and the third stage started after
the ABSP's take-over in 19^3*
During the period of the Unity the Labour Code No. 91 of 1959 was
introduced and its provision as regards strikes and lock-outs were
intended to be implemented strictly. However, because the Syrian
(l) For details on these strikes, see Salim, S.A.K., op, cit..
pp. 318-320 and Nabulsi, H.M.S., op, cit.. pp. 281-285.
industrial society was very different from the Egyptian and more
similar to the pluralistic Iraqi society, it was difficult to
take firm measures to prevent worker protest. while unions
realised that there were common economic and political objectives
between them and the government, they rejected the regime's idea
of political incorporation. They directed their protest mainly
against this incorporation and the legal and practical measures
which were taken to achieve it. Employers, on the other hand,
realising the change in their position and the threat to their
interests, directed their protest against the regime rather than
against the workers. This means that this period witnessed
fewer management-labour disputes, but more protests (although for
different reasons) from both employers and unions against the state'
policy.
Under the Separatist government, the situation was changed.
Employers, at least in theory, regained their pre-Unity position,
while legislation was introduced to deprive workers of the strength
they had gained during the Unity period. This gave rise to
worker protest against both the government and employers. This
time collective action was of a previously unknown violent nature,
comprising hunger strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations. Although
the disputes were concerned with economic demands and goals, they
were politically motivated and succeeded in creating a political
atmosphere which was hostile to the regime.
The collapse of the Separatist regime reversed the situation.
The ABSP, ideologically committed to sooialism, believed in a
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"partnership" role to be played by unions in economic development.
This implied that the unions should change their strategy by
spelling out that they had a moral responsibility for economic
development and for the protection of the socialist government.
They were not to resort to strikes unless all other conciliatory
means, whether formal or informal, had been tried and failed.
As time went on, nationalisation measures reduced the influence of
private employers and the state itself became a major employer.
The government began, therefore, to apply the formal dispute
procedure, as stipulated by the Labour Code, and, because the
unions' attitude had changed in favour of the government, union
co-operation was easily secured on this matter. Although a few
strikes took place they were infrequent, largely unofficial and
usually quickly dispersed. These incidents were not recorded in
official statistics because they were mainly illegal, and unions and
employers only reported actions in which they were directly involved.
This means it is impossible to obtain a picture of the economic
effects of these strikes in terms of working days and production
lost.
As the Labour Code 91 of 1959 still applies in Syria, the dispute
procedure which it laid down is similar to that of Egypt. In
1967 the establishment of a separate employers• association for
public sector management necessitated a modification in the
composition of the labour courts, and .Article 198 of the Labour
Code was amended. The aim of the amendment has been to establish
separate courts, one set dealing with disputes in the public
sector and the other set of courts in the private sector. A
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representative of the public sector employers' industrial
federation is to be appointed to each of the former courts and
from the chambers of industries to each of the latter* Otherwise,
the court composition remains unohanged as stipulated originally
by the Code*
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Comparison of Industrial Disputes in the Three Countries
3h Iraq and Egypt, under the British administration, no specific
procedure was adopted to handle disputes whether by employers or
government* The trade union movements, which were in their
early stages, resorted to collective action as the only way to
express their protest* Political and economic circumstances in
Egypt forced the British administration to form a dispute committee
during the last years of their rule* This was, however, ineffective*
In Syria, under the French administration, employers were allowed
to establish procedural rules related to disputes* These rules
deprived workers of the right to take collective action and
subjected strikers to severe disciplinary measures*
Under the traditional systems in the three countries, some legal
steps were taken by governments to regulate for the settlement of
disputes* In Iraq, the legislation (which was not introduced
until 195k) made conciliation compulsory in disputes but arbitration
remained voluntary* It laid down that legal notice must be given
prior to calling a strike* In Egypt, regional conciliation
committees were formed at the beginning of this period, but they
were ineffective because of the dominant position of the employers*
In 1 %£, a Dispute Procedure Act was passed, according to which
conciliation and arbitration became compulsory, but this Act was
not effectively implemented until after the revolution*
In Svria, the Labour Code of 1 %£ provided for tripartite
conciliation and arbitration boards* The work of these boards
was relatively successful due to the semi-constitutional
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arrangements during this period. Strikes were increasingly
directed against foreign concerns which were considered responsible
for the exploitation of Syrian workers.
Under the nationalist systems, legislation, in contrast to the
previous two stages, paid serious attention to dealing with
industrial disputes. Conciliation and arbitration became compulsory
in the three countries and, except for Iraq, strikes and lockouts were
practically banned. In Iraq, the regulation that legal notice must
be given prior to a strike remained in force; this means that the
parties can call a strike if the compulsory dispute machinery
falls to deal satisfactorily with the dispute . In Syria, the ban
on strikes could not be applied as effectively as in Egypt, and a
number of strikes took plaoe throughout the period.
The new co-operatively-based relationship between unions and the
nationalist governments has resulted in a gradual decline of
political strikes and an increase in economically activated
strikes. The latter have been directed mainly against employers
and were largely a result of lack of success in systematic
negotiations. This is in contrast with the two previous stages
where the majority of strikes were politically activated and took
place suddenly. This trend was more pronounced in Iraq than in
Egypt and Syria. Because strikes in Egypt have been banned, the
government has frequently forced the parties to reach a settlements
the few strikes which did occur were mostly of a political nature.
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The main features of the developments are summarised on the
separate page which follows*
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1. Ho specific procedure was
adopted to handle disputes
whether by employer or
government.
2. Strikes were economically
motivated! workers relied on
the sympathy of certain
political groups.
3. V/orker protest suppressed
by the government.
(1882-1922)
1. Ko speoifio procedure was
adopted to handle disputes until
late in the period. In 1919> the
government formed a central con¬
ciliation committee. The commi¬
ttee was ineffective because
workers were not represented on
it.
2. Early strikes were economi¬
cally motivated. Later in the
period strikes combined economic
and political objectives.
3. The police were used to pro¬
vide protection for employers
and suppress strikes.
(1920-1+6)
1. Employers established rules
for disputes. These rules
deprived workers of the right to
strike.
2. Late in the period a tripartite
disputes committee was formed but
did not come into being.
3. Early strikes were economically
motivated. Later in the period










1. Regulations for the handling
of disputes were introduced by




2. Early in the period unions
chose to pursue their activities
peacefully and concentrated on
political sympathy and support.
Later in the period, strikes
increased- considerably because
of political instability and
poor economic conditions.
3. The government combined
violent suppression and peace¬
ful manoeuvres in dealing
with worker protest.
(1922-52)
1. Early in the period, tho
government replaced the central
committee by regional concilia¬
tion committees but these
remained ineffective.
2. In 19U8, a Dispute Procedure
Act was passed. Conciliation
and arbitration became compul¬
sory. The Act was not effect¬
ively implemented until the
next stage.
3. Strikes were largely
economically motivated. At a
later stage they were combined
with political motives.
(191+6-58)
1. The Labour Code of 19U6 provided
for tripartite disputes handling
boards. These boards were success¬
ful because of the semi-
constitutional arrangements.
2. Additional informal arrangements
for handling disputes were adopted
jointly at company level.
3. Early strikes were economically
motivated. Later they became
mainly politically motivated and
directed against foreign firms
which were considered responsible




1. Firmly implemented compulsory
disputes procedure. Conciliation
jointly carried out by the
Minister of Labour and the GFTTJX,
The High Labour Court used for
arbitration. The Ccurt com¬
prised representatives of
unions and employers jn addition
to independent judges. Ho
government representative 011
the Court.
2. Although strikes and lock¬
outs restricted, they remain
as a right of unions and
employers respectively.
3. A tendency towards consti¬
tutional protest has been
developed by both workers and
employers. Strikes resulted
mainly from the failure of
negotiations. For the same
reason employers resorted
occasionally to lock-outs.
1+. Strikes are tolerated and
political pressure is usually
used to reach a settlement.
(1952-76)
1. Firmly implemented compulsory
disputes procedure. Concilia¬
tion carried out by tripartite
committees on which government
representatives are dominant.
The Labour Courts used for
arbitration. The Courts com¬
prised representatives of
unions, employers and the
government. Government repre¬
sentatives on the Court are
dominant.
2. Strikes and look-outs are
banned. Strikes are very rare
and usually violently
suppressed. When they occur,
they are mainly politically
motivated.
(1958-76)
1. Firmly implemented compulsory
disputes procedure. Conciliation
carried out by tripartite
committees on which government
representatives are dominant.
The Labour Courts comprised
representatives of unions,
employers and the government.
Government representatives on the
Courts are dominant.
2. Although strikes and lock-outs
are banned, strikes normally
tolerated because of the government1s
favourable attitude towards labour.
3. Strikes normally combine
political and economic objectives.
Some of the recent strikes tend to
confine to economic objectives.
CHAPTER 7
WORKER PART1CIPATION IN MANAGEMENT
This ohapter deals with the statutory schemes of worker participation
which have been introduced in the three countries, that is
joint consultative, worker-director, and profit-sharing schemes.
Ira£
As has been pointed out in the preceding chapters, under both the
British Mandate and the monarchy, the development of trade unions
was discouraged and' restricted. Both the state and employers
treated workers paternally and expected them to accept the
employers' authority unquestioningly. In the later period of
the monarchy, however, political and economic developments brought
about some changes, at least from the employers' side. The
emerging post-War industrial elite, as I have discussed earlier,
formed an alliance with unions and campaigned jointly with them
for freedom of association. The managements of foreign firms,
particularly of oil companies, who had refused to recognise trade
unions and who had been backed by the government, had to find means
by which they could reduce worker protest against their anti-union
policy. For this purpose, IPC introduced a joint consultation
scheme in 1948. Joint consultative committees, which met monthly,
were set up to discuss grievances, welfare, safety and technical
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matters: wages were excluded from these discussions.(1) Wage-
rates were determined unilaterally by management up to the late
1950's when the first collective agreements were concluded.
Workers' representatives were chosen on a basis of seniority
and tribal affiliations. By the mid 1950's, some of the
nationally-owned large firms followed the IPC example and
introduced similar forms of joint consultation, but these
remained ineffective.
The structural changes in management-labour relations brought by
the revolution laid down statutory provisions to put the notion
of "partnership" into practice. The early measures dealt with
the statutory introduction of joint consultation. Under Labour
Law 1/1938, joint consultative committees were to be formed in
firms employing 20 workers or more. These committees were to
consist of equal representatives of management and workers.
Their activities were specified by ministerial decrees and were
limited to recommend on working conditions and welfare services.
The recommendations of these committees were binding on both
parties if agreed by the majority of the members.
Unfortunately, no study of the activities of these committees
has been conducted to indicate how effective they were, but it
would seem that they were not extensive because their functions
were limited and were usually covered by collective bargaining.
(1) For a detailed account of these committees, see Badre, A.Y.
and Siksek, S.U., op. oit». pp. 182-188.
The move towards establishing a socialist economy led to an
expansion of worker participation, and as a result of the
nationalisation measures of 1964 and the enactment of the Labour
Code No. 151 of 1970, schemes of joint consultation,worker-
directors, and profit-sharing were introduced and expanded.
(a) Joint Consultation
As stated earlier, the scheme of joint consultation introduced
under the Labour Law of 1958 was limited. The enactment of the
present Labour Code No. 151 of 1970 introduced a far more
comprehensive scheme of joint consultation than the Labour Law
of 1958. Under this code, trade unions vfere given an active part,
enabling them to co-ordinate the activities of the consultative
committees and the shop stewards committees in order to avoid
conflicting functions. The new Labour Code laid down that, in
cases where more than 30 and less than 100 workers were employed,
a joint consultative committee must be established, composed of
four members, two of whom should represent workers and the other
two management. inhere 100 or more workers were engaged in the
undertaking, there should be six committee members (representing
workers and management in proportion). The joint committees
should be set up for a two-year term of office. Workers'
representatives should be selected by the shop stewards committee
from among its members. In undertakings where there were no
shop stewards committees, workers' representatives must be eleoted
by the direct vote of all workers engaged in the plant. In
privately owned firms, the employers should select the management
team to the committees, and the workers' and employers'
representatives should chair the committee alternatively each
month. In public organisations, the board of direotors should
select the management team of whom should be one of the worker
directors who would permanently chair the joint committee.(1)
The joint consultative committee, which was to meet at least twice
a week, had, as its name implies, a mainly consultative function
only its decisions took the form of proposals and recommendations,
except where disputes arose over the application of the Labour
Code and labour regulations. If the committee reached a
unanimous decision, the two parties were bound to comply with the
decisions.
In both Iraq and Syria (where similar joint committees exist) the
principle of equal representation is strictly adhered to and the
general manager is not on the committee. Managerial representatives
on the committee in both countries as well as in Sgypt consist of
personnel in close contact with the production process, such as
supervisors, technical staff, works managers and production
managers. They have different social, economic and educational
backgrounds from the workers* representatives who lack training
in the organisational aspect of management. This hindered the
-workers' ability to assume the full share of their responsibility
(1) Iraqi Labour Code No. 151 of 1970. Article 124 (a and b)
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in the decision making. However, some of the workers believed
that they were on equal terms with all committee members, and
that they could criticise the management while receiving
protection from the trade union. This led them to think that
they had an over-riding say in matters of concern to the joint
committee. But the GFTUI did not agree and warned such workers
that they were going beyond their authority. Such behaviour,
the GFTUI contended, "precipitated a very bad impression and led
to the management and the workers adopting a negative attitude
towards the joint committees."(1 )
The functions of the Iraqi committees are similar to those in
Egypt and Syria in the sense that they discuss and advise on
matters related to management-labour relations. However, the
Iraqi committees are distinctive in that they advise on what is
known as "socialist competition". "Socialist competition" is a
process of planning periodical targets of production within the
framework of the agreed overall annual plan. The joint committees
advise on the departmental targets and set principles for individual
incentives so that outstanding workers who exceed their targets or
achieve it within the prescribed period are awarded extra financial
and fringe benefits by management and unions. Although there has
been no empirical study to evaluate this experience, both the GFTUI
and IFI have praised it on the grounds that it ensures ample
management-union consultation before putting production plans into
(l) Jai1 Al-Ummal (Labour Review) (Organ of GFTUl), Vol. 3, No. 112
(July 10, 1971), p.40. (in Arabic).
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effect, thereby minimising a potential area of friction.(l)
The two organisations have also praised the whole scheme of
joint consultation: GFTUI on the grounds that the scheme has
ensured effective consultation to the unions,(2) and IFI on
the grounds that it has eliminated the frictions between unions
and the committees on the one hand, and between them and
management on the other, which existed under the 1958 Labour
Law scheme.(3)
(b) \forker-Director3
The first worker-director schemes, together with profit-sharing
schemes, were introduced in accordance with the nationalisation
Acts of 1964. The Iraqi version of the two schemes was influenced
by the Egyptian participation laws 11lt/l96l and 141/1 9&3« The
Iraqi Law 102/19^4 laid down that two out of seven members of the
boards of public and private sectors' industrial firms were to be
elected for a two-year terra by the workers (as in the Egyptian case,
(1) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Al-'alaqa Baina
Attraf Alinta.1 (Relations between the Parties of Production),
(GFTUI, Baghdad, 1974), PP« 84-85. (in Arabic); and Ad-Sinai
(The Industrialist) (Organ of IFl), Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1971),
p. 145. (In Arabic).
(2) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, Al-mu'tamar
Al-awal Lili.jan Tsmtheem Al-'amal Al-mushtaraka. 15-17 Shibat 1975
(The First Conference of the Joint Consultative Committees,
February 15-17, 1975), (GFTUI, Baghdad, 1975), p.22. (in Arabic).
(3) See Ad-Sinai (The Industrialist), op, cit.. p.146.
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one white-collar and the other blue-collar).(1) The Iraqi Law
put no political restriction on workers to stand for a position
on the board and required that the workers should at least have
acquired the certificate of primary education. This educational
condition was intended, as explained by Dr. Haseeb, the President
of the Iraqi Economic Organisation from 1964 to 1966 (2) and the
architect of the nationalisation measures in Iraq, to enable
worker representatives to exercise their duties actively on the
boards without being hindered by lack of literacy.(3) Another
condition before workers could assume their posts on the boards,
was that they should attend a special course for worker directors
to be organised by the Establishment of Workers' Education. The
preparation for the first elections and the preparatory course
took more than eighteen months, and therefore the first group of
worker-directors did not take up their posts till early in 1966.
The soheme, though welcomed by unions, was criticised by them
because it prevented union office holders from standing for board
membership. This was later justified by Dr. Haseeb on the ground
that "the Iraqi experience was concerned with distinguishing
between the duties of trade union officers and those of worker-
directors, in order that union officials would not misunderstand
the nature of their jobs and duties."(4) The unions rejected
(1) See Haseeb, K.A., op. cit.. p. 125.
(2) The Iraqi Economic Organisation was created in 1964 to
supervise the nationalised firms.
(3) See Haseeb, op, cit.. p. 129.
(4) Idem.
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these arguments and considered the scheme in its form at that time,
as "inconsistent with the notion of partnership and as preventing
the trade union movement from participating in the process of
planning at plant level."(l) The Iraqi unions finally succeeded
in persuading the government to repeal the 1964 law, and on
October 3rd, 1970, a new law was passed (No. 194 of 1970). The
new law made various amendments to the previous one and expanded
the scheme of worker-directors to include government establishments
and public and private firms in the commercial sector. This law,
in turn, was replaced on April 20, 1971, by the present Law No. 60.
Law No. 60 of 1971 cancelled the previous requirement that, in order
to be eligible for board membership a worker must have a certificate
of primary education, instead it stipulated literacy. Worker
representatives were allowed to combine their membership on the
boards with the holding of union offices. The number of worker-
directors was increased to three out of seven in the private sector
and three out of nine in the mixed sector(2) (two representing
blue-collar workers to be chosen by their union and one representing
white-oollar workers to be elected by his colleagues.) In the
public sector where all white-collar employees were deemed to be
officials (i.e. civil servants) who could not join unions, there
would only be two blue-collar representatives to the boards. These
would be chosen by their respective unions subject to the approval
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, op. cit.. p. 61.
(2) The mixed sector is defined as consisting of those enterprises,
owned jointly by the government and private interests, in which the
government owns more than 50/ of the shares.
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of the GFTUI. The term of office of worker-directors was changed
to the same period as other board members as specified for each
company by its byelaws. The new law, however, maintained the
provision that worker-directors had to pass the special course
organised by the Establishment of Workers* Education.
Unions have enthusiastically welcomed the new law which gives
them a greater say in the process of decision-making in the firms.
The GFTUI considers the present scheme as aiming to enhance the
notion of partnership and lead to the "serious participation of
the Iraqi working-class in the process of developing the national
economy through the path of socialism."(1) Employers, too, seem
satisfied with the new act. They feel that it has ended the state
of conflict created by the 1964 law, which was caused by the unions*
absence from the boards and by their refusal to consent to the
boards' decisions.(2)
(c) Profit-Sharing
The Profit-Sharing Act 101/1964 applied to all nationalised firms.(3)
Like the Worker-Directors Act, it was influenced by the Egyptian
(1) General Federation of Trade Unions, Iraq, op. cit,. p. 63.
(2) See Al-Sinai (The Industrialist), op. cit.. p. 144.
(3) These included 34 manufacturing companies, seven trading
companies, and all banks and insurance companies.
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experience which, in turn, was influenced by the Yugoslav
experiment.(1) However, the Iraqi Act of 1964 (as well as the
Egyptian Profit-Sharing Act 111/1961) differed from the Yugoslav
experience in that it provided cash payments as well as welfare
benefits out of the workers' share of profit. The Iraqi Profit-
Sharing Act 101/1964 gave individual workers a 25/ share of their
company's profit. This was to be distributed as follows: 10/ in
cash to the workers, but the maximum amount paid to an individual
worker was not to exceed ID100 ($533 ) per annum, and 1f$ was given
to the Ministry of Labour for Social Services renderable to the
workers.(2) In Yugoslavia, the profits are paid monthly and
re-adjusted at the end of the year (December) in order to take
income from sales into account.(3) "here the monthly distributed
income is paid on the basis of production rather than sales figures,
employees may be asked to return part of their wages. The
industrialisation drive in Yugoslavia led the authorities to
curtail the amount of profits available for distribution and
compelled the enterprise to invest the profit or put them in
certain housing funds. (4)
(1) See Elsayed, M.S.E., op, pit.. p.34»
(2) See International Labour Review. Vol. 92, No. 6 (December 1965)»
pp. 518-519.
(3) See Adizes, I., Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Style.
(Free Press, New York, 1971), pp. 54-55.
(4) See Sturmthal, A.F., Workers' Councils: a study of workplace
organisation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 19&4)» p.102.
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This was then copied in 1969 by the Iraqi authorities, thus amending
Law 101/1 964. The amendment (Law 157/1969) extended the application
of the profit-sharing scheme to all state-owned firms(l) and
required the redistribution of profits as follows:
(1) 75$ to the shareholders (private sector) or the
organisation (public sector).
(2) 25$ to be allocated to the workers of the
organisation as follows:
(i) 10$ to be allocated to Pensions
and Social Security Administration
(li) 10$ to be allocated to Workers'
Investment Institution
(iii) lf.% to be allocated to social services
and housing, and
(iv) 1$ to be given to the G-FTUI.
This meant that workers no longer received a direct share of the
profits, but the GFTUI was now participating in determining the
use of the "workers' " share through its representatives on the
boards of the Pensions and Social Security Administration and the
Workers' Investment Institution.
(1) i.e. In contrast to the original Profit-Sharing Act 101/1964
which was strictly applied to the firms which were nationalised in
1964. Law 157/1969 extended the application of the Profit-Sharing




As in Iraq, trade unions were weak during the British occupation
and employers were therefore able to control their labour force
without running into many difficulties. Under the monarchy,
the Trade Union Act of 1942 laid down that trade unions had a
statutory right to recognition, and trade unions began to put
pressure on hostile employers to give them such recognition.
Their main aim at that time was to regulate conditions of
employment through collective bargaining.
During the early stages of Nasser's regime, a few large employers,
realising that employer-labour relationship had changed drastically,
began to introduce some sort of joint consultative committees.
The composition and activities of such committees differed greatly.
In the Shell Oil Company, for example, which was a focus of labour
attack as a foreign concern, the committee comprised equal
representatives of management and labour, with management
retaining chairmanship. The committee was authorised to advise
on various aspects of the employment relationship including wages.(l)
In the Egypt Bank Group, the committee consisted of heads of plant
sections and one representative of unions. Its function was
advising on work affairs and plant conditions.(2)
(0 See Moore, R.V., "The Ecology of Egyptian Labour",
Indian Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 1, No. 4 (April 1966),
P.452.
(2) See Khalid, M., op. cit.. p.37.
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Because these arrangements were voluntary, these committees
could easily be manipulated by management.
The Nasser regime, believing in participation of the mass of
workers, intended from the start of coming to power to introduce
and later expand statutory consultative schemes. Thus, once the
political and economic difficulties of the early revolutionary
stage had been overcome, and the move towards socialism could
begin, a number of laws of worker participation were enacted.
The Labour Code of 1959 introduced compulsory joint consultation,
while the socialist laws of 19^1 and 19^3 provided for the
statutory application of worker directors and profit-sharing
schemes.
(a) Joint Consultation
The Labour Code 91A 959 established joint consultative committees
in every industrial firm employing 50 workers or more. A
consultative committee should include six members, representing
management and workers in equal proportion. Members of the
committees were to serve a one-year term, while the term of
committee members in Iraq was two years. The chairman of the
committee was to be elected by its members. The possible functions
to be assigned to the committees, which were not all obligatory
upon management, included making recommendations to the board with
regard to measures for improving production, industrial safety,
other working conditions, training programmes, and promoting
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co-operation between workers and management# The committees
were similar to those in Iraq insofar as they played an advisory
role, but the possible scope of the advisory role was much greater#
In Egypt, the board usually includes the general manager among the
managerial team. Owing to his prestigious position, the latter
is normally elected to the chairmanship of the committee# In Iraq
and Syria, by contrast, the managerial team is exclusively chosen
from among those directly related to the shop floor#
Workers' representatives on the committees are elected by their
colleagues, and the ASU unit plays an unofficial role in their
nomination. Shop stewards are strictly prohibited from standing
for elections on the grounds that they cannot combine two functions.
Joint consultation in Egypt does not seem to have been as successful
as in Iraq and Syria. The exclusion of union officials from standing
for committees results in their alienation and sometimes the
opposition of the committees. A communications gap has been created
between the workers* representatives on the joint committees and the
shop stewards committees. Instead of co-ordinating with the latter,
the joint committee usually competes with them in discussing matters
of & negotiable nature, which weakens the solidarity of the workers
and is therefore often deliberately encouraged by management. The
EFL staff, to whom I talked in May 1576, expressed the view that the
worker representatives on the joint consultative committee are




The Worker-Directors Act 112|/1961, supplemented by the Presidential
Decree 617/1962 (Nomination and Election Procedure for Worker-
Directors), required that white and blue-collar employees be
represented on the board of directors of industrial enterprises
in both private and public sectors. These representatives, one
from each group, were to fill two out of a maximum of seven seats.
Nominations for worker-directors were to be restricted to ASU
members who could read and write. Elections were to be by secret
ballot and those persons elected were to serve for a one-year tern.
An amendment of the Act in 1963 extended its coverage to co-operatives
and other organisations operating for profit. The amendment
increased the number of worker-directors on the board to four out
of a maximum of nine seats and extended the term of office to two
years. This measure by the government, together with the Profit-
Sharing Act, reflected the philosophy and attitude of Nasser's
regime towards the working-class. The government justified these
measures on two grounds:(l)
(1) In pursuanoe of the goal of social justice as
enunciated in the 1952 revoluntionary programme
and then in the National Charter.
(2) To put into practice the notion of "partnership"
based on the argument that the worker in the new
"socialist" society is a part-owner of the means
of production.
(1) See United Arab Republic (Ministry of Labour), Egyptian Labour:
New Horizons. (National Publication House), (Cairo, 1964)# p.6. ~~
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Reactions to the Egyptian experience of worker-directors seem to
have differed. The EFL, for instance, has praised the experience
in principle, but sees the present scheme as "unsuccessful" because
it does not contain a clear provision as to whether or not union
office holders are entitled to stand for board membership.(1)
This has resulted in management refusals to accept the nomination
of union officials on the ground that they are ineligible to stand
for election. The scheme thus seems to have excluded unions from
actual participation in decision-making and to have confronted
them with the problem of co-ordinating with worker directors who
might not even be union members(2) (although they had to be ASU
members).
In contrast with the EFL, Dr. Haseeb, the President of the Iraqi
Economic Organisation from 1964 to 1966, in his study
■/orker Participation in Management in Arab Countries, concluded
that political stability and the harmony of labour relations in
the then UAR had contributed to the "success" of the experiment.(3)
However, Haseeb's study must be criticised on the grounds that it
was mainly based on discussions with a few arbitrarily selected
trade union officials, FEI staff and senior officials of the
Ministry of Manpower.
(1) See Barsoum, F.F., op. cit,. p.11•
(2) Ibid.. p.12.
(3) See Haseeb, K.A., op. cit.. pp.95-96.
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Other academic studies(l) based on representative sample surveys
of managers and worker directors reached different conclusions to
those of Haseeb. The findings from these studies may be
summarised as follows:
(1) The Act has not been properly implemented because:
(a) elections have not been held bi-annually,
(b) the elected worker directors who leave the
company are either not replaced or replaced
by appointment,
(c) companies are able to delay and even avoid
election of worker directors.
(2) Because candidates must be members cf the ASU, the
latter's unit in the plant plays an unofficial role
in the nomination and subsequent election of worker
directors while neither the shop stewards committee
nor the union are able to play such a role.
(3) Workers do not see the elections as "free" when the
ASU unit intervenes.
(4) The scheme suffers from the different attitudes and
behaviour adopted by the parties:
(a) top management tend to be against participation.
Therefore, they refuse to accept elected
representatives as full board members. They
refuse to provide worker directors with
sufficient information to participate
constructively in the board's discussions,
and thus render them powerless,
(b) Worker directors generally concern themselves
with work-related matters only. They are not
involved in formulating the whole spectrum of
policies with which the board must deal,
(c) the government is inconsistent in enforcing
the law and this tends to cause confusion,
(d) the unions, as well as the management, do not
perceive the elected representatives as having
any real influence in making company policies.
During May 1976 I held informal discussions with trade union leaders,
PEI and government officials who were not themselves worker-directors.
(1) See Kamel, I.A., op. cit,. pp.193-194* and Elsayed, M.S.E.,
op. cit.. pp.362-364.
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These revealed that the people I spoke to all considered that the
present scheme is not operating "smoothly". The trade unionists
stated that trade union exclusion is the major problem. The FEI
staff and the officials of the Ministry of Manpower considered
that the worker-director scheme ought to be revised because it was
introduced without prior consultation with the parties concerned
and because it ignored the problem of different social and
educational backgrounds when it was enacted, (l)
In the light of Kamel's and Elsayed's evidence and my own, I am
inclined to think that the Egyptian worker-director legislation
needs to be modified to ensure effective participation by worker
representatives in the formulation of companies' policies so that
they are not exposed to so much pressure from the ASU unit and from
top management.
(c) Profit-Sharing
The Profit-Sharing Act 111/1961 which applied to all nationalised
firms, gave individual employees a 25/? share of their company's
profitj this was to be distributed as follows: 10$ in cash to
the workers but the maximum amount paid to an individual worker
was not to exceed £E50 O?>140) per annum, 10$ for central and
regional social services, and ^ for housing and social benefits
(l) Information based on informal discussions which I held between
May 5 and May 10, 1976 with members of the Executive Bureau of
the EEI, senior officials of the Ministry of Manpower and FEI staff.
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The provisions for profit-sharing schemes were influenced by the
Yugoslav experiment.(1) However, they differed from the
Yugoslav experiment by paying cash shares to individual workers
and providing them with welfare services rather than investing
their shares.
Profit-sharing was introduced to give some reality to the concept
that workers are "part" owners of the means of production and are,
like shareholders, entitled to returns in the form of profits.
Mother aim was to motivate workers to increase their productivity
as a means of increasing their profits.(2) However, studies into
the effect of the schemes suggest that they had practically no
impact on production except when they were first introduced.(3)
This was probably because the stipulated cash limit for
distribution to individual workers of ££50 ($140) per annum was
so low that the worker did not perceive it as a visible benefit
in a situation where the demand for direct economic returns is
greater than that for longer term welfare benefits. By contrast,
(1) See Elsayed, M.S.E., op. pit.. p.34»
(2) See United Arab Republic (Ministry of Labour), op. cit..
pp.11-12; and Charkaoui, G.M.,"Les Syndicats Des Travailleurs
Et Leurs Fonctions Dans Le Regime Socialiste", h'E/rypte Contemporaine.
No. 321 (Juillet 1965), P. 63.
(3) See Kamel, I,A., op. cit.. pp.197-198; El-Sayed, M.S.E.,
op. cit.. pp.365-366.
to be distributed as agreed by the company board and the shop
stewards committee.
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the Iraqi Aet of 19&4 provided a limit of more than double this
amount, namely ID100 ($333) per worker. In Syria, where the
same Egyptian Act applied, the limit was slightly higher than in
Egypt (£S500-$1 65)• This may have been caused by currency rate
discrepancies and by differences in the cost of living in the two
countries, but it undoubtedly led to criticism from the Egyptian
trade unions who compared the amounts paid rather than the real
value of money.
The working of these provisions of the Act was suspended in 1 973,
partly because of the above shortcomings, but also to provide
indirect subsidies to firms suffering economic hardship. in June
1976, following a union campaign for change, the government
announced its intention to end the suspension of the provisions
of the Act after reviewing its clauses and amending the method of
distribution.(1) Such action, to the best of my knowledge, has
not yet taken place.
(l) See Al-Ahram (Daily Newspaper of Cairo), Vol. 102, No. 32705
(June 26, 197&), p.1. (in Arabic).
334
Syria
The origins of worker participation in Syria can be traced back
to the Second World War. The change in French policy which was
necessitated by wartime conditions and the preparation for
independence led to a change in management-labour relations;
for instance, a number of joint consultative committees were
formed in the larger firms. These committees, however, were
not very effective and in many cases management tried to use
them as a substitute for trade unions as was the case in Egypt
and Iraq. After the war, most of these committees disappeared
while trade union membership began to spread to firms which had
hitherto refused to recognise trade unions. The development of
semi-constitutional management-labour relations led to union
opposition to management attempts to form joint consultative
committees which the unions felt would compete with union
activities. Y/hen the IPC (Syria), for instance, attempted to
establish joint consultative committees similar to those operating
in Iraq, trade unions opposed their establishment because they
feared these committees would interfere with their authority.(1)
Under the nationalist regimes, participation was instituted by
government legislation. Section III (Chapter 1) of the 1959
Egyptian Labour Code relating to joint consultation was applied
simultaneously in Syria, as were the Worker-Director and Profit-
Sharing Acts of 1961. Later on, changes were introduced which
aimed to enhance the workers' position by ensuring direct union
(i) See Badre, A.Y. and Siksek, S.G., op. cit.. p.186.
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involvement in selecting worker-directors and workers'
representatives on the joint consultative committees.
Influenced by the Yugoslav experiment, a worker
co-management scheme was introduced in 19^4, but this met
with difficulties and its application was suspended in 1967*
(a) Joint Consultation
A statutory joint consultation scheme entirely similar to that
of Egypt was introduced in Syria under the provisions of the
Labour Code 9l/l959» However, as in the case of the other acts,
the different conditions in Syria were ignored and the unions voiced
strong protests against their exclusion from the joint consultative
committees. Once the ABSP took over, the union view prevailed and
the scheme was amended in 19&4* The amendment laid down that
worker representatives were to be chosen by the shop stewards »
committees, possibly, though not necessarily, from among the
shop stewards. This was slightly different from Iraq where
the shop stewards committees chose worker representatives from
among their members. As in Iraq, the new amendment provided for
a rotation of the chairmanship of the committees on a monthly basis
between worker and management representatives. Unlike in Iraq,
it did not stipulate that a worker-director had to be included in
the management team in public enterprises, nor in the case of his
inclusion that he had to be a chairman of the committee.
The joint consultative committees were replaced by the works councils
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in companies covered by the co-management scheme introduced in
1964 but once the application of this scheme was suspended in
1967# the joint consultative committees were reinstated# The
4y
consultative nature of the committees was not affected and their
functions remained similar to those in Egypt. However, while
unions in Egypt had no influence over the committees and management
proved to be the main influence, union influence in Syria forced
management on many occasions to treat the recommendations of the
committees as obligatory although they might not agree wholly or
partly with these recommendations.(1)
(b) Worker-Directors and Co-Management
Law 11A/1961 applied to industrial firms in both regions of the UAR.
However, the separation of Syria from the UAH shortly after the
enactment of the Law resulted in delaying its application, and the
Act was not seriously put into effect until the take-over by the
ABSP in 1963.
As in Egypt, the Worker-Direotor Act HA/1961 required that white
and blue-collar employees be represented on the board of directors
of industrial enterprises in both private and public seotors.
These representatives, one frcoi each group, were to fill two out
of a maximum of seven seats. Ministerial Decree 12/1963, similar
to Egypt, required that elections of worker-directors were to be
(1) Information supplied by Ahmed Samman, Secretary of Damascus
Chamber cf Industry.
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by secret ballot and those persons elected were to serve for a
one-year term.(l) Because the Act was ambiguous about the
right of union officials to stand for board membership, the
GFTUS criticised and campaigned for amending it to this
effect.(2) However, the Syrian trade unions were in a stronger
position vis-a-vis management than their Egyptian counterparts,
and thus were able, on many occasions, to force management to
interpret this ambiguity in the Worker-Director Act in favour of
union officials.(3)
In pursuance of its socialist policy, the ABSP government did not
confine its measures to expanding nationalisation but also sought
to ensure worker participation in the process of decision-making
in undertakings. Influenced mainly by the Yugoslav experience,
the government introduced on April 16, 1964, Legislative Decree
55/1964 which defined and provided for co-management schemes in
the public manufacturing sector.
Under a co-management scheme, the management of the undertaking
was to be the responsibility of a board of directors whose term
of office would be of two years. The board was to consist of
seven members representing the workers, the government, the trade
(1) For full text of this Decree, see Syrian Arab Republic
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour), Labour Guide, pp.105-107.
(2) See General Federation of Trade Unions, Syria, Report Presented
to the Eleventh Congress, p.80 and 84.
(3) See Haseeb, K.A., op. cit.. p.158.
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union and the ABSP. The government was to have one representative
who would chair the board and be managing director of the
undertaking. He was also authorised to veto decisions taken by
a majority vote and present them to the State Organisation for the
Socialist Industrial Sector for finalisation.(1) Each of the trade
unions concerned and the ABSP were to have one representative who
would be chosen by their respective leaderships. The rest of the
members would be chosen by the shop stewards committee from among
the workers. The Legislative Decree did not stipulate whether
shop stewards (being workers) were entitled to join the board or
not. It also did not provide any arrangement for the selection
of workers' representatives in multi-plant companies which had more
than one shop stewards committee. This created considerable
difficulties arising from different interpretation of the law.
To solve the problem, central union officials were eventually
forced to step in and take over the responsibility of choosing
worker representatives from the shop stewards.
In addition, the Legislative Decree laid down provisions for the
formation of workers' councils in each of the plant of these firms.
Members of these councils were to be chosen by the shop stewards
committees on the basis of one representative from each section,
and the counoils were to replace the joint consultative committees.
Although influenced by the Yugoslav experience, the Syrian
co-management scheme gave the decision-making power to the board
(1) This organisation was responsible for the overall management
of the nationalised firms.
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of directors and not to the workers' councils, so that the scheme,
in reality, was more like a worker-director one than a
co-management scheme. In Yugoslavia, the workers' councils
(which were exclusively elected by workers) together with the
communal representatives made the main decisions for the firm.
The workers' councils elected the director-general and entrusted
the board with the responsibility for implementing the council's
policy, (l) The Yugoslav director-general was responsible to the
council for the implementation of its decisions, although he was
entitled to veto them. His veto, however, could be appealed
against by the council to the people's committee of the
municipality.
The Syrian experience with co-management was very limited and
subjected to considerable state intervention. Only 30% of the
net profit was to be retained by the enterprise: I+Cf/o was to be
distributed to workers (25% in cash and 1^ in the form of social
services) and 30% was to be used by the state for general
industrialisation. This allocation of profits created jealousy
between workers in firms covered by the experiment and other
workers. It also resulted in financial difficulties in the firms
covered by the co-management schemes. These problems eventually
led to the suspension of the Legislative Decree 55/136k and to a
return to the original worker-director scheme. However, in the
light of this experience and in order to satisfy the GFTUS which
(l) See Kolaja, J., Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience.
(Tavistock Publications, London, 1965), p.6.
had criticised the ambiguity of the Worker-Director Act llij/1%1
with regard to the right of union officials to stand for Board
membership, the Worker-Director Act was amended to increase the
number of worker-directors to four out of a maximum of nine
members, and to make their selection a prerogative of the &FTUS,
thus further enhancing the Feceration's central authority.
(c) Profit-Sharing
As with the Worker-Director Act, Law 111/1961 on profit-sharing
was applied simultaneously to both regions of the UAR. As in
Egypt, the Act, which covered all nationalised firns, gave
individual employees a 2$% share of their company profit. This
was to be distributed as follows: 10/» in cash to the workers but
the maximum amount paid to an individual worker was not to exceed
£S500 ($65) per annum, 10^ for central and regional services,
and 5% for housing and social benefits to be distributed as agreed
by the company board and the shop stewards committee. The
application of the Act met with difficulties in Syria beoause of
the frequent political changes ocouring in Syria, The unions
voiced accusations as to the way in which the 10^ allocated for
central social services was spent, and they also accused the
companies of manipulating the Act by including business expenses
such as protective clothing in the 5% allocated for company
services.(l) Originally, the law was to apply only to the
(1) Information supplied by the GFTUS.
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companies which were nationalised in 1961, hut later in 1964 it
was expanded to cover all public sector enterprises. The law
created dissatisfaction and jealousy among workers in the private
sector, and to counteract this, private sector workers were awarded
higher financial incentives in the forms of feast and new year
allowances. This meant that the cash proportion of the profit-
sharing scheme lost its effectiveness as a motive for higher
productivity in the public sector because it was a low annual amount.
These difficulties and trade union pressure for a say in the method
of allocating and applying the workers' share in the public sector
enterprises, led to the amendment of the Profit-Sharing Act
111/1961(1) in 1968. The 1 968 amendment (Legislative Decree 20/1968)
expanded the application of the Act to all firms employing 50 or
more workers in both private and public sectors. As in Iraq,
direct cash payments to workers were stopped, but while in Iraq
the total amount of 25/ was distributed among different activities,
in Syria the whole workers' share of 25% was allocated to the social
security fund to be strictly applied to workers' welfare. Although
the workers no longer receive cash profits, the unions seem to
feel that the present practice is more satisfactory because:(2)
(1) Hie scope of the Profit-Sharing Act 111/1961 was expanded in
1964 to apply to all public sector firms (Presidential Decree
7/1964), but the Act itself was not amended in detail until 1968
(Legislative Decree 20/1968). For full details of the Legislative
Decree 20/1968, see Syrian Arab Bepublic (Ministry of Social
Affairs and Labour), op. pit., pp.100-102.
(2) See Al-Ishtiraki (The Socialist), (Organ of the &FTUS), No. 422
(January 10, 1972), p.4.
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(1) they believe that it avoids problems resulting from variations
in the amounts of profits distributed by different companies, and
(2) because it ensures that all workers benefit from the profits
of the different companies irrespective of the amount of the share
of their company, even if the latter was in loss.
It seems to me that the changes in the original Profit-Sharing
Acts in both Iraq and Syria and the suspension of the application
of the Profit-Sharing Act in Egypt, suggest that the original Act
of 1961 (and that of 1964 in Iraq which was largely based on the
Egyptian Act) failed to consider the social and economic factors
which determine worker behaviour and their attitudes to work and
management. This does not mean that the profit sharing schemes
were not successful; it means that the method of distribution
provided by the above two Acts proved contentious.
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Comparison of the Development of Worker Participation Schemes In
the Three Countries
Under the foreign administrations, when the trade union movement
was very weak, in both Iraq and Egypt no form of worker participation
existed, and e ap loye rs'role in establishing industrial relations
rules was dominant. In Syria, where the French Mandate continued
until the end of the Second World War, the political and economic
conditions had brought about scane changes in management-labour-state
relations. Thus some form of joint consultation was introduced at
company level during the War period. However, management controlled
the activities of the joint consultative committees and the latter
disappeared once the War was over.
Under the traditional system, in Iraq, although there was no change
in state-labour-management relations, a form of joint consultation
was introduced by the IPC, and some other large firms followed this
example. The schemes were controlled by management and were
conceived as a substitute for trade unionism. These schemes were
ineffective because they were opposed by the unions and did not
appear to attract workers. In Syria, where trade unionism was
growing and semi-constitutional management labour relations had
developed, unions were able to resist attempts by some employers to
form management-sponsored joint committees for fear that such
committees might interfere with union authority. In Egypt, trade
unions were concerned with putting pressure on employers to grant
their statutory right to recognition and to engage in collective
negotiations rather than with any other form of participation.
Thus, schemes of joint consultation were only introduced under the
nationalist system when employers were forced by the political
changes to seek peaceful relations with labour.
The nationalist systems introduced and expanded various statutory
forms of worker participation in each of the three countries.
These schemes aimed to put into effect the notion of worker-state-
management partnership in the process of industrialisation and
economic development. Whether this objective was satisfactorily
achieved or not, the participation schemes indirectly enhanced
the position of labour in the three countries, and particularly
the position of trade unions in Iraq and Syria.
Under the nationalist systems in the three countries, the schemes
of worker participation which were introduced included joint
consultation, worker-directors and profit-sharing. In addition,
there was a short-lived co-management scheme in Syria.
Under the nationalist system, somewhat different schemes of
JOINT CONSULTATION were introduced in the three countries, although
the principle of equal worker-management representation was strictly
adhered to in each of them. In Iraq, the joint consultative
committees have an advisory role, but if any reached unanimous
decisions the two parties were bound to comply with them.
In Egypt, the committee's recommendations have been treated as
merely advisory, while union influence in Syria has often forced
management to implement the recommendations of the committees.
3*25
In Iraq, in the public enterprises one of the worker-directors
must be included in the management team to the committee, and he
permanently presides over the committee. This is not the case
in either Egypt or Syria, though in Syria a worker-director might
be included in the management team. In Syria, chairmanship of
the committees rotates monthly between management and workers*
representatives. This is also the case in the Iraqi private
films. In Egypt, members elect their chairman, but due to his
prestigious position, the general manager (who is included in
the management team) usually gets the post.
In Iraq, if there is a shop stewards committee, it is authorised
to select the worker representatives for the joint consultative
committees from among its members. In all other cases, workers
elect their representatives. In Syria, the shop steward
committees are also authorised to select worker representatives
although not necessarily from among its members. In Egypt.
union officials cannot be elected to the joint committees.
Workers elect their representatives, and the ASU unit plays an
important unofficial role in the process of nomination. The
exclusion of union officials from the committees in Egypt has
created continuous friction between them and the joint committees
on the shop floor.
The original worker-director and profit-sharing schemes had
similar structures in the three countries because they were applied
simultaneously in Syria and Egypt, and because the Iraqi schemes
were strongly influenced by the UAR schemes. Following their
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introduction, some changes were made in each of the three
countries.
The present worker-director scheme in Egypt requires that four
out of nine members on the boards are to be elected by workers
from among them on a bi-annual basis. Jh Iraq, the number is
three, two representing blue-collar and one white-collar workers.
The Iraqi legislation does not lay down a fixed limit for the
term of office of worker-directors but stipulates that it should
be the same as for other board members as specified for each
company by its by-laws. Union office and board membership may
be combined, and blue-collar representatives are appointed by
their unions. In Syria, present legislation lays down that there
should be four worker-directors among the nine members of the board
and that they should be selected by the GFTUS.
In both Iraq and Syria, unions seem satisfied with the working of
the worker-director schemes since they have led to an enhancement
of their role in the process of decision-making in undertakings.
In Egypt. however, there is dissatisfaction among unions because
it is not clear from the legislation whether union officials can
stand for election to the board of directors or not. This limits
the power of trade unions while the ASU units control the nomination
to the board unofficially. The unions, therefore, are
campaigning for changes in the law so that they can take part
in the work of the board.
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Syria is unique among the three countries in introducing a scheme
of worker co-management, influenced mainly by the Yugoslav
experiment, and restricted to the nationalised manufacturing firms.
Its structure was, however, somewhat different from that in
Yugoslavia where different political, economic and social
conditions existed. The Syrian experience ran into some
practical and economic difficulties and was suspended in 1967*
The original profit-sharing schemes introduced under the nationalist
regimes in each of the three countries, limited the application of
the scheme and the maximum amount of the profits which was allowed
to be distributed to workers. The original schemes applied only
to nationalised firms; workers were to receive a 2$}o share of the
net profit of their firms, but only 10/o of the net profit was to
be paid in cash, and the maximum amount allowed to be paid to
individual workers limited to a relatively small amount. 'Hie
application of the law encountered difficulties and proved
ineffective as an inducement to increased productivity. In
consequence, it was eventually suspended in Egypt. and in Syria
the 25f° workers' share was transferred to the Social Security Fund
so as to be strictly used for the purpose of workers' welfare, but
its application was extended to cover all firms employing 50 workers
or more in both private and public sectors. In Iraq a new scheme
was introduced in 1 9*>9» according to which part of the workers'
share v/as to be invested for workers* welfare under the supervision
of a tripartite agency. The other part was to be exclusively used
by unions for a similar purpose. The application of this scheme
was to cover all state-owned firms operating for profit.
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The information relating to the structure of the various schemes
of participation in the three countries is summarised on the
following page.
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Schemes of Worker Participation in Management In Iraq, Egypt and Syria











1. Statutory joint consultative
committees originally introduced
in 1958 and revised in 1970,
2. Equal representation of
management and workers.
3. Workers representatives are
chosen by and from shop stewards.
In. plants which have no shop
stewards they are elected by
workers. Management team is
chosen by employer, but in public
enterprises should include one
of the worker directors.
1). Chairmanship of the committees
rotates in private firms. It is
given permanently to worker-
directors in public firms.
5. The committees have an
advisory role, but if they reach
unanimous decisions the two
parties are bound to comply
with them.
6. Unions and employers seem
satisfied.
1. Statutory joint consultative
committees introduced in 1959-
2. Equal representation of
management and workers.
3. Worker representatives are
elected by workers. Union
officials cannot stand for
election. Management team is
chosen by employers.
1+. Tho chairmanship of the
committees is by election.
Because of his prestigious
position the general manager
is often elected for the post.
5. The committees have only
an advisory role.
6. The ASU plays an unofficial role
in the nomination of workers
representatives.
7. The committees are in conti-
nous conflict with shop stewards.
1. Statutory joint consultative
committees originally introduced
on the Egyptian pattern in 1959,
but then revised in 1961+.
2. Equal representation of
management and workers.
3. Workers representatives are
chosen by shop stewards but not
necessarily from among them.
Management team is chosen by
employers.
1). Chairmanship of the commi¬
ttees rotates.
5. The committees have only an
advisory role, but union inf¬
luence has often forced
management to implement the
committees' recommendations.




1. Statutory scheme originally
introduced on the Egyptian
pattern in 1961). The scheme was
revised in 1970 and 1971.
2. Two blue-collar workers chosen
by their union. In private
firms another white-collar
worker elected by workers.
3. Term of office determined by
company by-laws.
1+. Possible to combine union-
office and board membership.
5. Unions and employers seem
satisfied with the present
arrangement.
1. Statutory scheme introduced
in 1961 and revised in 1963.
2. Four worker-directors out of
a maximum nine elected by workers.
3. Two-year term.
1+. It is not clear whether a
board member can hold union
office.
5. The ASU plays an unofficial
role in the nomination and
this has caused noticeable
dissatisfaction.
1. Statutory scheme introduced
on the Egyptian pattern in 1961,
and revised in 1967.
2. Four worker-directors out of a
maximum nine chosen by the GFTUS.
3. Two-year term.
1+. Possible to combine union
office and board membership.
5. The two parties seem satis¬
fied, particularly unions.
6. A worker co-management scheme
introduced on the Yugoslav
pattern in 1961), but suspended in




1. Statutory scheme originally
introduced on the Egyptian
pattern in 1961), and revised
in 1969.
2. Currently 25% of net profit
is distributed to GFTUI and
tripartite agencies to be used
for worker velfare.
3. Because it is represented
on tho boards of the tripartite
agencies, the GFTUI seems sati¬
sfied with the present scheme.
1. Statutory scheme introduced
in 1961.
2. Currently 25% of net profit
distributed to workers, 10% in
cash (annual maximum limit of
£E5o) and 15% for social
services.
3. Suspended since 1967 because
of economic and practical
difficulties.
1. Statutory scheme introduced on
the Egyptian pattern in 1961, and
revised in 1968.
2. Currently 25% of net profit, is
allocated to social security fund
for worker welfare.
3. Unions seem satisfied with the
present scheme because it ensures
that all workers benefit from the
scheme irrespective of the
profitability of their firms.
CHAPTER 8
POSTSCRIPT AHH CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has attempted to investigate and compare the develop¬
ment of industrial relations in Iraq., Egypt and Syria. The )
evidence suggests that the development of industrial relations in
the three countries has been the product of the political changes
and of the socio-economic environments. —
Chapters 1 to 7 of this thesis ive described different aspects
of the development of industrial relations in Iraq, Egypt and
Syria in the course of three successive historical periods,
namely those of the foreign administrations, the traditional
systems and the nationalist systems. The impact of the changes
in the political systems and in the economic and social conditions
has been traced within this historical framework. The develop¬
ments which have been described, in turn for each country, have
been evaluated and compared in a comparison section at the end
of each chapter, and the final page of these comparison sections
has presented a summarising overview. Since it would be a
z-epetition to go over this ground again in the concluding
chapter, no further summary of the chapter evidence is presented
here.
It would seem more appropriate and rewarding to relate the
evidence in this thesis to one study which was ambitious enough
to try to explain industrial relations developments within an
analytical framework, namely to the study conducted in 1960 by
Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers.(1) Their approach was based
(1) See Kerr, C., Dunlop, J.T., Harbison, P.H., and Ityers, C.A.,
Industrialism and Industrial Ilan; the problems of labour and
management in economic growth, (Heinemann. London. 1962). ""
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on Dunlop's framework for analysing industrial relations
practices, according to which the industrial relations system,
like economic and political systems, is viewed as a sub-system
of the social system.(l) Dunlop had argued that this system
was "comprised of certain actors, certain contexts, an ideology
which binds the industrial relations system together, and a body
of rules created to govern the actors at the work place and work
community".(2) Kerr, et al., in identifying the "actors",
postulated that there were five ideal types of elite "who
customarily and variously take the leadership of the
industrialisation process".(3) These are: the dynastic elite,
the middle-class elite, the revolutionary intellectuals, the
colonial administrators and the nationalist leaders.
As regards Iraq, Egypt and Syria, it seems to me, Kerr, et al.'s
theory fails to recognise the existence of the type of traditional
system which is found under semi-feudal semi-capitalist regimes.
Neither the dynastic elite nor the middle-class elite which the
authors postulated exist were found to play a role in the J
traditional systems of the three countries. Kerr, et al.
suggested that the dynastic elite would approach industrialisation
vigorously for military purposes, and gave as examples pre-V/ar
Japan and Bismarck's Germany. The existing evidence shows that
under the traditional systems of Iraq and Egypt a policy of
(1) Dunlop, J.T., Industrial Relations Systems. (Holt, New York, 1958).
(2) Ibid., p.7.
(3) Kerr, Gs, et al.. op. cit.. p.50»
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industrialisation for military purposes was never thought of.
The authors further suggested that, in a society led by a
dynastic elite, the state sets the general rules of the work
community while the rules related to the work place are
established unilaterally by management. This might seem
applicable to the Iraqi situation under the traditional system
but, in Egypt, the state was not involved in rule-making except
during the last few years of this period. Egyptian employers
were influential enough to resist government involvement in
making rules which could adversely affect their authority in
dealing with labour, and applied only their own work place rules.
Kerr, et al., held that under a dynastio elite management
generally adopts a paternalistic approach in dealing with
workers and that industrial oonflict is looked upon as inconsistent
with such a paternalistic view. During the early stages of the
traditional rule, this may have been true of Iraq and Egypt.
Later under the traditional regime the emergence of large firms
in Iraq and Egypt led to the decline of paternalism and to the
adoption of rather impersonal approaches by employers in dealing
with labour relations. In Iraq in particular the emerging
industrial elite worked together with trade unions and sympathised
with strikes which were directed against the government and
foreign employers. Even in Egypt, although employers generally
maintained their authority in rule-making, and although a few of
them occasionally called upon the police to suppress strikes-
some large firms, especially the foreign concerns, developed a
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professional approach in dealing with labour and accordingly,
introduced joint consultation schemes and occasionally concluded
collective agreements with unions. This suggests that a mixture
of paternalism and professionalism was adopted by the management
in dealing with labour under the traditional system in Iraq and
Egypt while the state followed a policy of little intervention
and later of gradual intervention in Egypt, and complete
intervention in Iraq. The evidenoe collected here thus presents
quite a different picture from that of complete paternalism
postulated as existing under a dynastic elite by Kerr, et el.
The middle-class elite, according to Kerr, et al., was supposed
to approach management-labour relations constitutionally: work
place rules were postulated as being established jointly by
management and workers, and a framework of procedural rules as
being established by government with the participation of trade
unions and management, in a way similar to that used by
industrialised nations. Hie nearest approximation to this type
of model was found under the traditional system in Syria, but it
was only a semi-constitutional approach as the dominance of
employers in the establishment of rules was maintained.
Kerr, et al. distinguished three types of colonial administration:
one of these they called "segmental colonialism". In my view,
this kind of colonialism did exist in the three countries,
particularly Egypt and Syria where foreign rule continued for
relatively long periods. The authors held that the economic
policy of this type of colonial administration would result in the
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development of one or a few sectors of the economy such as
agriculture and transportation. However there was, as I have
shown, an inconsistency in the economic policies of the foreign
administrations, particularly in the case of Syria where the
French authority was forced by wartime conditions and by
internal political pressures to change its economic policy
and to encourage the establishment of some manufacturing industries.
Kerr, et al. would not appear to have been aware of these
developments.
As regards their "nationalist leaders' model", Kerr, et al.
considered that Nasser's Egypt provided an example, when, in the
march towards industrialisation, Nasser declared: "We shall march
as one people".(1) In mobilising "people" for the aim of
industrialisation, Nasser adopted a policy of integrating unions
and managers in the state-controlled sole political organisation,
the ASD. Because of the differences in the political conditions
in Iraq and Syria (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis)
the mobilisation of these groups required co-operation and loyalty
but not necessarily political integration. Such differences in
the nationalist situations were not dealt with in Kerr et al.'s
study.
The authors state that "there is no single ready-made ideology for
the nationalist conduct of an economy. Consequently, the
(1) Quoted in Kerr, C., Dunlop, J.T., Harbison, F.H., and Myers, C.A.,
"Industrialism and Industrial Man", International Labour Review.
Vol. 82, No. 3 (September i960), p.241.
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nationalist approach tends to be a wavering one following an
unsteady coursed (l) This conclusion was once more put forward
by the authors in a recent re-examination of their findings in
which they state that some of the countries led by nationalist
elites are at times "moving in the direction of the communist
elites. Other countries are characterised by a growing
middle-class private industrial sector or by elements of the
dynastic elite".(2) The present Egyptian regime's tendency
to move towards economic liberalism and revival of the private
industrial sector seems to suggest that there is a move towards
some of the characteristics of Kerr, et al.'s "middle-class
model". These changes, however, are pursued slowly and
cautiously by the Egyptian government. It seems that there
has been no clear intention to depart from the present policy
of subordinating management-labour relations to the broader
objectives of continued modernisation and economic development
under state control. Kerr, et al., in their recent
re-examination, repeated their earlier claims,(3) without being
aware of the existence of the traditional systems and of some
of the differences in the approaches used by different
nationalist systems. One explanation may be that their study
(1) Kerr, C., et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man;
The Problems of Labour and Management in Economic Growth, p.49.
(2) Kerr, C., Dunlop, J.T., Harbison, F.H., and Myers, C.A.,
"Postscript to Industrialism and Industrial Man", International
Labour Review. Vol. 103, No. 6 (June 1971)> p.528.
(3) Ibid., pp.51 9-521.
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focussed mainly on developed countries and included only a few v
developing countries such as Egypt, India and Ghana. Mother
explanation is that they tried to make generalisations based on
findings for specific countries which do not necessarily share
similar historical and cultural backgrounds.
With regard to the development of industrial relations in Iraq,
Egypt and Syria, the following conclusions may be drawn from
this study.
(1) The development of industrial relations in Iraq, Egypt and '
Syria has been, to a large extent, determined by the political
systems which influenced economic policies, and gave rise to
changes in social conditions, and these changes, in turn, have
affected the practices of industrial relations.
(2) The patterns of development of industrial relations in the
three countries are related to the amount of centralisation of
their institutions which, in turn, reflect the centralised nature
of the political machinery and the relations between the government,
the workers and the managers. Trade unions and employers'
associations in the three countries, therefore, have centralised
structures. These structures are largely inflexible; they are
determined by legislation and not by decisions of the respective
organisations. They correspond with the centralised machinery
of the governmental agencies dealing with labour policies.
Even in cases where there was a regionally-based structure,
such as that of the Syrian chambers of industries, the
Damascus Chamber of Industry eventually has taken over from
other chambers and has dealt directly on their behalf with the
centrally-based trade unions and governmental agencies.
(3) The study suggests that there is a direct relation between
the complexity of the political stricture and that of the
industrial relations stricture. The transformation from
static to differentiated political structures under the foreign
administrations was accompanied by improvements in the hitherto
primitive industrial relations practices, in terms of the
emergence of trade unions and increase in labour activities.
The political structures which developed under the traditional
systems in Iraq and Egypt were based on the support of landowners
(and businessmen in the case of Egypt). These groups used their
influence to minimise the application of the labour laws, restrict
trade union activities and encourage severe repressive measures
against worker protest.
As the political structure under the traditional system in Syria
was based on the support of many interest groups, including v/orkers,
the structure of industrial relations took a different shape from
those of Iraq and Egypt, namely a semi-constitutional approach
to management-labour relations.
The considerable changes in the political structure under the
nationalist systems were accompanied by changes in economic
policies, social conditions and industrial relations, Workers
emerged as powerful groups as a result of their participation
in political activities. Their position was further enhanced
as a result of strengthening trade unions and measures of worker
participation in the planning of the national labour policies
and in the implementation of these policies at the regional and
enterprise levels.
(4) The study suggests that the increase in the role of the )
government in economic activities and in industrial relations
practices has improved the institutions of industrial relations.
These improvements are reflected in the development of
tripartite and joint rule-making maohinery, particularly in
Iraq and Egyptj in the decline of politically motivated strikes,
particularly in Iraq and Syria, in the compliance v/ith labour laws
and in the improvement of industrial safety standards, particularly
in Egypt.
(5) Further improvements suggest themselves. The governments
of the three countries, for instance, could strengthen the
industrial relations structures and in particular the positions
of labour and management. The governments could improve industrial
relations through maintaining and strengthening trade unions and
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employers* organisations and through the tripartite agenoies
in whioh government, employers and workers participate in
economio planning and its implementation, and in regulating
management-labour relations whether at national or regional
levels* Such notion seems particularly important in the oase
of Syria where tripartite agencies are at present less important
than in Egypt and Iraq*
An improvement in management-labour relations might also be
aohieved through improving the struoture of governmental agencies
so as to allow greater departmental autonomy. This is particularly
applicable to Syria where the governmental agenoies play a far more
dominant role than those of Iraq and Egypt in determining the
course of industrial relations*
(6) The governments could also keep a better balance between
workers in various seotors and regions* As mentioned in
Chapter 3> unionised workers in the three countries are mainly
concentrated in seotors where the majority of workers are
legally permitted to join trade unions, such as in manufacturing
industries and transportation. The governments, based on their
belief in the oritical role of workers in eoonomio development,
could strengthen the position of workers in other seotors, suoh
as services and commeroe, by extending the right to join trade
unions to cover the majority of employees in these sectors.
Furthermore, the large cities accounted for the majority of
unionised workers. This is largely attributable to the
concentration of employment in these cities, but also to the
emphasis of government educational and training programmes
being put on unions located in these cities. The governments
could expand their educational and training programmes to other
regions and thus strengthen the position of workers there.
(7) The study suggests that trade union leaders could improve
the position of workers through education and training. To do
this they would have to work together with government educational
institutions to ensure that worker training programmes conform
to estimated training needs. This is particularly true in the
case of Egypt where the ASU rather than the EFL is the major
determinant of worker training programmes. Trade unions might
also be able to increase the effectiveness of labour at the
enterprise level through adequate training for participation on
the consultative committees and on the boards of directors.
In Egypt, where union influence in determining worker
participation at company level is uncertain, unions might be
able to take effective measures to prevent deterioration in their
relations with other representative bodies of workers on the
shop-floor. In particular, it would seem desirable that they
should collaborate with worker representatives on the boards and
on the consultative committees, so as to avoid dissension among
various worker bodies and to ensure effective participation by
workers in these two institutions.
(8) Employers in the three countries might be able to improve
their positions by effective use of their existing organisations
and, if possible, might benefit from reforming the present
structures of the organisations to make them more effective.
This is particularly important in Egypt where little use is
made of the FEI by employers. It is also important in the
Syrian private sector where the role of the chambers of
industries in representing private employers has diminished.
The management of public enterprises could be made into a more
influential instrument for the governments in improving management-
labour relations at company level if they were to adopt more
positive attitudes towards labour, by fully implementing all
aspects of labour regulations and by making effective use of
participation schemes and labour welfare programmes.
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